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JAINA ONTOLOGY

By

Dr. K. K. Dixit, M. A., Ph. D.
Research Officer, L. D. Institute of Indology
AHMEDABAD-9

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FOREWORD

I am very happy to place before scholars 'Jaina Ontology' by Dr. K. K. Dixit. The work clearly and lucidly traces the development of Jaina concepts and views pertaining to not only ontology but epistemology also. Though the title of the work is 'Jaina Ontology', it occasionally deals with Jaina Epistemology as well because both are intimately related, and the treatment of one necessitates the treatment of the other too. Dr. Dixit has taken into account the works of both the sects, Śvetāmbara and Digambara while tracing the history of various concepts. This is, thus, the first English work of its kind. It covers the period of time beginning with the old Āgamic texts like Bhagavatīsūtra (5th-2nd centuries B. C.) and ending with Up. Yaśovijaya (17th-18th centuries A. D.). In the course of his discussion the author takes important Śvetāmbara and Digambara texts one by one in their chronological order, analyses their contents and pinpoints their special features, methodological as well as doctrinal He never loses the historical perspective. This work is really a good history of Jaina thought. I congratulate Dr. Dixit on his masterly analytical study of the history of Jaina thought.

I hope that this publication will be of very great value for the students of Indian culture, in general, and of Jainology, in particular.

L. D. Institute of Indology
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Dalsukh Malvania
Director

PREFACE

The following essay is devoted to a historical treatment of the Jaina speculations pertaining to the field of ontology. And what has been achieved does not deserve to be called anything more than an outline. For the topic as such is truly stupendous. Certainly the Jainas have a very old tradition of treating philosophical problems, preserved in a large number of texts — more or less important and more or less early — composed in Prakrit or Sanskrit. And the additional stumbling block in this connection is the unfortunate fact that the texts called Āgamas which the present-day Śvetāmbaras regard as most authoritative are dismissed as spurious by the present-day Digambaras. The truth seems to lie somewhere in between these two versions of the case. For these texts contain some of the oldest pieces of doctrinal discussions undertaken by the Jaina theoreticians and yet they are more or less replete with more or less late interpolations. Under such circumstances the task of a scientific research work is to separate out the material that is genuinely old from that which is not so. And here lies the rub. For barring insignificant exceptions the Āgamic texts as they now stand are composed in a language that is almost uniformly the same and this means that it is next to impossible to determine on the basis of linguistic peculiarities, the antiquity or otherwise of this or that from among them (and hence of the doctrines formulated therein). So, what remains to be done is to study the antiquity or otherwise of the concerned doctrines themselves (and thence of the texts formulating these doctrines). In the present study it is this method that has been chiefly employed while tracing the historical evolution of the Jaina notions related to ontology. But this method has its own difficulties and possible pitfalls. For one thing, one applying this method must have an adequate acquaintance with the content of the standard form of the doctrine whose historical evolution one is out to delineate; then one must be in a position to convincingly argue out why a particular version of this doctrine ought to be earlier (or later) than another. I am keenly aware of my deficiencies on both these counts, particularly the first which is basic. As a matter of fact, it is precisely this why I have been able to achieve so little inspite of my best efforts. This much about the Āgamic texts. The difficulty remains essentially the same also in the case of non-Āgamic texts — particularly the earlier ones; for here too the relevant chronology is a matter of heavy dispute. My own participation in this dispute has been rather implicit inasmuch as I have simply sought to ascertain as to what position the texts in question occupy vis-a-vis doctrinal evolution. In some cases this has meant taking sides in controversy as to chronological question, in some

cases not. For example, I must concede that Kundakunda came after Umāsvāti, and Samantabhadra not much before Akalaṅka (most probably after Mallavādi) but I need not decide whether Haribhadra or Akalaṅka came first — though it is certain that not much space of time separate the two. In the case of authors coming after Haribhadra and Akalaṅka there is no dispute at least as to the relative chronology and the fact has facilitated my task a lot. For now the reader has only to judge whether I have been able to make a correct assessment of the specific contribution made by this or that from among the authors in question towards the enrichment of the contents of Jaina philosophy. But then these authors wrote in Sanskrit and in the very mature style that was now commonly current among the Brahmins, Buddhists as well as Jainas. And to evaluate a Sanskrit text written in such a style is not after all easy. However, in this connection I have been helped in no small measure by certain Jaina texts on Logic edited and provided with illuminating Hindi introduction, notes, etc. by Pt. Sukhlalji, Pt. Dalsukhbhai Malvania and Pt. Mahendrakumar Shastry. To tell the truth, it is the editions of these texts that have introduced me not only to the world of Jaina philosophy but to the world of Indian philosophy in general. For before coming across them mine was the plight of a 'babe in the woods'. Of course, these teachers of mine are in no way responsible for the mistakes I might have committed in following the meaning of a Sanskrit text or for the interpretations that are my own novelties — may be my oddities. But I owe them graitude for what they have given me. Then let me acknowledge that even in the task of comprehending Āgamic texts I have been much helped by Pt. Dalsukh Malvania's Gujarati version of Sthānāṅga and Samavāyāṅga Sūtras, a version which in fact is a total reworking of these texts from the standpoint of the needs of a modern reader. But here another very solid source of enlightenment has been Walter Schubring's 'Die Lehre der Jainas" which contains a masterly topicwise analysis of the contents of Āgamic texts. Lastly I must mention Frauwallner's two volumes "Geschichte der Indischen Philosophie" whose historical treatment of philosophical systems has been almost a model for me. Frauwallner honestly admits that his chapters on Jaina philosophy are based on no much independent study but that is a different matter — for what has proved so illuminating for me is the way he has traced the historical evolution of the Brahmanical and Buddhist philosophical speculation; (Frauwallner has yet to complete his projected four-volume history of Indian philosophy but his method in all its clarity is there to be met with in the volumes already published).

In order to be able to follow these pages one need not have a very thorough grounding in the Jaina philosophical literature but it will be better if one knows something more than what the chapter on Jainism in a

current text books on Indian philosophy offers. The best thing will be to master the contents of the following five books of which the first three will help one in understanding the part devoted to the age of Āgamas, the last two in understanding that devoted to the Age of Logic

(i) Tattvārthasūtra of Umāsvāti (English translation by Jaini) Chapters I-V and VIII

(ii) The Doctrine of Jainas by Schubring (Translated from German) Chapters III-V

(iii) The Doctrine of Karma in Jaina Philosophy (Translated from German) by Glasenapp

(iv) Syādvādamañjarī of Malliṣeṇa (English translation by Thomas)

(v) Pramāṇamīmāṁsā of Hemacandra (English translation by Mookherji and Tatia)

D. Institute of Indology
Ahmedabad-9
15 th August 1970

K. K. Dixit

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

THE NEED FOR A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE AND STAGES IN THE EVOLUTION OF JAINA PHILOSOPHICAL SPECULATION

Three Attitudes towards the Āgamic Texts :

Forty five texts collection called Āgamas are treated as basic scriptures by a section of the Jaina community—to be precise by the icon-worshipping Śvetāmbaras. On the other hand, the aniconist Śvetāmbaras repudiate the authority of thirteen of these texts while the Digambaras that of the whole lot. These attitudes of these three very important sub-groups of the Jainas towards these very important texts are bound to be taken into consideration by any fair-minded student of Jainism—particularly in case the student also happens to be historically minded. Of course, whether these texts are at all important is itself a matter of dispute but the fact that they are so regarded by a considerable section of the Jainas creates a prima facie case in their favour Let us therefore acquaint ourselves in some details with the text-mass in question and then judge how far the different sub-groups of the Jainas are justified in adopting towards it the attitude they do.

Sub-grouping of the Agamic Texts and the Possible line of their composition :

The forty-five Āgamic texts are sub-divided into six groups as follows :

I	11 Aṅgas	IV	6 Chedasūtras
II	12 Upāṅgas	V	4 Mūlasūtras
III	10 Prakīrṇakas	VI	2 Cūlikāsūtras ;

(the texts are themselves in Prakrit but it is convenient to refer to them by their Sanskrit names and so there is no harm in resorting to Sanskrit rather than Prakrit while giving the general titles of the six groups in question).

The aniconist Śvetāmbaras repudiate the authority of all the ten Prakīrṇakas, two Chedasūtras and one Mūlasūtra ; besides, they give the title Mūlasūtra to two of the remaining Mūlasūtras and to the two Cūlikāsūtras while making one remaining Mūlasūtra constitute a separate group. Thus according to them the thirty two Āgamic texts are sub-divided into five groups as follows :

I	11 Aṅgas	IV	4 Mūlasūtras
II	12 Upāṅgas	V	1 Āvaśyakasūtra
III	4 Chedasūtras		

However, the tradition of naming the forty five texts in question (or, for that matter, the thirty two texts in question) as *the* Āgamic texts and sub-dividing them in the above manner is not much old. What seems to have happened is that sometimes near about the 15th—16th Centuries A.D. (may be still later) the intellectual leadership of the Śvetāmbara Jainas took stock of the mass of scriptural literature available to them, selected from it forty-five texts and sub-divided them in the above manner ; not much after. wards the aniconists among them thought fit to repudiate the authority of thirteen of these texts and to introduce a slight change in the original scheme of subdivision. As can be legitimately surmised the aniconists must have rejected those texts which to them appeared to support iconolatory, but from the point of view of the evolution of Jaina thought the texts rejected by them deserve as serious notice as those accepted by them. [The point remains essentially valid even if the texts in question were rejected on some other ground. For, this ground is not likely to be much weighty.] Of course, the texts rejected by them are not as important as those accepted by them, for they have taken good care to repudiate only such texts as are not of basic importance. But that is not the point. What is to be noted is that we here have before our eyes a case of dismissing historically important texts on rather flimsy grounds and the fact provides a clue to the understanding of the earlier Digambara repudiation of the whole lot of Āgamic literature. For it is a legitimate surmise that sometimes near about the 6th —7th Century A.D. (may be still later) the Digambara repudiated the authority of the Āgamic texts available to them on the alleged ground that most of them contained something or else that went against such beliefs of theirs as that a true monk must go stark naked, that a woman cannot attain *mokṣa*, that an omniscient person takes no meals, and so on and so forth. This however is not to deny that even from the point of view of evolution of Jaina thought the forty-five Āgamic texts constitute a mixed lot—for they include on the one hand texts like Catuḥśaraṇa and Bhaktaparijñā which were composed by an author blonging to the 11th Century A.D. and on the other hand texts like Ācārāṅgasūtra-prathamaśrutaskandha, Sūtrakṛtāṅgasūtra-prathamaśrutaskandha and early portions of Bhagavatīsūtra which are all of a genuinely hoary antiquity. But that again is not the point. For what is to be noted is that in overwhelming majority of cases the material here included belongs to a date earlier than the 6th—7th Centuries A.D. while in certain very important cases it belongs to the pre-Christian Centuries. Hence for reconstructing the history of Jaina thought for the pre-Christian Centuries the only documentary material now at our disposal are Āgamic texts belonging to this period while for doing the same for the early Christian Centuries the Āgamic texts belonging to the period constitute an important part of our documentary material—the other part being costituted by a number of non-Āgamic Śvetāmbara texts and by a few Digambara

texts. Now it may be asked as to what difference it makes to a student of Jainism if he bases himself on a text belonging to this period rather than on one belonging to that. The idea is that Jaina thought has remained what it is since times immemorial and down to our own days, a thoroughly misconceived idea indeed. For Jaina thought, like all living organism, has, in the course of its growth, assimilated ever new material and discarded the waste. In view of its all-out importance for the historian of Jainism in general and for that of Jaina philosophy in particular the matter deserves a deeper probe.

Subject-matter of the Āgamic Texts and the philosophically important among them :

Both Śvetāmbara and Digambara maintain that twelve Aṅgas—viz. Ācārāṅgasūtra, Sūtrakṛtāṅgasūtra etc.—are their earliest and the most basic scriptural texts but even Śvetāmbaras concede that one of them—viz. Dṛṣṭivāda – has been lost (i. e. faded out of memory) long ago ; (hence it is that above two catalogues of Āgamic texts mention eleven rather than twelve Aṅgas). And even if there has been no unanimity about the number, names and classification of the remaining scriptural texts a common belief has been current that there are at least a few such ones and that they are to be called *Angabāhya* (or *Anangapraviṣṭa*) scriptural texts ; (Umāsvāti even uses the word *Upāṅga* where *Angabāhya* is to be expected). As for the final Śvetāmbara classification of the Aṅgabāhya scriptural texts into Upāṅgas, Prakīrṇakas, Chedasūtras, Mūlasūtras and Cūlikāsūtras it has some justification of its own For the six Chedasūtras are texts devoted to the problems of monastic discipline, the four Mūlasūtras texts meant to educate and edify the beginner, the two Culikāsūtras texts laying down in an elementary form the fundamentals of Jaina philosophy ; (Āvaśyakasūtra included among the Mūlasūtras is in fact a class by itself inasmuch as it is a collection of six recitation-formulas that accompany a Jaina's daily religious service). Similarly, the twelve Upāṅgas are miscellaneous texts of relatively major importance while the ten Prakrīṇakas are miscellaneous texts of relatively minor importance. From the point of view of chronology the oldest of all are four Chedasūtras—viz. Daśāśruta, Kalpa, Vyavahāra, Niśītha—and three Mūlasūtras—viz. Āvaśyakasūtra, Daśavaikālikasūtra and Uttarādhyayana while two Chedasūtras – the Mahāniśītha and Jītakalpa, one Mūlasūtra—viz. Piṇḍaniryukti and two Cūlikāsūtras – viz. Anuyogadvāra and Nandī—are more or less recent. Similarly, the twelve Upāṅgas are relatively old while ten Prakīrṇakas are more or less recent. This means that the 34 Angabāhya scriptural texts are to be studied from the point of view of subject-matter, chronology as well as importance, that is to say, they are not to be studied from the point of view of subject-matter alone—as might be suggested by their current sub-division into six groups. [There has also been a custom to see a one-

by-one correspondence between the eleven Aṅgas and twelve Upāṅgas but for this there is no justification whatsoever]. Even then, the question of subject-matter has to be pursued still further. The Prakīrṇakas and the Mūlasūtras (minus Āvaśyaka) are mostly of the nature of so many collections of ethical exhortations but there are exceptions ; for example, Tandulavaicārika deals with the problems of physiology, Gaṇividyā with those of astrology, while four chapters of Uttarādhyayana (viz. 28, 33, 34, 36) and one of Daśavaikālika (viz. 4) deal with the problems of philosophy. Of the Upāṅgas five (collectively called Nirayāvalikā) are collections of didactic stories, Sūryaprajñapti and Candraprajñapti (two nominally different but identically worded texts) deal with the problems of astronomy and related mythology, Jambūdvīpaprajñapti with those of cosmogony, mythology and astronomy, Jīvājīvābhigama with those of cosmogony, mythology and philosophy, Prajñāpanā with those of philosophy ; the material collected in Aupapātika and Rājapraśnīya is thoroughly miscellaneous—but the latter text contains an important philosophical dialogue. So to complete the account, let us also have a look at the subject-matter of the eleven Aṅgas. Here again five texts—viz. Jñātṛdharmakathā, Upāsakadaśā, Antakṛddaśā, Anuttaraupapātikadaśā, Vipākaśruta—are collections of didactic stories, while Praśnavyākarana (suspected to be a post 6th Century A.D. work) deals with the problems of ethics. Similarly, Ācārāṅgasūtra and Sūtrakṛtāṅgasūtra are mostly of the nature of two collections of ethical exhortations but the first Adhyayana of the former and occasional passages of the latter come out with philosophical formulas. Lastly, Bhagavatīsūtra on the one hand and Sthānāṅgasūtra and Samavāyāṅgasūtra on the other are meant to be an encyclopedea of Jaina thought—the former in the form of a collection of full-fledged dialogues where Mahāvīra is alleged to be the chief spokesman, the latter in the form of a number-wise cataloguing of all sorts of entities. On the basis of this much information it should be possible for a student of philosophy to pick out Āgamic texts that specially concern him ; they are the relevant portions of five Aṅgas viz. Ācārāṅga, Sūtrakṛtāṅga, Sthānāṅga, Samavāyāṅga and Bhagavatī—, three Upāṅgas viz. Rājapraśnīya Jīvābhigama and Prajñāpanā, two Mūlasūtras viz. Daśavaikālika and Uttarādhyayana, two Cūlikāsūtras viz. Anuyogadvāra and Nandi. But the material contained in these texts requires very careful handling if the results yielded are to be really worthwhile. And in this connection the greatest danger arise from the tendency to read into an earlier text positions that came to be formulated only in later times. The question is important and deserves an independent treatment

Umāsvāti on Mokṣamārga, Samyagdarśana and Saptatattva :

The students of Jaina philosophy are accustomed to form their basic notions about the subject on the basis of a reading of Umāsvāti's Tattvārthādhigamasūtra—particularly because the text happens to enjoy the support

of both the Śvetāmbaras and Digambaras. But the positions maintained in Tattvārthasūtra have a history which should never be lost sight of. Let us consider a few instances. Tattvārthasūtra begins with a declaration to the effect that *samyagdarśana* (right faith), *samyagjñāna* (right knowledge) and *samyakcāritra* (right conduct)—these three factors taken together constitute *mokṣa*. Immediately afterwards, *samyagdarśana* is defined as *tattvārthaśraddhāna* (faith in veritable reals) and in this connection we are told that by *tattva* (verity) are meant seven entities, viz. *jīva* (soul), *ajīva* (not-soul), *āsrava* (karmic ingression), *bandha* (karmic bondage), *saṁvara* (protection against *karma*), *nirjarā* (expulsion of karma), *mokṣa*. The tradition of so positing these questions is not very old. It was an old belief that in order to attain *mokṣa* one must become *vītarāga* (one devoid of passion) and also that a *vītarāga* necessarily becomes *sarvajña* (omniscient); again it was an old belief that truth is what the Jinas (Jaina Masters) have declared it to be. All this contained seed of the doctrine that faith in the teaching of the Jaina Masters, knowledge of this teaching, and conduct in conformity to this teaching must lead to *mokṣa*. But the precise formulation of this doctrine took place in the atmosphere where the Brahmanical philosophers like Sāṅkhyas and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas were arguing that *jñāna* alone leads to *mokṣa* while the Buddhists were countering them by suggesting that *avidyākṣaya* (cessation of nescience) and *tṛṣṇākṣaya* (cessation of worldly desire) together do the same; as if to outdo their Brahmanical and Buddhist rivals the Jainas came out with the position that not *jñāna* alone, not even *jñāna* and *cāritra* together, but *darśana*, *jñāna* and *cāritra* lead to *mokṣa*. Similarly, the seven concepts *jīva*, *ajīva*, *āsrava*, *bandha*, *saṁvara*, *nirjarā* and *mokṣa* were not unknown to the old Jaina theoreticians but the view that the knowledge of these seven is what is a constituent of *Mokṣamārga* was certainly new. The old Jaina theoreticians used to talk in terms of couples like *jīva–ajīva*, *bandha–mokṣa*, *puṇya–pāpa* (virtue–vice), *āsrava–saṁvara*, *vedanā* (karmic experience)–*nirjarā*, and this way they would explain the details of their doctrine of karmic bondage and *mokṣa*. But the statement that *āsrava* is the cause of *bandha* while *saṁvara* and *nirjarā* the cause of *mokṣa* was patterned after the Buddhist way of talking in terms of *duḥkha* (misery) and its cause, *duḥkhanirodha* (cessation of misery) and its cause; that is, the Jaina position in question was something like a doctrine of 'five noble truths' fitted against that Buddhist doctrine of 'four noble truths'. And the statement that these five factors together with *jīva* and *ajīva* constitute the seven entities whose knowledge leads to *mokṣa* was patterned after the Nyāyasūtra talk of twelve *prameyas* (knowables) whose knowledge was similarly supposed to lead to *mokṣa*. Certainly, the twelve *prameyas* in question are amalgum of ontological and ethical categories as are Umāsvāti's seven *tattvas*—the significant difference between the two being that latter, unlike the former, are exhaustive. Of course, even the followers of Umāsvāti had to answer the question why his list omitted *puṇya* and *pāpa* and the question was

answered in various ways. But the simple fact is that the doctrine of nine *tattvas*, viz. Umāsvāti's seven *tattvas* plus *puṇya* and *pāpa* did in a relatively less adequate manner precisely the same thing as was done in a relatively more adequate manner by the doctrine of seven *tattvas*. As a matter of fact there was also a less adequate version of the doctrine of *Mokṣamārga*, for there were people who would submit that not *darśana, jñāna and cāritra* alone but they along with *tapa* (penance) constitute *Mokṣamārga*. Both the doctrine of nine *tattvas* and the doctrine of quadruple *Mokṣamārga* are maintained in the Uttarādhyayana chapter 28 which cannot be very old precisely because it broadly shares Umāsvāti's pattern of thinking (and not on these two questions alone). Of course, Umāsvāti was not the originator of his pattern of thinking—though the possibility is not ruled out that the replacement of the doctrine of nine *tattvas* by that of seven was his contribution. What happened is that Umāsvāti belonged to an age in which the Jaina theoreticians were making new experiment in the field of methodology—if not also in that of thought-content. This becomes still more clear when we examine the questions taken up by Umāsvāti after those preliminary ones are disposed of.

Umāsvāti on Anuyogadvāra, Naya, Pramāṇa :

In one aphorism Umāsvāti says that things (e. g. the seven *tattvas*) have to be posited by way *nāma* (name), *sthāpanā* (configuration), *dravya* (formative material) and *bhāva* (essential form), in the second that they have to be understood by means of *pramāṇas* (instruments of valid cognition) and *nayas* (expressions of partial truths), in the third that they have to be understood in terms of *nirdeśa* (reference), *svāmitva* (ownership), *sādhana* (instrument), *adhikaraṇa* (location) *sthiti* (duration) and *vidhāna* (sub-classification), in the fourth that they have to be understood in terms of *sat* (being), *saṅkhyā* (number), *kṣetra* (place), *sparśa* (field of touch), *kāla* (time), *antara* (interval), *bhāva* (mode) and *alpabahutva* (relative numerical strength) ; immediately afterwards he devotes twenty five aphorisms to a treatment of *pramāṇas* and two to that of *nayas*. Through all this Umāsvāti poses three problems with which the Jaina theoreticians of his age were seeking to grapple, viz. the problem of *anuyogadvāras* (points of investigation), the problem of *nayas*, the problem of *pramāṇas*. The problem of *anuyogadvāras* was in essence the problem of formulating a definite series of questions that can be readily made use of in connection with all sorts of investigations. The Jaina theoreticians must have become aware of this problem as a result of their experience in the field of investigating matters, for they must have noted that the questions they posed in connection with one investigation had a tendency to recur in connection with other investigations. Evidences are available to the effect that all the three lists of *anuyogadvāras* drawn up by Umāsvāti were actually in use in his times (the list containing *nāma, sthāpanā, dravya* and *bhāva* was most popular and had even a special name viz. *Nikṣepa* given to it), but what is noteworthy is that none

—not even that of *nikṣepas*—was in use in olden times. Again, the problem of *nayas* was in essence the problem of classifying partial truths and this too was a problem that came to exercise the Jaina mind in Umāsvāti's times. Umāsvāti speaks of seven *nayas* and the contemporary literature is full of references to them, but what is noteworthy is that none was known in olden times. Lastly the problem of *pramāṇas* was the problem of presenting a Jaina counterpart to the lists of *pramāṇas* that were being adduced on one hand by the Brahmanical philosophers like Sāṅkhya, Vaiśeṣika, Naiyāyika, Mīmāṁsaka and on the other by the Buddhists. In this connection Umāsvāti came out with the suggestion that the traditional Jaina list of five *jñānas* (types of valid determinate cognition) was but a list of five *pramāṇas*. This was simply a case of giving a new name to an old thing, but Umāsvāti did something else as well. For making use of a terminology current in the contemporary logician circles—but one unknown to the old Jainas— he maintained that *mati* and *śruta* are the *parokṣa* type of *pramāṇas* while *avadhi*, *manaḥparyāya* and *kevala* are the *pratyakṣa* type. Even more radical departure from the traditional view of the matter was evinced by later Jaina logicians but we are not yet concerned with that ; for just now we are interested in assessing the extent of Umāsvāti's departure from the traditional view. To sum up, the problem of *anuyogadvāras* and the problem of *nayas* were altogether new to the age of Umāsvāti while the problem of *pramāṇas* was new to his age in the form in which he presented it. But there are yet problems which Umāvsāti raises and which are new to his age.

Umāsvāti on Jīva (and Karma) :

The second chapter of Tattvārthasūtra is devoted to an account of soul and much that is said on the subject is old stuff. But the chapter begins with a classification of the qualities of soul made in terms of the technicalities of the karma doctrine and most of these were unknown in olden times. The eighth chapter of Tattvārtha is exclusively devoted to the karma doctrine but in that chapter Umāsvāti does not raise so many complex problems which the karma specialists of his times were raising and which were unknown in olden times. So, in order to estimate the new contributions made in this field by Umāsvāti's age we will have to depend on other works which are certainly there with us. But the early aphorisms of the second chapter of Tattvārthasūtra are clearly indicative of certain new elements introduced in this connection by Umāsvāti's age.

Umāsvāti on Pañcāstikāya, Pudgala, and Satsāmānya :

Lastly let us mention the fifth chapter of Tattvārthasūtra wherein occurs an account of the five *pañcāstikāyas* (basic reals) in general and that of the *ajīvāsti kāyas* (basic reals of the non-soul type) in particular (the *jīvāstikāya* - basic real in the form of soul having been specially treated in the second chapter). This account too on the whole follows traditional lines but towards the end of the chapter

a rather new problem is introduced—viz. the problem of a general definition of the real. This problem was unknown in olden times and was one which specially occurred to the Jainas as a result of watching the Buddhist-vs.-Brahmin duel on the question. Umāsvāti's definition of the real viz. *utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvya-yuktaṁ sat* (the real is possessed of origination, destruction as well as permanence) is extremely famous but let us not forget that an extensive elaboration of the definition came from the Jainas of post-Umāsvāti age and that in Umāsvāti's age itself the idea lying at the basis of this definition was rather new to the Jaina mind.[1]

Periodwise classification of the philosophically important Āgamic texts :

The above way of looking at Umāsvāti's problems would certainly have made little sense had we not at our disposal certain Āgamic texts that are genuinely old. As a matter of fact, it is precisely because these texts exhibit no acquaintance with the specific atmosphere of Umāsvāti's age that they are to be treated as genuinely old. For the criteria of language, style, etc.—so useful elsewhere—are not of much avail in this case. We had earlier enumerated the Āgamic texts which contain portions that are of philosophical importance. Now let it be noted that just two of them viz. Anuyoga and Nandī belong to Umāsvāti's age. This in turn means that the follwing texts contain the oldest Jaina treatment of philosophical problems :

1. Ācārāṅgasūtra
2. Sūtrakṛtāṅgasūtra
3. Sthānāṅgasūtra
4. Samavāyāṅgasūtra
5. Bhagavatīsūtra
6. Rājapraśnīyasūtra
7. Jīvājīvābhigamasūtra
8. Prajñāpanāsūtra
9. Uttarādhyayanasūtra
10. Daśavaikālikasūtra

All these texts include parts that are remotely old and those that are relatively new but only three of them include material that is apporopriate to Umāsvāti's age. For as has already been hinted, the Uttarādhyayana chapter 28 cannot but belong to Umāsvāti's age ; (its other three chapters viz. 33, 34, 36 which too contain philosophical material may well be old). Similarly, Sthānāṅgasūtra and Samavāyāṅgasūtra include material that is much new and that is because of the very nature of these texts. For as has been mentioned, these texts are of the form of a number-wise cataloguing of all sorts of entities. As such they provide the largest scope for interpolations that go undetected and, as a matter of fact, in the body of these texts very late interpolations have actually been made. This definitely proves one thing. The preservation of Āgamic texts was in the hands of persons who were in no position to prevent possible interpolations. It is not difficult to see that the first śrutaskandha of Uttarādhyayana belongs to one age the second to another, the first śrutaskandha of Sūtrakṛtāṅga to one age the second to another, the first twenty śatakas of Bhagavatī to one age the last

twenty one to another. However in each of these cases both the ages in question are old enough—that is, they are older than the age of Umāsvāti. Another fortunate circumstance is that Prajñāpanā, which is one of the two most important texts for our present purpose (the other being Bhagavatī) is almost—though not absolutely—free from interpolations. Thus making a close study of the genuinely old material of Bhagavatī which is concentrated in its first twenty śatakas we can form a clear picture of the oldest stage in the evolution of Jaina philosophical speculation, while making a close study of Prajñāpanā we can form a similar picture of the next stage. As for the remaining texts in question they contain material that can be called either 'pre-Bhagavatī' or 'post-Bhagavatī but pre-Prajñāpanā' or 'post-Prajñāpanā', but in practice it might not be possible for us to draw that much fine distinction. What we can at the most say is that the philosophical parts of Ācārāṅga, Sūtrakṛtāṅga and Daśavaikālika breathe an atmosphere that is appropriate to the relatively old Bhagavatī stage while those of Jīvājīvābhigama, Rājapraśnīya, and Uttarādhyayana (minus that chapter 28) breathe an atmosphere that is appropriate to the relatively new Prjñāpanā stage. But even to say this much is to say something important. For viewing things thus we are enabled to see not only how the old style of philosophising made way for the Tattvārtha style but also how within the old style itself a relatively old sub-style made way for a relatively new sub-style. And for understanding Umāsvāti's age itself Tattvārthasūtra, even if an important document, is not an all-sufficient document. Even supplementing it by the Āgamic texts Anuyogadvāra and Nandī might not suffice ; for in this connection there are two most important texts in the field—one Śvetāmbara, the other Digambara. The Śvetāmbara text is Āvaśyakaniryukti (particularly its Upodghāta part) while the Digambara text is Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama. Thus in what might be called the Age of Āgamās in the history of Jaina philosophy there are to be noted three distinct stages, viz.

I The stage represented by the old parts of Bhagavatī and by the philosophical parts of Ācārāṅga, Sūtrakṛtāṅga and Daśavaikālika.

II The stage represented by Prajñāpanā (plus the new parts of Bhagavatī) and by the philosophical parts of Jīvājīvābhigama, Rājapraśnīya, Uttarādhyayana (minus its chapter 28).

III The stage represented by Tattvārthasūtra (plus the Uttarādhyayana chapter (28)) and by Anuyogadvāra, Nandī, Āvaśyakaniryukti, Ṣaṭkhṇḍāgama.

The Age of Āgamas Contrasted to the Age of Logic :

To the age of Āgamas is to be contrasted what might be called the Age of Logic. Its most distinctive feature is the relatively free use of logical faculties while dealing with philosophical problems. In the Śvetāmbara

camp the first spokesman of the tendency of this age is Siddhasena (whose treatment of problems is semi-Āgamic); the second Mallavādi (whose treatment of problems is purely logical); likewise, in the Digambara camp the first spokesman of the tendency of this age is Kundakunda (whose treatment of problems is semi-Āgamic), the second Samantabhadra (whose treatment of problems is purely logical). A comparative study of Siddhasena and Mallavādī on one hand and Kundakunda and Samantabhadra on the other will convince any one that the former couple has a much grasp of problems than the latter; (moreover, the former couple receives powerful reinforcement from Jinabhadra who came after Mallavādī but was a Semi-Āgamic author like Siddhasena). But in the case of the authors that follow them the roles are just reversed—that is to say, in the case of those later authors it is the Digambaras who evince a deeper grasp of problems. Thus in the Svetāmbara camp Mallavādī (along with Siṁhasūri whose commentary on Mallavādī's Nayacakra is our only means for getting at this text) is followed first by Haribhadra and then by a long lull, while in the Digambara camp Samantabhadra is followed by a galaxy of great names like Akalaṅka, Vidyānanda, Prabhācandra. By the time of Prabhācandra the old situation returns back, for he is the last great author belonging to the Digambara camp while the Śvetāmbara camp yet produces three giants, viz. Abhayadeva, the author of Sanmatitarkaṭīkā, Vādideva, the author of Syādvādaratnākara and Yaśovijaya the last and the most acute of Jaina philosophers. Yaśovijaya belonged to the 18th Century and after him begins the modern age whose problems are all its own. In the Age of Logic itself some sort of Āgamic activity also continued—in both the Śvetāmbara and Digambara camps. Thus in the Śvatāmbra camp authors like Śīlāṅka, Abhayadeva and Malayagiri wrote Sanskrit commentaries on Agamic texts while those like Śivaśarmasūri and Candrarṣi wrote works on Karma-doctrine; similarly, in the Digambara camp Yativṛṣabha wrote in Prakrit a commentary on Kaṣāyaprābhṛta (a minor Karma text of Umāsvāti's age) while Vīrasena wrote in Prakrit occasionally mixed with Sanskrit a commentary on Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama and one on Kaṣāyaprābhṛta. But let us for the moment ignore Āgamic activity of the Age of Logic and concentrate our attention on what undoubtedly is specific activity of this age.

Chief Activities of the Age of Logic :

The chief endeavour of the authors of the Age of Logic was to demonstrate the validity of Anekāntavāda, and in this connection they whould examine and find fault with the rival views of the Brahmanical philosophers like Sāṅkhya, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṁsaka, Vedāntī on the one hand and the Buddhist philosophers like Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Vijñānavādī, Śūnyavādī on the other. The three distinct phases of this type of activity are found culminated in the writings of Mallavādī (belonging to the 5th century A.D.),

Vidyānanda (belonging to the 8th-9th century A·D.) and Yaśovijaya (belonging to the 18 th century A.D.). These three authors deserve special mention not only because they belong to three distinct periods of time but also because their grasp of respective contemporary systems of Indian philosophy was most thorough possible for a Jaina. Another field in which the authors of the Age of Logic specialised was that of logic and epistemology. But in this field the real beginning was made by Akalaṅka who came out with a list of *pramāṇas* that was a good match for those of his Buddhist and various Brahmanical rivals. Akalaṅka's list of *pramāṇas* had no Āgamic sanction behind it (though he tried to show that it had) but such was the need of the hour that not only the subsequent Digambara authors but also the subsqeuent Śvetāmbara ones accepted it without reservation (of course, the latter after some amount of initial hesitation).

The Jainas of the Modern Age — i,e. Jainas of the 19th-20th Century A.D. have inherited the rich literary legacy of the Age of Āgamas as well as the Age of Logic. But the task before them is to assimilate it so as to make it serve the needs of this age. And the fair thing that has to be done in this connection is to evaluate the legacy in question by placing it in a correct historical perspective. It is just such an evaluation that is attempted in the following pages.

CHAPTER II

THE AGE OF ĀGAMAS

I ITS GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS AND ITS THREE STAGES

Need for a Historical Approach towards the Āgamic Material:

The earliest age in the history of Jaina philosophical speculation is to be called the Age of Āgamas simply because the Āgamas happen to be the earliest available Jaina texts and because these texts happen to contain portions dealing with philosophical problems. But to work out the characteristic features of the Jaina philosophical speculation of the Age of Āgamas is a somewhat difficult task. Of course, there are people who doubt the very authenticity of the Agamic texts, but even if this doubt is dismissed as essentially groundless there remains the question as to what must have been the precise conditions under which these text came to be composed. And this is not an idle question or a question of secondary importance. For our evalution of the philosophy of the Āgamic texts will vitally depend on our evaluation of the conditions under which these texts came to be composed. The tradition says that the twelve Aṅga texts were composed by the direct disciples of Mahāvīra basing themselves on the teaching of the Master himself and the remaining Āgamic texts were composed by the Jaina teachers belonging to a more or less recent period (in the case of a number of these texts the actual names of the alleged authors being given out). Now even if it is conceded that each of the eleven Aṅga texts now available contains a nucleus that was the work of this or that direct disciple of Mahāvīra it will be too much to concede that the description applies to the entire content of this entire body of texts. As a matter of fact, in the case of the available Aṅga texts just as much as in the case of the non-Aṅga Āgamic texts an independent investigation will have to be made in order to determine as to which part of the material lying before us is relatively old and which one relatively recent. But such an investigation requires that we have at our disposal fairly probable conjecture as to the evolution of Jaina doctrines related to the questions considered in the Āgamic texts. And this creates a real difficulty. For the danger is very great that a student constructs for himself something which to him appears to be a fairly probable conjecture as to the evolution of Jaina doctrines but which in fact is far from being so. And this initial mistake will vitiate his whole subsequent endeavour—however diligent and however stupendous. Of course, the remedy for the situation is not in giving up the historical approach—for that will only go to aggravate the malady but in

being serious about the business. Confining ourselves to our specific subject-matter, viz. philosophy let us see how a historical attitude enables us to evaluate the relevant Āgamic texts than would have been the case in the absence of such attitude.

Three Stages chiefly determined on the basis of Stylistic Peculiarities :

Of the Āgamic texts the following contain the largest mass of philosophical discussions :

1. Bhagavatīsūtra (an Aṅga)
2. Prajñāpanāsūtra (an Upāṅga)

3-4. Anuyogadvārasūtra and Nandisūtra (two Cūlikāsūtras) ;

and for all practical purpose the following texts—all full of philosophical discussions—can be treated as Āgamic :

1. Āvaśyakaniryukti
2. Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama
3. Tattvārthasūtra (along with the author's own Bhāṣya).

It is natural to expect that the comparatively older of these texts should be less systematic in their treatment of topics while the comparatively more recent ones should be more so. And since it is the material contained in the Bhagavatī that is least systematic in content as well as arrangement it is legitimate to conclude that it is this material that is chronologically oldest. Bhagavatī is a huge collection of dialogues in which the same type of questions repeat themselves time and again and in many cases there seems to be no apparent reason why a question should be discussed where it has been. From the point of view of their size these dialogues are either brief (the briefest containing just two small sentences) or medium or lengthy (the lengthier containing several pages of the printed text) ; from the point of view of their content some of them contain such assertions as would make just no sense to a later Jaina author, some such as would be formulated differently by him, while some such as would be formulated identically by him. Also noteworthy is the fact that in good many of these dialogues the literary style adopted is lively and polemical rather than dry and dogmatic as was generally the case with later texts (and so often with Bhagavatī itself). All this makes it clear that difficult parts of the material contained in Bhagavatī came from the pen of different authors belonging to different periods of time. However there yet remains the task of arranging this material in a precise chronological order. But in this considerable help should come from Prajñāpanā. For on the whole Prajñāpanā is a collection of systematically formulated views on some 36 selected topics—each considered to be more or less important by the Jaina scholars. And in connection with each topic it will be instructive to

compare the so systematically formulated Prajñāpanā views with the more or less loosely formulated corresponding views lying scattered in the different parts of Bhagavatī. But the utility of Prajñāpanā does not end there. For the Prajñāpanā treatment of topics, even if more systematic and full than the corresponding Bhagavatī treatment, is certainly less systematic and full than what we come across in texts like Tattvārthasūtra, Anuyogadvārasūtra, Nandi, Āvaśyakaniryukti and Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama ; moreover, certain methodological tendencies which are so prominent a feature of these last mentioned texts are conspicuous by their absence in Prajñāpanā, and the conclusion is inevitable that these tendencies are a post-Prajñāpanā growth. Hence Prajñāpanā has to be compared with Tattvārthasūtra, Anuyogadvāra etc. in order to assess the latest stage of the philosophical speculation undertaken in the age of Āgamas—just as it has to be compared with Bhagavatī in order to assess its earliest stage. [As for the philosophical discussions—of comparatively minor importance—contained in the Āgamic texts like Ācārāṅgasūtra, Sūtrakṛtāṅgasūtra, Daśavaikālikasūtra, Uttarādhyayanasūtra, Jīvājīvābhigamasūtra, Rājapraśnīyasūtra, they have to be judged independently, and then it will be found that for some reason or other the discussions of the first three texts belong to the Bhagavatī-stage, those of the last three to the Prajñāpanā-stage (those of one Chapter (28) of Uttarādhyayana to the Tattvārtha-stage.)]

Gradual evolution of the various Anuyogadvāra lists, particularly Mārgaṇāsthānas, Jīvasthānas, Guṇasthānas :

That with the passage of time philosophical speculation becomes more and more systematic is a universal rule, but its application has a special advantage in the case of Jaina Studies. For since the very beginning the Jaina scholars were in the habit of undertaking what might be called an 'aspect-wise consideration' of questions. Thus whenever they posed before themselves a question they also enumerated a definite number of aspects under which the question was to be considered. Gradually they felt that it would be convenient if they had at their disposal several ready-made lists of aspects under which questions were likely to be considered. Several such lists are now well known to the student of Jainism - e.g.the list of 14 *mārgaṇāsthānas*, that of 14 *jīvasthānas*, that of 14 *guṇasthānas*—but what is not so well known is that these lists are the culminating point of a pretty long evolution.[2] For example, the list of 14 *mārgaṇāsthānas* had a predecessor with six additional items while there was a time when this list of 20 items was itself in the process of formation. Thus in Bhagavatī several times these and those items out of the 20 in question were taken up (once as many as fifteen[3]) but at no time was the full list put to use ; the conclusion is inevitable that the full list was yet in the process of formation. Prajñāpanā twice uses the full list of 20 items but each time an additional one, viz.

astikāya has been inserted in between the 19th and 20th ; this insertion is outright anomalous and the anomaly deserves examination. Āvaśyakaniryukti uses the full list of 20 items in its proper form and since then it has been a heritage of the Śvetāmbara Āgamic authors. As against this, the list of 14 items first makes its appearance in Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama and since then has been a heritage of the Karma-specialists—both Śvetāmbara and Digambara. [However, even Digambara authors use a list of 20 items whose six additional items are mostly different from those of the Śvetāmbara list of 20 items[4]]. Similarly, the list of 14 *jīvasthānas* was preceded by one which made no distinction between *saṁjñi-pañcendriya* and *asaṁjñi-pañcendriya*, while this itself was preceded by an altogether different one having 24 items. As a matter of fact it is the list of 24 items that is most frequently used not only in Bhagavatī but also in Prajñāpanā. As for the list of 12 items it makes its stray appearance in Bhagavatī[5] but in Prajñāpanā it is used in the first chapter that is most important and in the second and third that are considerably so. The list of 14 items first makes its appearance in Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama and since then has been a heritage of all Jaina authors—particularly the Karma-specialists among them ; (the lone appearance of the list of 14 items in Bhagavatī must be a very late interpolation[6]). Lastly, the list of 14 *guṇasthānas* too seems to have a history but to unravel it is somewhat difficult. The list as it stands first makes its appearance in Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama but it might be argued that even Prajñāpanā and Bhagavatī presuppose it. On close consideration the argument seems to lack weight. Certainly, Prajñāpanā is quite famalir with the concepts *mithyādṛṣṭi*, *samyagmithyādṛṣṭi*, *asaṁyatasamyagdṛṣṭi*, *saṁyatāsṁyata*, *pramattasaṁyata*, *apramattasaṁyata*, *bādarasaṁparāya*, *sūkṣmasaṁparāya*, *upaśamakaṣāya*, *kṣīṇakaṣāya*, *sayogakevali*, *ayogakevali*—that is, with 12 out of 14 *guṇasthānas*. But the concepts *sāsvādana-samyagdṛṣṭi* and *apūrvakaraṇa* are here conspicuous by their absence. Certainly, the text once speaks of *upaśāmakabādarasaṁparāya*, *kṣapakabādarasaṁparāya* and *kṣapakasūkṣmasaṁparāya*—but this does not mean that it is also familiar with the concepts *upaśāmaka-apūrvakaraṇa* and *kṣapaka-apūrvakaraṇa*. Similarly, the text does always presuppose that *vikalatrika* (two-, three-, and four-sensed beings) can possibly possess *samyaktva* (though once even that is explicitly denied[7])—but this does not mean that it is also familar with the thesis that this *samyktva* is of the *sāsvādana* sub-type. As for Bhagavatī it seems to be unfamiliar even with the concept *upaśānta-kaṣāya*. For example, it frequently distinguishes between *īryāpathikakarmabandhaka* and *sāmparāyikakarmabandhaka* but never once does it divide the former into *upaśāntakaṣāya* and *kṣīṇakaṣāya* of sub-types (nay, more than once it even explicitly says that the *īryāpathikakarma-bandhaka* must be *vyucchinnakaṣāya*[8]—a word which should naturally mean *kṣīṇakaṣāya*). The lengthy discussion of the chapter 26 clearly implies familiarity with the concept *upaśāntakaṣāya* but this part of the text is definitely of late origin (though of course even earlier there occurs a brief

passage whose argument is patterned after that of this chapter 26[9]). Be that as it may, on the question of the evolution of the list of 14 *guṇasthānas* the testimony of Prajñāpanā is going to be crucial. For if this text is not familiar with more than 12 *guṇasthānas*, then the genuinely old parts of Bhagavatī too cannot be familiar with more than 12; and then it will have to be seen whether or not these genuinely old parts are familiar with the concept of *upaśāntakaṣāya*. To sum up, in the task of determining the comparative antiquity or otherwise of an Āgamic text one convenient criterian is to see where it stands in relation to the use of the list of 14 *mārgaṇāsthānas*, that of 14 *jīvasthānas* and that of 14 *guṇasthānas*. There is however one more such list which deserves an independent treatment in this connection and let us take it up now.

Seeds of the Eight Anuyogadvāras Sat, Saṅkhyā, Kṣetra etc. in Prajñāpanā :

Thus Tattvārthasutra lays down the instruction that a subject-matter is to be investigated into under the following eight heads : *sat, saṅkhyā, kṣetra, sparśana, kāla, antara, bhāva, alpabahutva*. Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama in its very important first section makes a basic use of this list. Another version of this list contains an additional item in the from of *bhāga* and has been made use of in Anuyogadvāra and Āvaśyakaniryukti. But Prajñapanā is unfamiliar with this list as it stands. However, a close study of the contents of Prajñāpana makes it clear that in its different parts it does conduct discussion in terms of the different items of this list there being one exception which will be noted below. Thus the first chapter (viz. Prajñāpanāpada) which enumerates the classes constituting the animate world can be said to describe it under the head *sat* while the chapter twelfth (viz. Śarīrapada) which gives the number of members belonging to the different classes of the animate world can be said to describe it under the head *sankhyā* ; similarly, the chapter second (viz. Sthānapada) describes the animate world under the heads *kṣetra* and *sparśana* while the chapter fourth (viz. Sthitipada) does so under the head *kāla;* lastly the chapter eighteenth (viz. Kāyasthitipada) implicitly describes the animate world under the head *antara*[10] while the chapter third (viz. Alpabahutvapada) explicitly describes it under the head *alpabahutva*. There is no separate description of the animate world under the head *bhāga* but such a description is implicitly given in connection with that under the joint heads *saṅkhyā* and *alpabahutva* ; on the other hand, a description under the head *bhāva* is here conspicuous by its absence and the fact is significant. For a description under the head *bhāva* means a description in terms of *kṣaya, upaśama, kṣayopaśama* and *udaya* of the relevant karmas, and the total absence of such a description in Prajñāpanā means that the advanced stage of the Karma doctrine presupposed by such a description was attained only in the post-Prajñāpanā period. Certainly, the Karma doctrine as treated in Prajñāpanā is very elementary in compa-

rision to the same as treated in a text like Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama. In any case, a description of the qualities of soul in terms of *kṣaya*, *upaśama*, etc. of the relevant karmas is not known to Prajñāpanā and is known to Anuyogadvāra, Āvaśyakaniryukti as well as Tattvārthasūtra. As for the remaining topics of investigation under consideration—viz. *sat*, *saṅkhyā*, *kṣetra*, etc.—the fact that they are present in Prajñāpanā but not in a systematic form proves that the importance of these topics had already begum to be realised by the Jaina authors of the period of Prajñāpanā but that 9-item or 8-item list of the later texts was not yet drawn. As a matter of fact it can be shown that the importance of some of these topics was realised even in the times of Bhagavatī.

The Contents of Prajñāpanā :

The contents of Prajñāpanā deserves a closer look not only with a view to seeing as to how the treatment of topics undertaken in this text is more systematic than that found in Bhagavatī and less systematic than that found in Tattvārtha, etc. but also with a view to seeing as to which questions gradually came to occupy the centre of the Jaina scholars' attention. Prajñāpanā consists of 36 chapters each devoted to a particular topic, but there seems to be no order so far as the arrangement of chapters is concerned. But even a cursory glance at the title-list of the text reveals that it is mostly devoted to the various aspects of the life activity—mental or physiological —of the animate beings; (as for the first four chapters whose titles do not speak for themselves it has already been noted that they respectively acquaint us with the name, the location, the numerical strength and the life-duration of the different classes constituting the animate world). It looks as if we are having before our eyes an account of *jīvasthānas* in terms of *mārgaṇāsthānas*, for *jīvasthānas* are nothing but the names of the classes constituting the animate world while *mārgaṇāsthānas* nothing but the various aspects of the life activity of the animate beings (that precisely is why the insertion of the item *astikāya* in the list of 20 is outright anomalous). Only we have to keep in mind that the author is not yet in possesion of a well-established list of *jīvasthānas* or a well-established list of *mārgaṇāthānas*, for otherwise one chapter would have had one *mārgaṇāsthāna* for its title while in each chapter *jīvasthānas* would have had been taken up one by one. But the notable thing is that even as it stands the text does somethining of the sort. In the finally established list of *mārgaṇāsthānas* there is only one item—viz. *śarīra*—standing for physiological activity but in Prañāpanā some seven or eight chapters are devoted to these activities, and that no doubt goes to make its account more balanced than it otherwise would have been. However even then it might be asked as to how an account of just animate world can be treated as an account of the whole of reality—and certainly a text like Prajñāpanā must intend to offer us an account of the whole of reality.

To make the query more pointed let us recall that on the Jaina view (i) matter (*pudgola*) is as much of a reality as souls (*jīva*), (ii) the world (*loka*) consists not only of matter and souls but also of a medium of motion (*dharma*), a medium of stoppage (*adharma*), a medium of location (*ākāśa*), a medium of occurrence (*kāla* or *addhāsamaya*), (iii) the universe consists not only of the world but also of a not-world (*aloka*) surrounding the world. And a text which keeps silence as regards the nature of *loka-aloka*, that of *dharma, adharma, ākāśa* and *kāla*, that of *pudgala* has failed to provide us with a complete picture of the Jaina world-view. By way of defence it can be said that even within the four corners of its own specific framework Prajñāpanā has found occasion to say things about *loka, aloka, dharma, adharma, ākāśa, kāla* and *pudgala*. As for example, in the chapter on *alpa-bahutva* that anomalous insertion of the item *astikāya* makes possible the treatment of five *astikāyas* and *kāla*; besides, the chapter separately treats *pudgala*. Similarly, the fifth and thirteenth chapters (viz. Viśeṣapada and Pariṇāmapada) are devoted to a specification of the properties of souls as well as not-souls; (likewise the first chapter viz. Prajñāpanāpada enumerates the classes of souls as well as not-souls). And the tenth chapter (viz. Caramapada) so develops its content that what is mostly dealt with is the nature of *loka-aloka* on the one hand and *pudgala* on the other. Lastly, fifteenth chapter (viz. Indriyapada) incidentally (really, without any apparent reason) discusses the question whether *loka, aloka,* Jambūdvīpa, etc. are or are not touched by *dharma, adharma, ākāśa, kāla,* etc. All this might be conceded and yet one might feel that it would have been better if independent chapters were devoted to a treatment of the nature of *loka-aloka, pañcāstikāya*-cum-*kāla, pudgala*—just as so many independent chapters are devoted to a treatment of the nature of soul.

The net content of the Bhagavatī list of 23 Anuyogadvāras and the corresponding passages of Tattvārthasūtra:

So far as this aspect of the matter is concerned Bhagavatī evinces comparatively more balanced attitude and it seems that a comparative neglect of the problems related to *loka, aloka, pañcāstikāya*-cum-*kāla, pudgala* was a comparatively late phenomenon. Revealing in this connection is a list of topics-of-investigation to which Bhagavatī resorts more than once; (no trace of this list remains in the later texts). On two occasions this list appears as containing the following 23 items:[11]

(1) *antarvartī ākāśa* (=empty space lying in beween two regions of the world)

(2) *vāyu* (=the layer of air occupying a part of the space lying in between two regions of the lower world)

(3) *ghanodadhi* (=the layer of water occupying a part of the space lying in between two regions of the lower world)

(4) *Pṛthvī* (=a region of the lower world)

(5) *dvīpa* (=world-continent situated on our earth)

(6) *sāgara* (=world-oceans situated on our earth)

(7) *varṣa* (=regions of a world-continent)

(8) *nārakādi* (=the classes constituting the animate world—viz. 'hell-born beings' etc.)

(9) *astikāya* (=the five basic reals)

(10) *samaya* (=time)

(11) *karma* (= matter of the form of karma)

(12) *leśyā* (=a material indicative of the relative preponderance or otherwise of vices in a being)

(13) *dṛṣṭi* (= faith)

(14) *darśana* (= indeterminate cogntion)

(15) *jñāna* (= determinate cognition)

(16) *sañjñā* (= certain vices)

(17) *śarīra* (= body)

(18) *yoga* (= activity)

(19) *upayoga* (= cognition)

(20) *dravya* (= substance)

(21) *pradeśa* (= the constituent units of a substance)

(22) *paryāya* (= the properties of a substance)

(23) *addhā* (= time)

On a third occasion, the tenth item *samaya* is deleted while in between *varṣa* and *nārakādi* (i. e. 7th and 8th items there appears a new item *saudharmādi* (= region of the upper world)[12]; besides, here the list begins with the following five items which are altogether new :

(1) 18 vices from *prāṇātipāta* (= injury to life) down to *mithyādarśana* (= wrong faith acting as a piercing arrow)

(2) freedom from these 18 vices

(3) *autpattikī-vainayikī-kārmikī-pāriṇāmikī* (= four types of cognitive dealing)

(4) *avagraha-īhā-avāya-dhāraṇā* (= four stages in the perceptual process)

(5) *utthāna-karma-bala-vīrya-puruṣakāra-parākrama* (= five aspects of manly endeavour)

And on two occasions these additional five items along with the items 8th and 11th - 19th of the original list are made the basis of giving an exhaustive account of the nature of soul[18]. All this makes it clear that the authors of the list in question were aware that the aspects of the life-activity of a soul constitute just one set of the problems worth investigating into whereas the later authors felt that they constitute almost the sole set of such problems. For the list of 20 *mārgaṇāsthānas* developed out of the items 8th and 11th-19th of the present list (all of which—minus *karma*—are included in the former and as regards all of which the early authors were convinced that they pertain to the life-activity of a soul—whereas for the later authors the former list whose all items are essentially similar to those in question of the latter was the be-all and end-all of all philosophical investigation). May be the anomalous insertion of *astikāya* in the Prajñāpanā list of 20 *mārgaṇāsthānas* was a harbinger of the original list of 23. Of course, the Bhagavatī list of 23 is more balanced one as compared to the final list of 20 *mārgaṇāsthānas*, for otherwise the former has its own difficulties. For one thing, its inclusion of 7 or 8 items in the form of elements of mythological cosmography is philosophically unimportant and it would be better if these items are replaced by just one couple, viz. *loka-aloka* (world and not-world). Then *pudgala* (matter) should be an independent item. As for so many items being there which pertain to the life activity of soul it can be supposed that they are so many sub-items of one item, viz. *jīva*; (in view of its special importance in the Jaina scheme of things *karma* should be made an independent item). Lastly, *dravya*, *pradeśa* and *paryāya* can be treated as three sub-items of one item, viz. *satsāmānya* (i. e. reality in general). Viewed thus, the following appear to be the most important topics of Jaina ontology.

(1) *Loka* and *Aloka*	(4) *Jīva*
(2) *Pañcāstikāya* and *kāla*	(5) *Karma*
(3) *Pudgala*	(6) *Satsāmānya*

It is instructive to note that in the chapters of Tattvārthasūtra these topics stand dispersed as follows :

I (1) (in its mythological aspect) in the chapters III–IV

II (2), (3) and (6) in the chapter V

III (4) in the chapter II

IV (5) in the chapter VIII

As for the first chapter of Tattvārtha it has already been noted that it is devoted to the problems of *mokṣamārga*, *samyagdarśana*, *saptatattva*, *anuyogadvāra*, *pramāṇa* and *naya*. In view of what has already been said about the Jaina scholar's preoccupation with the problem of topics-of-investigation

nothing requires to be said about the problem of *anuyogadvāras*; but remaining problems deserve special consideration.

The Problem of Mokṣamārga, Samyagdarśana, Saptatattva in Tattvārtha:

Neither Bhagavatī nor Prajñāpanā raises the problem of *mokṣa-mārga* in the way it is done in Tattvārthasūtra—that is, neither of these texts asks whether faith, knowledge or conduct, or any two of these factors, or the three of them taken together lead to *mokṣa*. True, there is one passage in Bhagavatī (and reference to it is made in another place) where it is asked whether one can attain *mokṣa* with the help of moral conduct and asceticism alone and the answer forthcoming is that one must also become omniscient before one attains *mokṣa*.[14] This is the nearest approach to the Tattvārtha way of posing the question but it too is obviously distinct from the latter[15]. More generally, it is from the difficult accounts of *Kevalī* given in Bhagavatī and Prajñāpanā that we have to surmise as to what sort of personality one ought to become if one is to attain *mokṣa*. And the most distinguishing feature of such a personality is a complete freedom from all passion—resulting in a complete freedom from all ignorance and a complete freedom from all incapacity. As for right faith and right cognition—i. e. *samyagdarśana* and *samyagjñāna*—being two constituents of *mokṣa-mārga* it is never explicitly emphasised but is always implicitly taken for granted. For right faith means faith in the correctness of the Jaina teaching - while right cognition means cognition of this teaching, and certainly one cannot put into practice the teaching in question (and hence attain *mokṣa*) unless one already possess right faith and right cognition thus understood. Similarly, neither Bhagavatī nor Prajñāpanā describes the content of *samyagdarśana* in the way it is done in Tattvārtha—that is, neither of these texts maintains that *samyagdarśana* means faith in the reality of seven entities, viz. *jīva*, *ajīva*, *āsrava*, *bandha*, *saṁvara*, *nirjarā* and *mokṣa*. Bhagavatī does say in a general way that truth is what the Jinas have taught (*taṁ saccaṁ jaṁ jiṇehiṁ paveiyaṁ*)[16] while the faithful is often described (and not in Bhagavatī alone) as one possessing the knowledge of *loka*, *aloka*, *jīva*, *ajīva*, *pāpa*, *puṇya*, *āsrava*, *saṁvara*, *vedana*, *nirjarā*, *bandha*, *mokṣa*. But neither the doctrine of nine *tattvas* (as described in Uttarādhyayana) nor the doctrine of seven *tattvas* (as described in Tattvārtha) is an established or basic doctrine of any of the genuinely old Āgamic texts.[17] It is true that *āsrava-saṁvara* and *vedana-nirjarā* are two most crucial concept-couples of the Karma doctrine and as such they are further dealt with in Bhagavatī, though not in Prajñāpanā but that is a different matter. What is noteworthy is that the tradition of saying either that the nine *tattvas* of Uttarādhyayana are the nine basic reals or that the seven basic *tattvas* of Tattvārtha are the seven basic reals is not very old. The problem of *pramāṇa* and that of *naya* are a bit more complex and let us take them one by one.

Evolution of the treatment of Pramāṇa :

In old Āgamic texts like Bhagavatī and Prajñāpanā the word *pramāṇa* meaning right cognition (or instrument of right cognition) is used almost never. A dialogue of Bhagavatī does incidentally speak of the four types of *pramāṇas*, viz. *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *upamāna*, *āgama*[18] but the passage must be a late interpolation; similarly, Prajñāpanā in its account of *darśanārya* does speak of *praṇāma* and *naya*[19] but the account of this passage too is anomalous. For nowhere else do these two texts (or any of the old Āgamic texts) say a word about *pramāṇa*. On the other hand, it is a usual practice of the Āgamic texts to speak of the five types of *jñānas*, viz. *mati*, *śruta*, *avadhi*, *manaḥparyāya* and *kevala* and the three types of *ajñānas*, viz. *mati*, *śurta* and *avadhi* (the usual word for *matijñāna* being *ābhinibodhikajñāna* and that for *avadhi-ajñāna* - *vibhaṅga-jñāna*). Anuyogadvāra once speaks of the five types of *jñānas*, viz. *mati*, *śruta*, etc. and another time of the four types of them viz. *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, etc.[20] But this doctrine of fourfold *jñānas* is obviously a borrowing from the Nyāya school, for otherwise it is absolutely unknown in the Jaina Āgamic tradition. It is Umāsvāti who first gives the name *pramāṇa* to the five traditional *jñānas* and also subdivides them into *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa*—the latter covering *mati* and *śruta*, the former *avadhi*, *manaḥparyāya*, *kevala*. A similar twofold division of *jñānas*—not—*pramāṇas*—is to be met with in Nandisūtra which in addition says that *pratyakṣa-jñāna* is of two types viz. *indriyapratyakṣa* and *anindriyapratyakṣa*—the latter covering *avadhi manaḥparyāya* and *kevala*[21] ; (this is a confused position inasmuch as it places *indriyapratyakṣa* by the side of *mati-jñāna* rather than make it a constituent of the latter). But granting that the word *pramāṇa* is unknown to the old Āgamic texts the question remains as to how they conceive and classify right cognition. Let us attempt an answer. Bhagavatī frequently makes a distinction between *chadmastha* and *kevalī* and we are told that the former knows and sees (*jānāti*, *paśyati*) things only with the help of sense-organs while the latter does so without the help of sense-organs[22]. At one place we are given the following catalogue of ten things about which it is said that in their entirety they are known and seen by a *kevalī* alone not by a *chadmastha* as well :

(1) *dharmāstikāya*	(6) sound
(2) *adharmāstikāya*	(7) smell
(3) *ākāśāstikāya*	(8) air
(4) soul apart from body	(9) whether a particular person will attain omniscience or not
(5) physical atom	(10) whether a particular person will attain *mokṣa* or not[23]

Again the text often speaks of persons possessing *avadhijñāna* and *vibhaṅga-jñāna*—the former being a case of right cognition, the latter that of wrong cognition but both being cases of extra-sensory cognition;[24] and since the persons in question are *chadmastha* we are to understand that even a *chadmastha* can possibly have extra-sensory cognition. As a matter of fact, certain passages actually distinguish between the cognitive capacities of the following four types of persons :

(1) *chadmastha*

(2) *ādhovadhika* (= person with an imperfect type of *avadhi*)

(3) *paramāvadhika* (= person with the most perfect type of *avadhi*)

(4) *kevalī*[25]

All this makes it clear that the early Jaina theoreticians distinguished between three types of cognition, viz. (1) the sensory cognition of a non-omniscient (2) the extra-sensory cognition of a non-omniscient (3) the extra-sensory cognition of an omniscient; besides, in each case they disitnguished between two sub-types viz. (1) the visionlike cognition and (2) the cogitation-like cognition; lastly, in the first two cases they also distinguished between a true variety and a false one. It was later on that *manaḥparyāya* was conceived as a type of extra-sensory cognition (possessed by a non-omniscient) having for its object what another person is now thinking of; (about this type of cognition it was thought that it has no vision-like variety or a false variety). Simultaneously, additional thought was given to the sensory cognition of a non-omniscient. Here a distinction was made between cognition based on one's own sense perception and that based on somebody else's testimony; both were supposed to be the cases of cogitation-like cognition and both to be possibly true or false. As for sense-perception itself it was identified with vision-like cognition and divided into two types, viz. visual and non-visual. Thus came into existence the final Jaina theory of cognition with its following classification :

(1) a non-omniscient's visual sense-perception (*cakṣurdarśana*)

(2) a non-omniscient's non-visual sense perception (*acakṣurdarśana*)

(3) a non-omniscient's true cogitation-like cognition based on one's own sense-perception (*matijñāna*)

(4) false variety of (3) (*mati-ajñāna*)

(5) a non-omniscient's true cogitation-like cognition based on somebody else's testimony (*śrutajñāna*)

(6) false variety of (5) (*śruta-ajñāna*)

(7) a non-omniscient's extra-sensory vision-like cognition of the outer world (*avadhidarśana*)

(8) a non-omniscient's true extra-sensiory cogitation-like cognition of the outer world (*avadhijñāna*)

(9) false variety of (8) (*vibhaṅgajñāna*)

(10) a non-omniscient's true extra-sensory cogitation-like cognition of other's inner world (*manaḥparyāyajñāna*)

(11) an omniscient's extra-sensory vision-like cognition (*kevala-darśana*)

(12) an omniscient's extra-sensory cogitation-like cognition (*kevalajñāna*)

Now Bhagavatī and Prajñāpanā give us very few details about this whole theory; for what we mostly get there is a bare enumeration of types and sub-types. It is the later texts like Āvaśyakaniryukti and Nandisūtra which are more helpful in this connection. But the fact that Bhagavatī brings into prominence certain aspects of the theory which are given no much importance in its final form lends support to the supposition that it was the problems connected with these aspects that first drew the Jaina theoretician's attention; and it is on this supposition that we have based our above account of the conjectured evolution of this theory.

Relative recency of the treatment of Naya, Nikṣepa and Saptabhaṅgī :

Lastly, we take up the problem of *naya*. The doctrine of seven *nayas* is certainly present in Anuyogadvāra, Āvaśyakaniryukti, Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama, Tattvārthasūtra but it is conspicuous by its absence in Bhagavatī and Prajñāpanā. As a matter of fact, even the broad twofold division of *nayas* into *dravyārthikanaya* and *paryāyārthikanaya* is almost unknown to these old Āgamic texts. True, in Bhagavatī there are three dialogues of which the first says that a certain thing is eternal from the standpoint of *dravya* and non-eternal from that of *bhāva*, the second that a certain thing is eternal from the standpoint of *dravya*, non-eternal from that of *paryāya*, the third that a certain thing is eternal from the standpoint of *avyucchittinaya*, non-eternal from that of *vyucchittinaya* and then there is a rather long dialogue in which it is said about several entities (*loka*, for example) that they are finite from the standpoints of *dravya* and *kṣetra*, infinite from those of *kāla* and *bhāva*. These dialogues deserve notice—particularly because the later authors make so much of them. But let us not forget that in the field of ontology the specific contribution of the old Āgamic texts was their masterly method of examining entities from the standpoint of *dravya*, *kṣetra*, *kāla* and *bhāva* and it was absolutely no part of this method to suggest that things must exhibit mutually contradictory features when viewed from two of these standpoints. For example, if a jar stays in existence for one day and is red throughout the duration of its existence it is equally finite from two of these standpoints of *dravya* and *bhāva*—for it is a red substance so long as it is a substance called jar. Of course, it might be suggested

that the redness of this jar is different every moment and the suggestion might be valid; but the noteworthy thing is that it is never advanced in the Āgamic texts (the point was borrowed by the later authors and from the Buddhists).[26] In this connection a few words have also to be said about the doctrine of four *nikṣepas* and that of *saptabhaṅgī*. The case of four *nikṣepas* is in fact a case of a particular set of *anuyogadvāras* and it should suffice to point out that this set—just like the set of seven *nayas*—is unknown to the old Āgamic texts and makes its appearance only in Anuyogadvāra, Āvaśyakaniryukti, Tattvārtha and Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama. But the case of *saptabhaṅgī* deserves some further consideration. Really speaking, the doctrine of *saptabhaṅgī* is unknown not only to the old Āgamic texts like Bhagavatī and Prajñāpanā but also to the new ones like Anuyogadvāra, Āvaśyakaniryukti, etc; (in its unmistakably recognizable form it first appears in Siddhasena's Sanmati). Among the later authors the doctrine is current in two versions. According to one a thing is describable through the following seven propositions :

(1) It exists (from the standpoint of its own property)

(2) It does not exist (from the standpoint of alien properties)

(3) It is indescribable (from the standpoint of its own as well as alien properties)

(4) It exists and does not exsit (i. e. one part of it exists, another does not)

(5) It exists and is indescribable (i. e. one part of it exists, another is indescribable)

(6) It does not exist and is indescribable (i. e. one part of it does not exist, another is indescribable)

(7) It exists, does not exist and is indescribable (i. e. one part of it exists, another does not exist, a third is indescribable).

According to the other version a thing is describable through the following seven propositions :

(1) It exists (from the standpoint of its own properties)

(2) It does not exist (from the standpoint of alien properties)

(3) It exists and does not exist (from the two standpoints in question applied successively)

(4) It is indescribable (from the two standpoints in question applied simultaneously)

(5) It exists (in the manner of (1)) and is indescribable (in the manner of (4))

(6) It does not exist (in the manner of (2)) and is indescribable (in the manner of (4))

(7) It exists (in the manner of (1)), does not exist (in the manner of (2)), and is indescribable (in the manner of (4))

[For example, the first version is adopted in Siddhasena's Sanmati, the second in Samantabhadra's Āptamīmāṁsā].

Of the second of these versions there is absolutely no trace in any Āgamic text but a passage in Bhagavatī comes very near developing the first[27]. Thus it first declares that everything (e. g. an atom) is a 'self' from the standpoint of its own properties, a 'not-self' from the standpoint of alien properties, indescribable from the standpoint of both; (here 'is a self' can be treated as eqivalent to 'exists' and 'is a not-self' as equivalent to 'does not exist'—for after all both are rather technical usages Then it goes on to apply this principle to the cases of aggregates made up of two, three four, five and six atoms. Here new possibilities begin to emerage by virtue of the fact that the things in question are made up of parts. Thus if a thing is made up of two parts it will be possible to designate it by two features (out of the three—viz. 'self', 'not-self', 'indescribable'), if it is made up of three parts it will be possible to designate it even by all the three features; nay, if it is made up of four parts one feature can even belong to many parts (i. e. to more than one part), if it is made up of five parts two features can do so, if it is made up of six parts all the three features can do so. The noteworthy point is that all the seven possibilities allowed by the *Saptabhangī* doctrine (of the Sanmati-version) are already got when the aggregate is made up of three atoms; and yet Bhagavatī goes on to consider new cases with more possibilities—the maximum number 23 being reached in the case of the aggregate made up of six atoms. This clearly shows that the case with seven possibilities came to assume a special importance only in later times. Even Anuyogadvāra when it discusses a similar problem does not attach any special importance to the case with seven possibilities—there the maximum number of possibilities being 26[28]; (as a matter of fact, even in Bhagavatī the maximum number of possibilities should be 26 but it has chosen to disallow 3 possibilities). Of course, the problem considered in Anuyogadvāra has a rather restricted scope and so its treatment cannot be called a further development in the direction of the final establishment of the *Saptabhangī* doctrine. Thus whereas Bhagavatī has discussed the case of three most general features (really, those very features which appear in the finally established *Saptabhangī* doctrine) Anuyogadvāra discusses the case of three rather particular features, viz. *ānupūrvī* (ordered succession), *anānupūrvī* (lack of ordered succession) and *avaktavya* (indescribable either way) (*ānupūrvī* characterizing a group of units more than two in number, *anānupūrvī*

characterizing just one unit, *avaktavya* characterizing a group of two units). In any case, neither Bhagavatī nor Anuyogadvāra lays down the principle that everything whatsoever is describable through the seven propositions of the *Saptabhaṅgī* doctrine; for even on the showing of Bhagavatī (whose treatment of the problem is of a more general nature) it is only an aggregate made up of more than two atoms that is so describable (an aggregate made up of two atoms being describable through six propositions and a loose atom through three).

Evolution of the treatment of Pañcāstikāya :

It can thus be seen that the problems discussed in the first chapter of Tattvārthasūtra were either not treated at all or were treated differently in the old Āgamic texts like Bhagavatī and Prajñāpanā. But that is not the case with the problems discussed in its II, III, IV, V and VIII chapters. As a matter of fact, barring exceptions these chapters can be treated as a good summary of the corresponding discussion of the old Āgamic texts. But even here these old texts themselves will have to be consulted if we are to form an idea of the doctrinal evolution concerned. Take for example the course of discussion on *Pañcāstikāya*. In Bhagavatī a large number of dialogues touch upon this or that aspect of the nature of soul and a good number of them do the same for matter, but dialogues touching upon the nature of *dharma*, *adharma* and *ākāśa* are few and far between. As a matter of fact, two parallel possages which seek to indicate the doctrine of five *astikāyas* are couched in a strikingly defensive terminology. Thus in one of them Mahāvīra's chief disciple Gautama, when asked to justify his belief in the existence of the five *astikāyas*, naively pleads that only that which exists is called by his camp an existing entity, only that which does not a non-existing entity (*savvaṁ atthibhāvaṁ atthīti vadāmo savvaṁ natthibhāvaṁ natthīti vadāmo*)[29]; placed in a similar circumstance a staunch disciple of Mahāvīra named Madruka says that on the testimony of *kevalī* must one believe in the existence of all the five *astikāyas* even when they are not visible to eyes—just as one believes in the existence of air, smell, fire-inside-wood, etc. even when they are not visible to eyes[30]. It seems that the Jaina theoreticians first of all arrived at the notion of *loka* having a particular shape and size as also that of an empty *aloka* surrounding *loka*. Naturally, *loka* must have been supposed to be the permanent seat of the permanently existing matter and souls, but soon enough certain consideration led to the posting of three rather sophisticated concepts, viz. *dharma*, *adharma* and *ākāśa*—the first supposed to be the medium of motion, the second that of stoppage, the third that of location (the first two covering *loka* alone, the third *loka* as well as *aloka*). Thus in a dialogue of Bhagavatī it is maintained that a god standing at the far end of *loka* cannot move about his limbs inside *aloka;* however, the reason given for it is not that there are no *dharma* and *adharma* in *aloka* but that there

is no matter there—it being supposed that matter (also soul) can move only when placed in the midst of matter[31]. So originally it seemed a satisfactory argument that things from *loka* do not intrude into *aloka* simply because the latter is an empty region ; but later on it was thought fit to argue that things from *loka* do not intrude into *aloka* because the latter lacks *dharma* and *adharma*. As for *ākāśa* it was a natural enough concept—as is evident from its so wide a prevalence in diverse philosophical circles. On the other hand, the Jaina concepts of matter and soul have many peculiarities of their own—as is to be expected in view of the fact that so much atteniton was devoted to their formulation. All this tends to suggest that the doctrine of *pañcāstikāya* took some time to get established and the situation as it evolved historically is reflected in the pages of Bhagavatī. In Prajñāpanā, on the other hand, a deliberate attempt was made to offer an account of the multifarious activities of soul in the name of offering an account of the whole of reality and this, as has already been noted, was a rather misconceived plan. However, there is partial justification even for the Prajñāpanā procedure. For a most conspicuous feature of the Jaina concept of soul is that according to it not only are insects, animals, men (along with the denizens of hells and heavens) ensouled bodies but so also are earth, water, fire, air and plants of all sorts. As a result it happens that so many questions which others discuss in connection with their treatment of matter the Jainas do in connection with their treatment of soul. Even then the fact remains that the Jainas do have a theory of pure matter and aspects of it are brought to light in Prajñāpanā itself. That is why it would have been better if this part of the discussion was here accorded a special status of its own.

Relative recency of the treatment of Satsāmānya :

We have surmised that the tradition of discussing the nature of *loka* and *aloka*, matter and soul was comparatively old, that of discussing the nature of five *astikāyas* comparatively recent. It seems that the tradition of discussing the nature of reality in general is still more recent. As a matter of fact, this question as such is never raised in the old Āgamic texts and when Tattvārtha does raise it it comes out with an answer of which there is no trace in these old texts. Thus Tattvārtha says that the real is characterised by origination, destruction and permanence and no old Āgamic text subscribes to the position. So in the context of the old Āgamic texts the question of the nature of reality in general has to be understood somewhat differently. Let us recall that the Bhagavatī list of 23 topics-of-investigation contained three items in the form of *dravya*, *pradeśa* and *paryāya*, and it is these that we propose to treat as the sub-items of one general item, viz. reality in general. The proposal needs elaboration. As we have seen, the Jaina theoreticians gave thought to the question as to how many types of

things there are in the universe and they ultimately came out with the answer that there are five such types, viz. *dharma, adharma, ākāśa, pudgala, jīva*. But soon they also gave thought to the question as to what features these things *qua* things have common and they came out with the answer that they are all substances (*dravya*), that they are all made up of parts (*pradeśa*), that they all possess properties (*paryāya*). Later on further thought was given to the question of *pradeśa* and it was found that the *pradeśas* of *dharma, adharma* and *ākāśa* behave in one way, those of a soul in another way, those of a physical body in a third way. Thus one *pradeśa* of *dharma, adharma* or *ākāśa* must exist at a different place from another such *pradeśa* and it must always exist where it does ; on the other hand, one *pradeśa* of a soul can co-exist with any number of such *pradeśas* and it might exist now here now there. In the case of a physical body the concerned *pradeśas* are its constituent atoms ; like one *pradeśa* of a soul, one *pradeśa* of a physical body can co-exist with any number of such *pradeśas* and it might exist now here now there, but unlike the former the latter might possibly transfer itself from one physical body to another or even lie loose. In connection with these considerations it was realised that 'occupying a portion of space' is also an important feature of substances ; (this was particularly obvious in the case of souls and physical bodies). Parallelly came the realisation that 'occupying a portion of time' is also an important feature of substances (this was particularly obvious in the case of physical bodies). Now 'occupying a portion of space' could be seen as equivalent to 'occupying a portion of *ākāśa*' ; but the concept 'occupying a portion of time' created difficulty. So time was conceived as a series of successively arising *samayas* each lasting for a moment ; and then 'occupying a portion of time' was seen as equivalent to 'lasting for so many *samayas*'. Lastly some special thought was given to the problem of *paryāya* and it was maintained that each *paryāya*—physical as well as mental—has an infinite number of degrees from the minutest upto the greatest. Thus gradually came into existence what might be called the doctrine of fourfold *pradeśavāda* and what might be regarded as the high watermark of abstraction in the field of old Āgamic ontological speculation. According to this doctrine a substance might have four types of *pradeśas*, viz.

(1) *pradeśas* viewed from the standpoint of substance (*dravya*)
(2) *pradeśas* viewed from the standpoint of space (*kṣetra*)
(3) *pradeśas* viewed from the standpoint of time (*kāla*)
(4) *pradeśas* viewed from the standpoint of a property (*bhāva*)

The first type of *pradeśa* means one constituent atom (and so can be had only by a physical body), the second type of *pradeśa* means one *ākāśa-pradeśa*, the third type of *pradeśa* means *samaya*, the fourth type of *pradeśa* means one degree of the property concerned.

Evolution of the treatment of Karma :

Lastly, in view of its special importance a few additional words might be said about the Karma doctrine. This doctrine in mostly known to us through very late texts like Candrarṣi's Pañcasaṅgraha, Vīrasena's Dhavalā (a commentary on Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama) and Jayadhavalā (a commentary on Kaṣāyaprābhṛta). And as found there the doctrine contains features of which there is no trace in the old Āgamic texts. Earlier we had occasion to note the case of *guṇasthānas*. Certainly, the old Āgamic texts like Bhagavatī and Prajñāpanā seem to be unfamiliar with the later list of 14 of them, and this is so because they do not contain the later doctrine of *upaśamaśreṇī* and *kṣapakaśreṇī*. For it is only in connection with this doctrine that the concept *apūrvakaraṇa*—i. e. what is now called the 8th *guṇasthāna*—makes its appearance. Nay, Bhagavatī contains a significant passage (rather a collection of passages) which cleary looks like a transition from the simple old Karma doctrine to the complex later one couched in the terminology of *śreṇī-ārohaṇa* and all that.[32] Again, in its account of the process of *karma-bandha* and *karma-vedana* even Prajñāpanā confines itself to the eight chief types of *karmas* (i. e. it does not take into account the sub-types of these *karmas*). Āvaśyakaniryukti clearly contains an account of *upaśamaśreṇī* and *kṣapakaśreṇī*, Tattvārthasūtra refers to them while Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama explicitly conducts its discussion in terms of the 14 *guṇasthānas* (moreover, it takes into account even the sub-types of *karmas*). But even the Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama account of Karma doctrine, though most advanced so far as the Āgamic texts are concerned is relatively simple when compared with the corresponding account of the texts like Pañcasaṅgraha, Dhavalā and Jayadhavalā.

Conclusion : the general subject-matter of the Āgamic texts and absolute chronology of the Age of Āgamas :

Here we close our enumeration of instances purported to show that a historical attitude enables us to evaluate the philosophical Āgamic texts better than would have been the case in the absence of such an attitude. In the meanwhile we have been enabled to form a clear idea of what type of problems the Āgamic texts raise, what type they do not, what type of problems the old Āgamic texts raise, what type the new ones. In one word it can be said that an investigation into the nature of *loka* and *aloka*, *pañcāstikāya* and *kāla*, *pudgala*, *jīva* and *karma*, reality in general is the chief occupation of the Āgamic texts—the discussion in later texts being more systematic and comprehensive than that in the earlier ones. On the other hand the problems of *anuyogadvāra*, *naya*, *nikṣepa* and *saptabhaṅgī* are exclusively a subject-matter of the later Āgamic texts (while it is in these very texts that the old problem of *jñāna* assumes the form of

the problem of *pramāṇa*). However, before we study in details how these problems were indicated in the various Āgamic texts let us say something about the absolute chronology of the Age of Āgamas. In this connection what is most important is to determine the probable date of composition of Bhagavatī, Prajñāpanā, Anuyogadvāra, Nandī, Āvaśyaka-niryukti, Tattvārthasūtra and Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama. For some of these texts—e. g. Bhagavatī, Āvaśyakaniryukti and Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama—it is almost impossible to be the work of one author and even Prajñāpanā might contain enough interpolations. But Tattvārthasūtra is certainly the work of Umāsvāti while Anuyogadvāra and Nandī likewise seem to have got their respective authors. Now Umāsvāti almost certainly belonged to 3rd-4th centuries A. D. and so in view of what has already been said it is not unreasonable to suppose that the material contained in the five texts Anuyogadvāra, Nandī, Āvaśyaka-niryukti, Tattvārthasūtra and Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama was produced at some period or other during the first four or five centuries of Christian era. Similarly reasonable seems to be the supposition that the Prajñāpanā material was produced at some period or other during the last two pre-Christian centuries while the Bhagavatī material was produced at some period or other during the last four or five pre-Christian centuries; (certainly Bhagavatī possesses not only such passages as are contemporary with Prajñāpanā but also such ones as are posterior to it—though, of course, a large number of them decidedly came before Prajñāpanā). This whole reckoning might lack desirable precision but it should prove helpful so far as it goes. For example, we can now say that the three stages of the Age of Āgamas have run their course as follows:

I First Stage (5th-2nd certuries B. C.)
II The Second Stage (2nd century B. C. to 1st century A. D.)
III The Third Stage (1st-6th centuries A. D.)

II THE FIRST STAGE

Introductory :

As already indicated, we intend to work out the nature of the oldest phase of Jaina philosophical speculation chiefly on the basis of Bhagavatī. But Bhagavatī is not a homogeneous text and so the material contained in it needs a critical analysis. This we take up first. Afterwards, we examine the relevant material of certain minor texts that seem to be equally old.

(A) BHAGAVATĪSŪTRA

The dialogues collected in Bhagavatī broadly fall in two groups, viz. those couched in a terminology that is either largely non-technical or technical in its own way (these being mostly small in size), those couched in a terminology that is largely technical (some of these being

rather small some rather big in size). But in the body of the text these dialogues are arranged neither subjectwise nor lengthwise (only we can say that those collected towards the end - i. e. in chapters 21st–41st are unusually big— and, of course, couched in a higher technical terminology). Moreover, quite frequently does it happen that the question raised is answerd not directly but by guiding the reader to some particular passage in another Āgamic text (the name of the text and the location of the passage being fully given). The question naturally arises as to what is signified by all this. It can be reasonably surmised that the dialogues couched in a non-technical language are oldest in origin, those couched in a technical language but not unusually big are intermediate in origin, while the unusually big ones are latest in orign. But why should there be no order in the arrangement of the material and why should the reader be so often guided to other Āgamic texts ? It seems that the art of conducting theoretical discussion at a purely theoretical level was mastered by the Jaina scholars only gradually. The very adoption of the dialogue style for the purpose is a proof for that. But gradually the dialogue aspect of the affair grew less and less important—though in an utterly nominal form it occasionally appears even in a text like Prajñāpanā which is otherwise a collection of theoretical discussions conducted at a purely theoretical level. To begin with the dialogues in question must have been more popular than technical, towards the end they became more technical than popular. And since different dialogues are from different hands it is not unlikely that a comparatively early author composed a relatively more technical dialogue while a comparatively late one a relatively more popular one. But as a general rule it must have been the case that popular dialogues predominated in the beginning, technical ones towards the end. This might also explain why the same type of questions repeat themselves again and again in the different part of the text, but may be it is partly due to the fact that the different parts of the text were composed in the different circles of Jaina scholars. First only something like the later circumstance can explain why a question appears repeatedly even in those cases where the reader is simply guided to another Āgamic text for an answer. In any case, for some reason or other it must have been felt that these questions need being raised in the different parts of the text and the reader's next curiosity is whether these questions originally followed by an independent answer, for the Āgamic texts mentioned in this connection are more or less recent—e. g. Prajñāpanā, Jīvājīvābhigama, Jambūdvīpaprajñapti, Aupapātika, Rājapraśnīya, Anuyoga-dvāra, Nandī. In view of the fact that in so many cases the original discussions have been retained even if they also appear in a later Āgamic text—and naturally appear there in a relatively more systematic and comprehensive manner—it seems reasonable to suppose that these questions have been inserted where they have been by later scholars and at a time when the concerned Āgamic texts had already come into existence, Viewed in this

light, it is the old popular dialogues of Bhagavatī that prove to be of the utmost importance inasumuch as they provide us with a due key as to the considerations that originally led the Jaina theoreticians to posit their fundamental concepts. Let us see how this approach towards the text enables us to have a better understanding of the concepts of *loka–aloka*, *pañcāstikāya–cum kāla*, *pudgala*, *jīva*, *karma* and reality in general.

(i) Loka-aloka

In the field of cosmography some of the most basic Jaina positions are that *loka* (world) has got a particular shape, that *loka* is surrounded by *aloka* (non-world), that *loka* and *aloka* are two beginningless and endless entities. It will be interesting to study how these positions have been defended in Bhagavatī. In a characteristic fashion the text repeatedly appeals to Pārśva's authority when it lays down that *loka* is eternal or that such is its shape (*pāsena arahayā purisādāṁīeṇaṁ sāsae loe buie* etc)[33]—which seems to indicate that the Jainas were somehow keenly aware that these traditional views of theirs were a strikingly distinct feature of their world-picture. Equally revealing is the way these and the related views are sought to be indicated, for analogies have been used in this connection in an ample measure. Thus we are told that *loka* lies in the midst of *aloka* just as an island lies in the midst of an ocean, a ship lies in the midst of waters, a hole lies in the midst of a piece of cloth, shadow lies in the midst of sunshine.[34] Similarly, we are told that *loka* and *aloka* are co-eternal just as a hen and an egg are (inasmuch as an egg cannot come into existence without a hen nor a hen without an egg).[35] Lastly, two analogies are employed to justify the Jaina belief that the earth rests on water, water on air, air on sky. For we are told that a leather-pot can possibly contain air in its lower half and water in the upper half (the actual experiment being described in details)[36] while with the help of a water-filled leather-pot a man can float on water (again, the actual experiment being described in details)[37] ; the first analogy demonstrates that water can rest on air, the second that the earth can rest on water. We have already taken note of the dialogue where it has been argued that a god standing at the far end of *loka* cannot move about his limbs inside *aloka* because the latter is an empty region ; we have also surmised that these dialogues represent a stage when the concepts of *dharma* and *adharma* had not yet been posited. In any case, there is no dialogue in Bhagavatī which argues that things from *loka* do not intrude into *aloka* because the latter lacks *dharma* and *adharma*. Of course, in a number of dialogues it is described how *dharma*, *adharma* and the remaining *astikāyas* go to fill up *loka* and *aloka*, but that is a description of *astikāyas* rather than that of *loka* and *aloka*. As for the detailed information about the composition etc. of the various regions of *loka* it is overwhelmingly mythological in nature and we can take leave of it.

(ii) Pañcāstikāya-cum-kāla

Philosophically the most important Jaina concept is that of *pañcāstikāya-*cum-*kāla* and it deserves a thorough consideration. In their search for the basic types of reals Jaina scholars must have started with *jīva* (soul) and *pudgala* (matter) but the search came to an end only when three additional concepts—viz. *dharma* (the medium of motion), *adharma* (the medium of stoppage), *ākāśa* (the medium of location)—were posited. Thus came into existence the elaborated doctrine of five *astikāyas*. A number of Bhagavatī dialogues go to testify that the early Jainas were much exercised over the fact that they had to speak of things like *dharma*, *adharma* and *ākāśa* which were visible to nobody or as they naively put it, 'on which nobody could sit, stand, rest or lie down'.[38] They felt reassured only when it was pointed out to them that there are things like sound, smell and air which are visible to nobody and yet exist. We have already referred to the thesis that there are ten things which in their entirety are known and seen only by an omniscient person. The first eight of these are ontological categories and are (1) *dharmāstikāya* (2) *adharmāstikāya* (3) *ākāśāstikāya* (4) soul apart from body (5) physical atom (6) sound (7) smell (8) air. The meaning of the catalogue was clear, viz. that basically speaking the doctrine of five *astikāyas* was to be accepted on faith in the omniscience of a Jaina teacher like Mahāvīra who had propounded it. But the details of the doctrine could well be defended on rational grounds and this is what was actually done at length. However, as regards *dharma* and *adharma* little was attempted beyond saying that they were respectively the medium of motion and that of stoppage. Only in one rare passage of Bhagavatī was a catalogue drawn of the activities of the form of motion and of those of the form of stoppage-of-motion, the former included 'coming, going, speaking, blinking, mental activity, vocal activity, bodily activity', the latter 'standing, sitting, lying down, mental concentration'[39]. But even here it is puzzling why the catalogue remained confined to voluntary activities undertaken by a living being—for certainly the belief is that even purely physical activities are due to *dharma* and *adharma*. On the other hand, the concept of *ākāśa* was in a way fundamental. For whenever there was the need for saying that a thing exists in space—and there is nothing that does not exist in space—the meaning was that it exists in *ākāśa* ; this is the meaning of the statement that *ākāśa* is the receptacle of all things—living and otherwise (*āgāsatthikāe ṇaṁ jīvadavvāṇa ya ajīvadavvāṇa ya bhāyaṇabhūe*)[40]. Lastly, the concepts of *pudgala* and *jīva* were again fundamental and obviously so, but they deserve independent treatment—each on its own account.

In this connection there also arises the question of the ontological status of time. In Bhagavatī time (its favourite word for it being *addhāsamaya*) is frequently mentioned along with the five *astikāyas*. Thus its list of *ajīvas* or

ajīvadravyas always includes *dharma, adharma, ākāśa, pudgala, addhāsamaya* while its list of *sarvadravyas* always includes these five plus *jīva*. This means that five *astikāyas* are *astikāyas* as well as *dravyas* while *addhāsamaya* is *dravya* (and *ajīvadravya* at that) but no *astikāya*. The situation is somewhat puzzling and the simple fact seems to be that the importance of time as a basic ontological category occurred to the Jaina scholars only in the course of time—that is, at a time by which the list of five *astikāyas* had become well established. Otherwise, there seems to be little reason why the Jainas should have one list of basic reals with five items and another one with these very items plus time. The later Śvetāmbara authors argue that *dharma*, *adharma* etc. are called *astikāya* because they are made up of co-existing units while *addhāsamaya* is not so called because it is made up of units of which no two ever co-exist. Of this argument there is no hint in Bhagavatī or any other Āgamic text. Nay, there is at least one Bhagavatī passage with assertions which presuppose that *addhāsamaya* is made up of co-existing units[41]—thus substantially supporting the later Digambara authors who however on their part argue that time is not an *astikāya* because its units even if co-existing with each other do not touch each other. It seems that in the context of the present question the later authors—Śvetāmbara as well as Digambara—have sought to see a distinction which was originally not there. Be that as it may, in the ontological speculations of Bhagavatī *addhāsamaya* (i. e. time) is as fundamental a concept as *ākāśa* (i. e. space)—for everything whatsoever must exist not only in space but also in time.

(iii) Pugdala

In Bhagavatī the *astikāya pudgala* (matter) receives treatment in two contexts—one when matter as such is under description, the other where matter as used by a living being. In view of the widely different issues raised in the two contexts it will be better to take them up separately.

Regarding matter as such we are told that it is possessed of colour, taste, smell, touch and is available in the form of either an atom or a multi-atomic aggregate. Again, aggregate might be either subtle or gross. Neither an atom nor a subtle aggregate can be subjected to a gross physical process like cutting into pieces, burning, wetting etc.[42] and neither is visible to an ordinary mortal;[43] moreover, of the four possible pairs of touch only two, viz. smooth-rough, hot-cold can possibly be present in either (in the case of an atom only one touch from each pair is possible, in the case of a subtle aggregate even both are possible).[44] The number of atoms in a subtle aggregate might range from two to infinite; on the other hand, a gross aggregate must necessarily be made of an infinite number of atoms[45]. Lastly, any number of atoms—from one to infinite—can occupy one unit of space (i. e. one *pradeśa* of *ākāśa*)[46].

These fundamental tenets of Jaina atomism have their own significance but in Bhagavatī much attention is not devoted to them as such but to certain arithmatical computations related to them, computations which in fact are simple corollaries to the tenets themselves.[47] Thus in one extremely lengthy dialogue it is shown in how many ways an aggregate made up of this or that number of atoms can break up into this or that number of parts—e. g. in how many ways a ten-atomic aggregate can break up into four parts[48]. Similarly, another lenghty dialogue shows in how many ways 5 possible colours, 5 possible tastes, 2 possible smells, and 8 possible touches can exhibit themselves in an aggregate made up of this or that number of atoms.[49] Both these are cases of simple arithmatical computation but they have been treated at full length and this suggests that the atomic hypothesis as well as the arithmatical computation in question were then considered something of a novelty. In Prajñāpanā the arithmatical computations undertaken in this connection concern comparatively more important aspects of the atomic hypothesis—and this suggests that by that time the hypothesis was rather well established. But in Bhagavatī even the elementary treatment of matter in terms of the atomic hypothesis is a somewhat later phenomenon; as a matter of fact, this is one reason why one must cast doubt on the validity of the later explanation that the *astikāya* is so called because it is a composite made up of co-existing units. What is more probable is that *dharma*, *adharma*, *ākāśa*, *pudgala* and *jīva* were first posited on the basis of certain independent considerations and were later conceived as made up of indivisible units.

Coming now to the question of matter as used by a living being it seems that this is the question that first engaged the attention of Jaina theoreticians (the question of atomic composition of matter being one that arose next). The first idea to occur in this connection was that a living being requires matter by way of nourishment and breathing (it being also understood that nourishment goes to build up body and sense-organs);[50] somewhat more sophisticated consideration led to the belief that a living being also requires matter by way of speech and thought.[51] In Bhagavatī the question is raised on several occasions and in several ways but every time these (or some of these) turn out to be the activities that a living being is supposed to perform with the help of matter.[52]

(iv) Jīva

A most conspicuous feature of Jaina theory of matter is that it does not view earth, water, fire and air as four basic types of matter, a most conspicuous feature of the Jaina theory of soul is that it views earth, water, fire, air and plants as one particular type of living beings. Thus in the eyes of Jaina theoreticians a glass full of water is a colony of living beings of the

water-type just as a glass full of ants is a colony of living beings of the ant-type ; in both cases the beings concerned are an amalgam of a body and a soul (the difference between them being that the former possess just one sense-organ viz. tactile, the latter three of them viz. tactile, gustatory and olfactory. Bhagavatī evinces a keen awareness of the peculiarity of the Jaina position in question and hence frequently seeks to reassure the reader that the position is nevertheless valid.[53] So whenever it undertakes a detailed description of any sort of animate activity it classifies the world of living beings into five types, viz. one-sensed, two-sensed, three-sensed, four-sensed five-sensed (the earth-bodied, water-bodied, fire-bodied, air-bodied and plant-bodied beings constituting the first type). Generally speaking, those animate activities are of five sorts, viz. (1) bodily (2) cognitive (3) emotive (4) conative (5) affective. However, quite frequently the first and the fifth are left out of account when the general qualities of a soul are being treated—while the second alone is taken into account when the matter has to be put in one word[54]. These positions and attitudes are not peculiar to Bhagavatī, for they also make their appearance in later texts. But what is noteworthy is the rather unconventional form in which they appear in Bhagavatī (they in fact appearing here in so many forms on so many occasions). For example, we have earlier taken note of a list of 23 topics of investigation that appears in Bhagavatī. Now ten of these items were later picked out to give an exhaustive account of soul, and to them were added five more which too appear in an enlarged version of the orginal list of 23. On a closer examination it seems that the present group of ten items and the one of five are each selfsufficient and that their juxtaposition is sheer mechanical. Thus the first group included following items :

(1) *Nārakīya*
(2) *Karma*
(3) *Leśyā*
(4) *Dṛṣṭi*
(5) *Darśana*
(6) *Jñāna*
(7) *Sañjñā*
(8) *Śarīra*
(9) *Yoga*
(10) *Upayoga*

Of these (1), (2), (8) covered bodily activities, (5), (6), (10) cognitive ones, (3), (4), (7) emotive ones, (9) conative ones. Similarly, the second group included following items :

(1) 18 vices from *prāṇātipāta* down to *mithyādarśanaśalya*
(2) Freedom from these 18 vices
(3) *Autpattikī*, *Vainayikī*, *Kārmikī*, *Pāriṇāmikī*
(4) *Avagraha*, *Īhā*, *Avāya*, *Dhāraṇā*
(5) *Utthāna*, *Karma*, *Bala*, *Vīrya*, *Puruṣakāraparākrama*

Of these (1), (2) covered emotional (and emotion-free) activities, (3), (4) cognitive ones, (5) conative ones. The noteworthy point is that this whole

way of presenting the problem is unknown to the later authors. And the case is not isolated.

(v) Karma

The Karma doctrine in the form in which it appears in Bhagavatī deserves serious study, for it offers us an inkling into the considerations that led to its first formulation. The idea at the root of the doctrine is that a bad act catches hold of the soul of the agent concerned and does not leave it until this agent has suffered the ill consequences of his misdeed. Revealing in this connection is the phrase "*vaireṇa spṛṣṭaḥ*" which Bhagavatī frequently employs to describe the net result of some wrong done by one being to another; the being committing the wrong is touched (meaning caught hold of) by the enmity of the being who is wronged. The same phrase in its generalised form "*kriyayā spṛṣṭaḥ*" is employed to describe the net result of a wrong act as such (*kriyā* being the word for wrong act)[55]. And in the technical language of the Karma doctrine—a language which also often makes its appearance in Bhagavatī—the soul of the person committing a wrong act is permeated by the coresponding karma-of-the-form-of-physical-particles. This aspect of the matter is brought out most clearly in the Bhagavatī passages touching upon the problem of *karma* [56]. On the other hand, the details of the Karma doctrine that appear here are often partly and often unrecongizable. The conclusion is inevitable that these details took time to grow and there was some stage or other when some of them stood in the form that is palpably defferent from their final standardised form. For example, a lengthy Bhagavatī passage (rather collection of passages), to which reference has already been made, describes in great destails the qualifications of one who is going to attain first omniscience and then *mokṣa*, and it is in this very connection that the later *karma* specialists decribe the qualifications of a *kṣapakaśreṇī-ārohī* (incidentally of an *upaśamaśreṇī-ārohī*); but the former description is so strikingly different from the latter that it can at best be called its remote ancestor[57]. And there are other similar cases though not so important. For example, Bhagavatī too often speaks of a karma-type called *kāṅkṣā-mohanīya* but no karma-type of the name is known to the later authors; the context makes it clear that what is being described is what the later authors call *darśanamohanīya* and the conclusion is that there was a time when *darśanamohanīya* was called *kāṅkṣāmohanīya*.

(vi) Reality in General

In view of its rather advanced technical nature it seems reasonable to suppose that the doctrine of *dravya, pradeśa* and *paryāya* came on the scene later than the comparatively simple doctrine of five *astikāyas*. Of course, it was these very five *astikāyas* (plus time) that were viewed in terms of *dravya, predeśa* and *prayāya* but that they were so viewed is significant; for thus started the process that culminated in a clear recognition of three important ontological category-couples, viz. (i) substance and pro-

perty, (ii) composite and component, (iii) space and time. Thus it was realised that whatever exists must be a substance-possessed-of-properties and that a substance can belong to any of the following types: (1) *dharma*, (2) *adharma*, (3) *ākāśa*, (4) *pudgala-paramāṇu*, (5) *pudgala-skandha* (6) *jīva*, (7) *addhāsamaya*. Similarly, it was realised that almost all types of substances can in a way be treated as composites but that five different cases must be recognised in this connection:

(1) *Dharma*, *adharma* and *ākāśa* are composites whose components remain fixed in location as well as number (and they are always the same).

(2) A *jīva* is a composite whose components remain fixed in number but not in location (and they are always the same).

(3) A *pudgala-skandha* is a composite whose components remain fixed neither in number nor in location (which means that they are not always the same).

(4) A *pudgala-paramāṇu* is not at all a composite.

(5) An *addhāsamaya* is not at all a composite.

[Here it was also made clear that (3) was the only case where a substance had other substances for its component parts and sometimes it was felt that this was the only case where the category-couple 'composite and component' was strictly applicable].

Lastly, it was realised that whatever exists must occupy units (at least one unit) of space and units (at least one unit) of time; (of course, space cannot occupy a unit of itself, nor can time do so). In this background were developed the concepts 'unit of property' (*bhāvapradeśa*), 'unit of component-of-the-form-of-substance' (*dravyapradeśa*), 'unit of space' (*kṣetrapradeśa*), 'unit of time' (*kālapradeśa*); (the second type of unit was possible only in the case of a physical composite). All this made for a basic clarification of ontological issues and all this is somehow present in Bhagavatī[65]. But it was a far cry from Tattvārtha type of pointed query as to the nature of reality in general, a query to which reply there came in the form "all that is real must be possessed of origination, destruction, permanence".

Here we close our critical analysis of philosophical content of Bhagavatī and proceed to take up the material contained in certain minor texts that appear to be old. For certain reasons it will be convenient to consider these texts in the following order: Ācārāṅgasūtra, Daśavaikālikasūra, Sūtrakṛtāṅgasūtra.

(B) ĀCĀRĀṄGASŪTRA

Ācārāṅgasūtra is a text almost exclusively devoted to the problems of conduct but the first adhyayana of its first śrutaskandha touches upon ques-

tions that have some philosophical bearing. And in view of the utmost sanctity attached to this part of the text it will be instructive to note what it has to say in this connection. The reader's attention is here drawn to the fact that the living beings are of six types, viz. earth-bodied, water-bodied, fire-bodied, air-bodied, plant-bodied and mobile-bodied. Of course no arguments are forthcoming to corroborate the contention.

(C) DAŚAVAIKĀLIKASŪTRA

Daśavaikālikasūtra too is a text almost exclusively devoted to the problems of conduct but in its chapter fourth it follows the procedure of the first adhyayana of the first śrutaskandha of Ācārāṅgasūtra and draws the reader's attention to the fact that the living beings are of the above-mentioned six types.

(D) SŪTRAKṚTĀṄGASŪTRA

Sūtrakṛtāṅgasūtra is a text of somewhat different sort. On the whole it is meant to train up beginners on the questions of doctrine--chiefly ethical ones. As such it sometimes raises questions of a philosophical nature. Its first śrutaskandha is older than the second one (by the way, the same is the case with Ācārāṅgasūtra), and in the first śrutaskandha one occasionally comes across a bare assertion to the effect that the living beings are of six types (it thus following the pattern of the earlier mentioned portions of Ācārāṅga and Daśavaikālika). But in the second śrutaskandha the matter has been gone into a bit more deeply. Thus its third adhyayana undertakes an elaborate description of the life-activities — mainly the nourishing process — of the different types of living beings while its fourth adhayayana emphasises — in the manner of the corresponding passages of Bhagavatī — that even the one-sensed beings (i.e. the earth –, water–, fire–, air–, plant-bodied beings) are capable of performing immoral acts; similarly, its seventh adhyayana argues that a soul which is static-bodied in this life can become mobile-bodied in the next — though these two broad classes of beings will always remain in existence. However, Sūtrakṛtāṅga — in both its śrutaskandhas — also contains philosophical material of another type and as a matter of fact it is on account of this that the text has so often attracted the attention of the general students of Indian philosophy. Thus here we now and then come across an account of the non-Jaina philosophical doctrines like materialist, Sāṅkhya, Vaiśeṣika, Buddhist, Vedānta etc. Of course, these doctrines are seldom mentioned by name ard the wording of the concerned account is often obscure; moreover, these doctrines are almost never subjected to a criticism on philosophical grounds (objections against them being raised on ethical grounds). This severely limits the importance of this part of Sūtrakṛtāṅga for a study like the present one which is chiefly interested in tracing the evolution of the Jaina philosophical doctrines in and for themselves.

3 THE SECOND STAGE

The second stage in the evolution of the age of Āgamas is chiefly represented by Prajñāpanāsūtra. As has already been noted, the text is a collection of theoretical discussions conducted at a purely theoretical level and from the point of view of style this is definitely something of an advance when viewed in the backrgound of a text like Bhagavatī which is more or less tied down to the apron-strings of the dialogue style. Then there are certain minor texts which contain philosophical material and seem to have come into existence nearabout the time of Prajñāpanā. Let us therefore critically analyse first the content of Parjñāpanā and then the philosophical content of the minor texts in question.

(A) PRAJÑĀPANĀSŪTRA

Prajñāpanā is divided into 36 chapters each of which is devoted to one topic but these chapters are arranged in no particular order. Moreover, even while certain parts of the text say things about *loka-aloka*, *pañcāsati-kāya*-cum-*kāla* and *pudgala* no independent chapters are devoted to them and as a result it looks as if the whole discussion is related to the world of living beings. With a view to clearly seeing the advancement made by Prajñāpanā over Bhagavatī in its treatment of topics it will be better if its content is analysed under the same heads as were employed while analysing the content of Bhagavatī.

(i) Loka-aloka

Twice does Prajñāpanā say things about *loka* and *aloka* and they are symptomatic of the dominant interests developed by the Jaina theoreticians of the period. There was no more the question of justifying a belief in the existence of *loka* and *aloka* — or that of the contents that filled them—; this existence was just taken for granted and the task was to draw simple corollaries from the supposed existence—moreover, corollaries chiefly based on the consideration that things of the universe are composites made up of units. Thus in the chapter 15th (viz. Indriyapada) devoted to a treatment of sense-organs (and it is not at all clear why here) the question is raised whether *loka* is or is not touched by *dharma*, a part of *dharma*, the units of *dharma*, by *adhrama*, a part of *adharma*, the units of *adharma*, by *ākāśa*, a part of *ākāśa*, the units of *ākāśa*, by the static-bodied being, by the mobile-bodied beings, by *addhāsamaya*; and the question is repeated about *aloka*, Jambūdvīpa and the remaining *dvīpas*.[69] To appreciate the answers forthcoming we have to remember that x is touched by y in case x and y are co-terminus in space, x is touched by a part of y in case x and a part of y are co-terminus in space, x is touched by the units of y in case x is co-terminus with certain units of y (possibly with all of

its units). This will cover the case of *dharma, adharma* and *ākāśa*. As for the static-bodied and mobile-bodied beings x is touched by one group or the other in case its members are to be found throughout the expanse of x. Lastly, x is touched by *addhāsamaya* in case x happens to lie within the region called *samayakṣetra* (consisting of the two innermost world-oceans along with the related two world-continents and a half). In the other concerned passage occurring in the chapter 10th (viz. Caramapada) the issues raised are even more far-fetched. For here it is supposed that both *loka* and *aloka* are made up of a border-region and an intermediate region and the question is raised about the relative numerical strength of the *dravyas* lying within the border-region of *loka*; those lying within its intermediate region, those lying within the border-region of *aloka*, those lying within its intermediate region, all these *dravyas* taken together the *prodeśas* lying within the border-region of *loka*, those lying within its intermediate region, the *pradeśas* lying within the border-region of *aloka*, those lying within its intermediate region, all these *pradeśas* taken together.[60] The calculation forthcoming is based on the supposition that the border-region of *loka* as well as *aloka* is made up of *asaṅkhyāta dravyas* and *asaṅkhyāta* X *asaṅkhyāta pradeśas* (but in both cases the number being slightly bigger for *aloka*);[61] on the other hand, the intermediate region of *loka* as well as *aloka* is made up of just one substance while the number of *pradeśas* is *asaṅkhyāta* X *asaṅkhyāta* X *asaṅkhyāta* in the case of *loka* and *ananta* in that of *aloka*. However, the entire discussion remains obscure on the most crucial question arising in this connection, viz. what is meant by the border region and the substances lying within it, what is meant by the intermediate region and the one substance lying within it ?

(ii) Pañcāstikāya-cum-samaya

About *pañcāstikāya* and *samaya* things have been said on three occasions but on two of them (viz. chapters I and V) there is given a bare enumeration of the items possible in one's connection, viz. *jīva* and 14 *ajīvas* as follows : (1) *dharma* (2) a part of *dharma* (3) the units of *dharma* (4) *adharma* (5) a part of *adharma* (6) the units of *adharma* (7) *ākāśa* (8) a part of *ākāśa* (9) the units of *ākāśa* (10) *pudgalaskandha* (2 physical aggregate) (11) a part of *pudgalaskandha* (12) the units of *pudgalaskandha* (13) *pudgalaparamāṇu* (14) *addhāsamaya*;[62] (we had just met ten of these items in connection with our first discussion related to *loka* and *aloka*). A more detailed discussion of the problem occurs in the chapter 3rd (viz. Alpabahutva).[63] Here the question is raised about the relative numerical strength of the following items :

(1) *dharma* in its capacity as substance (one or many)
(2) *adharma* ,,
(3) *ākāśa* ,,

(4) *jīva* ,,
(5) *pudgala* ,,
(6) *addhāsamaya* ,,
(7) *dharma* in its capacity as so many *pradeśas*
(8) *adharma* ,,
(9) *ākāśa* ,,
(10) *jīva* ,,
(11) *pudgala* ,,
(12) *addhāsamaya* ,,

In this connection it was maintained that the items (1), (2) and (3) are unitary, (7) and (8) are *asaṅkhyāta*, (4) is *ananta* times (7)-(8), 10 is *asaṅkhyāta* times (4), (5) is *ananta* times (10), (11) is *asaṅkhyāta* times (5), (6) and (12) are *ananta* times (11), (9) is *ananta* times (6) and (12). It is obvious that so many suppositions have been made here but one of them deserves comment. The later Jaina theoreticians invariably treat *ananta* as a definite number and so it can be understood why the number of *jīvas* or that of *ākāśapradeśas* should be *ananta*. But then it becomes difficult to see how *addhāsamaya* can consist of *ananta* units. For *addhāsamaya* must consist of unending units, that is, of units that can be called *ananta* only in a non-technical sense. To make matter still more difficult of comprehension *ākāśapradeśas* are supposed to be *ananta* times the number of *addhāsamaya* unites; (it would have made some sense if just the opposite was the case). Be that as it may, soon afterwards we are offered the following list of items arranged in the order of numerical strength :

(1) *sarvajīva* (*sarva*=all)
(2) *sarvapudgala*
(3) *sarva-addhāsamaya*
(4) *sarvadravya*
(5) *sarvapradeśa*
(6) *sarvaparyāya*[64]

Here (2) is *ananta* times (1), (3) *ananta* times (2), (4) a little more than (3), (5) *ananta* times (4), (6) *ananta* times (5); (here (4) is only a little more than (3) because each *addhāsamaya* is already a *dravya* so that an addition of even all the remaning *dravyas* would not make much difference to the number that already characterises *addhāsamaya*). This list is noteworthy because it indicates as to what aspect of the important problem of *dravya*, *pradeśa* and *paryāya* was being emphasised in the times of Prajñāpanā.

(iii) Pudgala

A general information regarding *pudgala* is offered in the chapters 1st and 13th (viz. Prajñāpanāpada and Pariṇāmapada). In the former chapter following are said to be the generic properties of *pudgala* : 5 colours, 5 tastes, 2 smells, 8 touches and 5 shapes;[65] in the latter chapter the following ones are added : *śabda* (i. e. speech), *bandha* (binding), *gati* (motion), *bheda* (splitting), *agurulaghu* (being neither-heavy-nor-light).[66] That speech is made

up of physical particles is an old Jaina position and an independent chapter of Prajñāpanā (the 11th viz. Bhāṣāpada) is devoted to the problem. Under the head 'binding' is here described the process of atomic bondage as a result of which multi-atomic aggregates come into existence. Motion is classified into long and short (*dirgha* and *hrasva*) on the one hand and into 'touch-producing' and 'non-touch-producing' (*spṛśadgati* and *aspṛśadgati*) on the other; the meaning of the latter classification is not clear. Under the head 'splitting' are described five ways in which a physical body might disintegrate. As for *agurulaghu* it characterises only certain types of physical substances (really speaking, only those ones which belong to the subtle type — as described in Bhagavatī); on the other hand, it invariably characterises all the remaining *astikāyas* as well as *addhāsamaya*.

In the chapter 5th (viz. Viśeṣapada) another aspect of the problem is touched upon. For here an enumeration is made of the counts on which two physical bodies might be compared with each other; and the following list of five items was drawn up in this connection :

(i) being a substance
(ii) possessing *pradeśas* (i. e. being made up of constituent atoms)
(iii) possessing a size (i. e. occupying *ākāśa-pradeśas*)
(iv) possessing a duration (i. e. occupying *addhāsamayas*)
(v) possessing a property (i. e. possessing degrees of a property)

Moreover, it was laid down that there are following six ways in which two quantities x and y might differ from each other.

(i) y might be more than x or less than x by an amount equivalent to $\frac{x}{sankhy\bar{a}ta}$

(ii) y might be more than x or less than x by an amount equivalent to $\frac{x}{asankhy\bar{a}ta}$

(iii) y might be more than x or less than x by an amount equivalent to $\frac{x}{ananta}$

(iv) y might be equivalent to $\frac{x}{sa\dot{n}khy\bar{a}ta}$ or x X *saṅkhyāta*

(v) y might be equivalent to $\frac{x}{asa\dot{n}khy\bar{a}ta}$ or x X *asaṅkhyāta*

(vi) y might be equivalent to $\frac{x}{ananta}$ or x X *ananta*

Now two physical bodies must be equivalent to each other in respect of being a substance, for certainly each of them must be one substance. On ther other hand, it is possible for two such bodies to differ from each

other in respect of possessing constituent-atoms, size, duration, degree-of-a-property. In the first and fourth cases the concerned difference can exhibit all the six above-enumerated ways, but in the second and third cases two ways which involve the number *ananta* are not possible; this is so because a physical body can possibly be made up of *ananta* constituent-atoms and can possibly possess *ananta* degrees of a property but it cannot occupy more than *asaṅkhyāta ākāśa-pradeśas*, and cannot last for more than *asaṅkhyāta samayas*.[67]

In the chapter 3rd (viz. Alpabahutvapada) an account was given first of the relative numerical strength of physical bodies lying in the three regions of the world — viz. upper region, middle region, lower region and then of the relative numerical strength of physical bodies lying in ten directions of the world — viz. south, south-east, east, north-east, west, south-west, north, north-west, upper, lower.[68] But these accounts are based on so many obscure considerations and we might ignore them. Then the same question -- that is, the question of relative numerical strength was raised about the physical bodies made up of this or that number of constituent-atoms, those occupying this or that number of space-units, those occupying this or that number of time-units, those possessing this or that number of units-of-a-property.[69] In each case the net result was a list arranged in order. The first list had following seven items :

(1) substances made up of *ananta* atoms
(2) atoms constituting the substances listed in (1)
(3) loose atoms
(4) substances made up of *saṅkhyāta* atoms.
(5) atoms constituting the substances listed in (4)
(6) substances made up of *asaṅkhyāta* atoms
(7) atoms constituting the substances listed in (6)

[Here (2) is *ananta* times (1), (3) *ananta* times (2), (4) *saṅkhyāta* times (3), (5) *saṅkhyāta* times (4), (6) *asaṅkhyāta* times (5), (7) *asaṅkhyāta* times (6)]. The second list had following six items :


(1) substances occupying one space-unit
(2) space-units occupied by the substances listed in (1)
(3) substances occupying *saṅkhyāta* space-units
(4) space-units occupied by the substances listed in (3)
(5) substances occupying *asaṅkhyāta* space-units
(6) space-units occupied by the substances listed in (5)

[Here (1) and (2) are equal, (3) is *saṅkhyāta* times (2), (4) *saṅkhyāta* times (3), (5) *asaṅkhyāta* times (4), (6) *asaṅkhyāta* times (5)]. The third list was identical with the second—with 'time-unit' substituted for 'space-unit'. In the case of the fourth list a distinction was








made between the properties hard-touch, soft-touch, heavy-touch, and light-touch on one hand and the remaining ones on the other. And it was laid down that the relative numerical strength of the substances possessing a degree of the latter of these properties follows the above first list while that of the substances possessing a degree of the former follows the above second list. For example, among the substances possessing the minimum degree of black colour least numerous are the *ananta*-atomic aggregates, *ananta* times them their constituent atoms, *ananta* times them loose atoms, etc. etc. Similarly, among the atoms possessing the minimum degree of hard touch least numerous are those occupying one space-unit, the same is the number of the space-units occupied by them, *saṅkhyāta* times them are the substances occupying *saṅkhyāta* space-units, etc. etc.

In the chapter 10th (viz. Caramapada) the question was raised as to how the features *carama*, *acarama and avaktavya* are exhibited by physical bodies in their capacity as atomic aggregates[70]. As will become clear later on the features in question are to some extent technical concepts. But broadly speaking, a *carama* atom is an atom lying in the border region, an *acarama* atom one lying in the intermediate region, an *avaktavya* atom one indescribable either way. Here it was supposed that each of these features can appear single, they can appear in twos, or they can appear all together; again, it was supposed that each of these features can appear either in one part of the concerned body or in more than one part of it. Now arithmatical computation shows that thus conceived these features can appear single in six ways, they can appear in twos in twelve ways, they can appear all together in eight ways. But let these alternatives be worked out in details so that it can be seen as to which of them are supposed impossible and what is the minimum number of atoms required to yield each possible alternative :


I Six cases of each feature appearing single :

Name	Shape	Minimum Number of atoms
(1) one *carama*		= 2
(2) one *acarama*	—	
(3) one *avaktavya*		= 1
(4) many *caramas*	—	
(5) many *acaramas*	—	
(6) many *avaktavyas*	—	

II Twelve cases of the three features appearing in twos:

Name	Shape	Minimum Number of Atoms
(7) one *carama* – one *acarama*		= 5
(8) one *carama* – many *acaramas*		= 6
(9) many *caramas* – one *acarama*		= 3
(10) many *caramas* – many *acaramas*		= 4
(11) one *carama* – one *avaktavya*		= 3
(12) one *carama* – many *avaktavyas*		= 4
(13) many *caramas* – one *avaktavya*		= 5

(14) many *caramas*
– many *avaktavyas*



= 6

(15) one *acarama*
– one *avaktavya* —

(16) one *acarama*
– many *avaktavyas* —


(17) many *acaramas*
– one *avaktavya* —

(18) many *acaramas*
– many *avaktavyas* —

III Eight cases of the three features appearing together :


Name	Shape	Minimum Number of Atoms

(19) one *carama*
– one *acarama*
– one *avaktavya*




= 6

(20) one *carma*
one *acarama*
many *avaktvya*




= 7

(21) one *carama*
many *acaramas*
one *avaktavya*




= 7

(22) one *carama*
- many *acaramas*
- many *avaktavyas*




= 8

(23) many *caramas*
- one *acarama*
- one *avaktavya*




= 4

(24) many *caramas*
- one *acarama*
- many *avaktavyas*




= 5

(25) many *caramas*
- many *acaramas*
- one *avaktavya*



= 5

(26) many *caramas*
many *acaramas*
many *avaktavyas*



= 6

Thus there are 18 possible alternatives in all, and in many of them it is obvious why an atom is given one of the designations in question but in some of them (i. e. in the alternative 7th) the practice adopted is merely conventional. Moreover, the above list along with diagrams shows what is the minimum number of atoms required to yield a particular alternative. So when we recall that a space-unit can contain any number of atoms it becomes obvious that the same number of atoms can be arranged in terms of more than one of the above alternatives. The simple rule of thumb in this connection is that a given number of atoms will yield all these alternatives whose minimum requirement is that same number of atoms or less. For example, six atoms will yield the alternatives 1, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 19, 23, 24, 25, 26. [Incidentally it might be noted that here we come across features which look something like those that later on

appear in the *Saptabhaṅgī* doctrine and yet the present discussion has nothing to do with the doctrine in question].

There are the cases (at least they are the most important such cases) where Prajñāpanā says things about matter as such. The question of matter as used by a living being should better be taken up in connection with the consideration of the nature of soul; for there a special sub-section will be devoted to the bodily activities undertaken by a living being.

(iv) Jiva

As has already been hinted, the whole of Prajñāpanā looks like a prolonged treatment of the nature of soul. Those parts of certain chapters which touch upon the problems of *Loka-aloka*, *pañcāstikāya*-cum-*kāla* and *pudgala* we have already considered in some details; the six chapters dealing with the various aspects of the Karma doctrine we intend to take up separately. But barring these two text-portions it can certainly be said that the whole of Prajñāpanā says something or else about soul. It will be convenient to divide the Prajñāpanā treatment of soul into the following six parts and take them one by one for special consideration.

(1) General
(2) Bodily activities
(3) Cognitive activities
(4) Emotive activities
(5) Conative activities
(6) Affective activities

(1) General

Almost all general information that Prajñāpanā has to offer concerning the world of living beings is concentrated in its first five chapters that fittingly serve as an introduction to the whole text. This is to be supplemented by what is said in the important chapter 13th (viz. Pariṇāmapada). The chapter 1st (viz. Prajñāpanāpada) presents an elaborate classification of the animate world (a world that naturally includes the earth-bodied, water-bodied, fire-bodied, air-bodied and plant-bodied beings), the chapter 2nd (viz. Sthānapada) yields information as to which parts of the world are inhabited by this or that class of living beings, the chapter 3rd (viz. Alpabahutvapada) does the same about the relative numerical strength of the different classes of living beings, the chapter 4th (viz. Sthitipada) does the same about the life-duration of the different classes of living beings. All these details — dogmatic for the most part — deserve close perusal, for one ignorant of them can make little head or tail of much that goes in the name of Āgamic ontological speculation. But specially noteworthy in this connection are certain methodological tendencies. While undertaking a classification of the living world Prajñāpanā usually speaks of 24 types arranged according to their place of residence. Thus we have :

(1) *Nāraka* (hell-born being) residing in the lower most part of the lower region of *loka*.

(2-11) Ten classes of *Bhavanapatideva* (*deva*= god) residing in the upper most part of the lower region of *loka*.

(12-21) *pṛthvī* (earth), *jala* (water), *agni* (fire), *vāyu* (air), *vanaspati* (plant), *dvīndriya* (two-sensed being), *trīndriya* (three-sensed being), *caturindriya* (four-sensed being), *pañcendriyatiryak* (five-sensed animal), *manuṣya* (man) mostly residing in the lower part of the middle region of *loka*.

(22) *Vyantaradeva* mostly residing in the upper part of the middle region of *loka*.

(23) *Jyotiṣkadeva* residing in the uppermost part of the middle region of *loka*.

(24) *Vaimānikadeva* residing in the upper region of *loka*.

As can easily be seen this classification has got grave mythological undertones but it is an old one inasmuch as it is usually present in Bhagavatī also. But in the important and basic chapter 1st of Prajñāpanā a better classification appears which speaks of the following main types :

Ekendriya (one-sensed being), *dvīndriya*, *trīndriya*, *caturindriya*, *pañcendriya* — the last sub-divided into *nāraka* (hell-born being), *tiryak* (animal), *manuṣya* (man) and *deva* (god); it is made use of in the chapters 2nd and 3rd as well and once at least it too appears in Bhagavatī. This new classification also takes note of the sub-classes *sūkṣma* (subtle) and *bādara* (gross) (to be found only among the class *ekendriya*) and of the sub-classes *paryāpta* (fully developed) and *aparyāpta* (partly developed) (to be found among all the five classes). It thus approaches quite near the later list of 14 *jīvasthānas*, but in order to actually become the latter it will have to subdivide the class *pañcendriya* into *sañjñī* (possessing higher cognitive capacity) and *asañjñī* (not possessing higher cognitive capacity) rather than into *nāraka*, *tiryak*, *manuṣya*, *deva*. And on this question Prajñāpanā adopts a rather odd usage, for it speaks of the sub-classes *sañjnī* and *asañjñī* not only in the case of *tiryak* and *manuṣya* but also in that of *nāraka* and *deva*, and unless this practice is given up the list of 14 *jīvasthānas* cannot emerge. Of course, when Prajñāpanā uses the words *sañjñī* and *asañjñī* in its account of *nāraka* and *deva* it is not using them in their natural meaning, but its manner of thus speaking does suggest that the idea has not occurred to it that the sub-division of the class *pañcendriya* into *sañjñī* and *asañjñī* is a basically important subdivision. And for our present purpose this is all that matters.

Again, in the chapter 3rd Prajñāpanā speaks of the relative numerical strength of the classes of living beings posited by it earlier. But here it also

takes into account the classes got by adopting 20 other schemes of classification -- and these are what the later Śvetāmbara Āgamic authors call 20 *mārgaṇāsthānas*.[71] The following are the items occurring in the list of *mārgaṇāsthānas* :

(1) *gati* (class of animate being)
(2) *indriya* (sense-organ)
(3) *kāya* (body)
(4) *yoga* (activity)
(5) *veda* (sexual behaviour)
(6) *kaṣāya* (certain vices)
(7) *leśyā* (mental temperament)
(8) *samyaktva* (faith)
(9) *jñāna* (determinate cognition)
(10) *darśana* (indeterminate cognition)
(11) *saṁyama* (moral discipline)
(12) *upayoga* (cognition)
(13) *āhāraka* (undertaking nourishment)
(14) *bhāṣaka* (capable of speaking)
(15) *parīta* (having one body each)
(16) *paryāpta* (fully developed)
(17) *sūkṣma* (subtle)
(18) *sañjñī* (possessing higher cognitive capacity)
(19) *bhavya* (capable of attaining *mokṣa*)
(20) *carama* (capable of attaining *mokṣa*)

(The more famous list of 14 *mārgaṇāsthānas* excludes the item nos. 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20). Of course, Prajñāpanā anomalously inserts the item *astikāya* (rather *astikāya*-cum-*kāla*) in between the 19th and 20th but that has to be ignored--even if the performance is similarly repeated in the chapter 18th (viz. Kāyasthitipada). Now in this part of the discussion it is only in connection with the items 1-3 that we come across what might be called the natural classification of the living world; and in this part it is only such a classification that is in place. For in order to grasp the import of the remaining items of the list much secondary information will have to be collected first. It is not unlikely that this part of the discussion is a later interpolation -- i. e. an interpolation made after the list of 20 *mārgaṇāsthānas* was finally established.

In the chapter 13th (viz. Pariṇāmapada) an enumeration of the basic properties of soul has been undertaken and a list of the following ten items has been drawn up in this connection :

(1) *gati*; (2) *indriya* (3) *kaṣāya* (4) *leśyā* (5) *yoga* (6) *upayoga* (7) *jñāna* (8) *darśana* (*samyaktva*) (9) *cāritra* (*saṁyama*) (10) *veda*[72]. Here the 24 classes

of living beings have been taken up one by one and each studied in terms of the 10 items in question—a procedure reminiscent of the later authors' treatment of 14 *jīvasthānas* in terms of 14 *mārgaṇāsthānas*. All the 10 items in question appear in the later list of 20 *mārgaṇāsthānas* (and only one viz. *upayoga* is absent in the later list of 14 *mārgaṇāsthānas*). This confirms the supposition that in the body of Prajñāpanā the discussions conducted in terms of 20 *mārgaṇāsthānas* are a later interpolation; for otherwise the present chapter should have spoken of 20 rather than 10 items.

Lastly, we take up the information regarding the living world contained in the chapter 5th (viz. Viśeṣapada)[78]. Here an enumeration has been made of the counts on which two souls might be compared with each other, and the following list of eight items was drawn up in this connection :

(i) being a substance
(ii) possessing *pradeśas*
(iii) possessing a size
(iv) possessing a duration
(v) possessing a physical property
(vi) possessing *jñāna*
(vii) possessing *ajñāna*
(viii) possessing *darśana*;

(in the item (v) the physical property concerned is the property of the body possessed by a soul).

Let us recall that the corresponding list in the case of physical bodies consisted of the first five of these items; and the present list incidentally indicates that a soul's cognitive capacities are considered to be its most characteristic capacities. Any way, two souls must be equivalent in respect of being a substance and in respect of possessing so many *pradeśas*, but they might differ in respect of possessing bodily size, life-duration and cognitive capacity. Again, the last difference can occur in all the six possible ways, the first two in these minus the two that involve the number *ananta*. But in this part of the discussion Prajñāpanā does not rest content with saying this much, for here the 24 types of living beings have been taken up one by one and in each case it has been considered as to how the remaining two types of differences occur in company with the maximum bodily size, minimum bodily size, intermediate bodily size, how they do so in company with the maximum life-duration, minimum life-duration, intermediate life-duration, how they do so in company with the maximum cognitive capacities, minimum cognitive capacities, intermediate cognitive capacities. [In this connection much information about the possible bodily size, the possible life-duration and the possible cognitive capacities of the different classes of living beings has already been presupposed].

(2) Bodily Activities

Several chapters of Prajñāpanā are devoted to the problems related to body as such or bodily activities and we take them one by one.

(i) The chapter 12th (viz. Śarīrapada) first enumerates the five types of bodies and then it takes up the 24 classes of living beings one by one in each case asking as to how many bodies of this or that type it possesses at present, how many of them it has possessed in the past; the first information is interesting because it incidentally gives us the supposed number of beings belonging to the class in question.

(ii) The chapter 21st (viz. Avagāhanāpada) treats the problem of bodily size. Here we are informed about the maximum and minimum bodily sizes possible in this or that class of living beings, then about the relative numerical strength of the five types of bodies, then about the relative numerical strength of the respective minimum sizes of the five types of bodies, lastly about the relative numerical strength of the respective maximum sizes of the five types of bodies.

(iii) The chapter 9th (viz. Yonipada) describes the respective birth-places of the different classes of beings. A being's birth-place can be the mother's womb but it need not be so—for the supposition is that many classes of being (e g. *nāraka*, *deva*, *ekendriya*, *dvīndriya*, *trīndriya*, *caturindriya*, and even some *pañcendriya* do not come out of the mother's womb). We are told that a being's birth-place might be either hot or cold or mixed, either animate or inanimate or mixed, either concealed or revealed or mixed.

(iv) The chapter 7th (viz. Ucchvāsapada) describes for each class of beings the maximum interval possible between one breathing and another.

(v) The chapter 28th (viz Āhārapada) describes for each class of being the maximum interval possible between one feeding and another. Again, a distinction has been made between pre-birth feeding, feeding through skin, feeding through mouth, feeding through sheer desire — also between voluntary feeding and involuntary feeding. And we are told as to which class of beings undertakes which of these types of feeding. This chapter also deals at length with a problem which has only nominal relation with that of feeding. The supposition is that a being undertakes no feeding while in the process of transmigration from one body to the next and here we are asked about a number of properties whether they can be had by one who is undertaking no feeding; obviously, the question amounts to asking whether the properties in question can be possessed by one who is in the process of transmigration from one body to the next, a question that has nothing to do with feeding as such.

(vi) The chapter 34th (viz. Pravicāraṇāpada) is chiefly meant to convey information about the sexual behaviour of the living beings in general and gods in particular. But the discussion is largely rambling.

(vii) The chapter 11th (viz. Bhāṣāpada) contains miscellaneous information about language but towards the end details are laid down in order to bring out that speech is physical in nature. Many of the things said here are identical with those said in the chapter on feeding—thus emphasising that speaking and feeding are two essentially identical activities. Interesting in this connection is a formula which describes the general behaviour of the physical-particles-of-the-form-of-speech when they are being received by a being; this formula is old and of a very wide use as is evident from its extremely frequent occurrence in Bhagavatī and on all possible occasions — that is, on all those occasions where the process of receiving physical particles in any form whatsoever is under description. In any case, in the present chapter we are told how one, when preparing oneself for speech, receives physical-particles-of-the-form-of-speech and how one, when actually speaking, expels these particles out.

(viii) The chapter 6th (viz. Vyutkrāntipada) contains information about births and deaths taking place in the different classes of living beings. Thus in connection with each of these classes we are here given the minimum and maximum periods during which no birth takes place, again the minimum and maximum periods during which no death takes place. Then we are given the minimum and maximum numbers for beings that can simultaneously be born in one class, again the minimum and maximum numbers for beings that can simultaneously die in it. Similarly, we are told about each class of living beings as to what possible classes a member of it could have belonged to in the previous birth, again as to what possible classes a member of it can belong to in the next birth.

(ix) The chapter 18th (viz. Kāyasthitipada) lays down the minimum and maximum periods for which one can continuously belong to a particular class of living beings. In this chapter — just as in the chapter 3rd (viz. Alpabahutvapada) — the enquiry is conducted not only in terms of the 24 well recognized classes of living beings but also in terms of the classes yielded by 20 *mārgaṇāsthānas*. And just like that earlier enquiry this too was possibly a later interpolation.

(x) The chapter 28th (Antakriyāpada) first of all tells us as to the members of which classes of living beings can possibly attain *mokṣa* in their next birth (one must be born as a human being in order to attain *mokṣa* in one's this very life); then we are given the minimum and maximum numbers for such members belonging to the classes in question. Again,

a list of nine increasingly nobler life-activities is drawn up and we are informed as to how many of them are possible-of-achievement-in-next-birth for a member of this or that class of living beings. Lastly, about certain particularly noble personages and certain particularly auspicious things (e. g. *tīrthankara*=the higher authority on matters religious and spiritual), *cakravartī* (world conqueror), 14 *cakravartiratnas* (jewels in possession of a world-conqueror) we are told as to which particular classes of living beings they could possibly have belonged to in their previous birth.

These are the Prajñāpanā passages which deal with what might be called — in some sense or other — the bodily activities undertaken by a living being.

(3) Cogntive Activities

Several chapters of Prajñāpanā are devoted to the problems related to cognitive activities and we take them one by one.

(i) The chapter 15th (viz. Indriyapada) in its major parts contains information about the physical make-up of sense-organs but it also raises certain questions that are of cognitive significance. Thus we are here told that the object of visual senseorgan does not touch it, that of auditory sense-organ does touch it, while that of another sense-organ 'touches it and also enters it.' Then we are told about the minimum and maximum distances that can possibly lie in between a particular sense-organ and its object, then about the relative numerical strength of the minimum and maximum periods characterising the cognition had through different sense-organs. Lastly, we are told that sensory cognition is completed through the following five stages : *vyañjanāvagraha* (initial grasping of the object), *arthāvagraha* (final grasping of the object), *īhā* (cogitation), *avāya* (determination), *dhāraṇā* (retention) (the first stage being not possible in the case of cognition had through visual sense-organ — or of that had through *manas*).

(ii) In the chapter 29th (viz. Upayogapada) *upayoga* (i. e. cognition) is subdivided into *sākāra* (i. e. determinate) and *nirākāra* (i. e. indeterminate) and we are told that the *sākāra upayoga* of a *samyagdṛṣṭi* is to be called *jñāna*, that of a *mithyādṛṣṭi ajñāna* (there being five types of *jñāna*, three of *ajñāna*). On the other hand, *nirākāra upayoga* is to be called *darśana* (there being four types of it). Here we are also informed as to which types of *jñāna*, *ajñāna* and *darśana* are possible in the different classes of living beings.

(iii) The chapter 30th (viz. Paśyattāpada) almost repeats the basic information contained in the chapter 29th — thus suggesting that *paśyattā* is virtually a synonym for *upayoga*. But there is one difference; the lowest type of *jñāna*, the lowest type of *ajñāna* and the lowest type of *darśana* are

not to be called *paśyattā* — that is to say, four types of *jñāna*, two types of *ajñāna* and three types of *darśana* are to be called *paśyattā*. [It is noteworthy that the concept of *paśyattā* is to be found in no other Jaina text except Prajñāpanā.]

(iv) The chapter 31st (viz. Sañjñipada) is of cognitive significance because it enables us to know as to which classes of beings do and which do not possess *manas* — the indispensable organ of all higher type of cognition. But as has already been noted, the *nārakas* and *devas* are here called *sañjñi* not on the basis of their possession or non-possession of *manas* in this life (for in this life they all possess *manas*) but on the basis of their possession or non-possession of *manas* in their previous life.

(v) The chapter 33rd (viz. Avadhipada) is devoted to *avadhi* — the type of extrasensory cognition which a non-omniscient can possibly have and to which special importance had been attached since olden days. Here we are first told that *nārakas* and *devas* possess innate *avadhi* while *tiryaks* and *manuṣyas* can possibly possess acquired *avadhi*. Then we are told about the minimum and maximum spatial ranges of *avadhi* possessed by the different classes of living beings--also about the shapes had by *avadhi* (really shapes had by the region falling within the range of *avadhi*) in these different cases. Again, we are told that *nārakas* and *devas* must stand within the range of their *avadhi*, *tiryaks* must stand outside it, while *manuṣyas* can behave either way; similarly, *nārakas*, *devas* and *tiryaks* must have partial *avadhi* but *manuṣyas* can have either partial or complete *avadhi* (this corresponds to the old Bhagavatī distinction between *ādhovadhika* and *paramāvadhika*). Lastly, we are told that *avadhi* can be of eight types; of these five imply a possibility of change, three its non-possibility, and it is maintained that the acquired *avadhi* can belong to any of these eight types while the innate *avadhi* to the latter three alone.

These are the Prajñāpanā passages dealing with some aspect or other of cognitive activities.

(4) Emotive Activities

Several chapters of Prajñāpanā are devoted to the problems related to emotive activities and we take them one by one.

(i) The chapter 14th (viz. Kaṣāyapada) contains information about four basic vices (technically called *kaṣāya*), viz. anger, pride, deceit, greed.

(ii) The chapter 8th (viz. Sañjñāpada) contains information about ten basic vices (technically called *sañjñā*), viz. hunger, fear, sex-instinct, acquisitive instict, anger, pride, deceit, greed, *loka*, *ogha* (the precise import of the last two being not clear.)

(iii) The chapter 22nd (viz. Kriyāpada) contains information about *kriyā* (meaning vicious act) classified in two ways. Both classifications contain five items and in the case of each we are told as to which of them can or must go together and which cannot. In the case of the first classification we are told that the ultimate cause of the items in question are 18 vices, viz. *prāṇātipāta* down to *mithyādarśanaśalya*, that is, those 18 vices which had so often made their appearance in Bhagavatī; (of course, both the present lists of *kriyā* also frequently appear in Bhagavatī). The chapter also contains detailed information about the type of Karmic bondage experienced by one under the influence of this or that vice enumerated in the list of 18; but that is a part of the Karma doctrine.

(iv) The chapter 17th (viz. Leśyāpada) too should be treated as containing information about emotive activities inasmuch as the presence or otherwise of this or that *leśyā* is vitally dependent on the presence or otherwise of these or those types of *kaṣāya*. Here we are told as to which types of *leśyā* are possibly present in the different classes of living beings — in the case of each class also the relative numerical strength of the members possessing different *leśyās*. A good part of the chapter is devoted to a description of *leśyā* viewed as a physical substance.

(v) The chapter 19th (viz. Samyaktvapada) too should be treated as containing information about emotive activities inasmuch as the acquisition of *samyaktva* is deemed possible only when worst type of *kaṣāyas* are got rid of. For the rest, it should be made clear that possession of *samyaktva* means possession of religious faith in the Jaina doctrine. In the present chapter, a threefold distinction is made between *samyagdṛṣṭi* (i. e. one possessing *samyaktva*), *mithyādṛṣṭi* (i. e. one lacking *samyaktva*) and *samyagmithyādṛṣṭi* (i. e. one partially possessing *samyaktva*) and about each class of living beings we are told as to which of these three types are possibly present in it.

These are the Prajñāpanā passages dealing with some aspect or other of emotive activity.

(5) Conative Activities

Two chapters of Prajñāpanā are devoted to the problems related to conative activities and we take them one by one.

(i) The chapter 16th (viz Prayogapada) contains information about three types of activity, viz. mental, vocal, bodily. These are divided into 15 sub-types (the first into 4, the second into 4, the third into 7) and we are told as to which of these sub-types can be possibly present in this or that class of living beings.

(ii) The chapter 32nd (viz. Saṁyatapada) contains information about three types of morally disciplined beings, viz perfectly disciplined (*saṁyata*),

imperfectly disciplined (*saṁyatāsaṁyata*), undisciplined (*asaṁyata*) and we are told as to which of these types can be possibly present in this or that class of living beings.

(6) Affective Activities

Just one chapter of Prajñāpanā (the 35th, viz. Vedanāpada) is devoted to the problems related to affective activities. Here *vedanā* (i. e. feeling) is variously divided into types and in each case we are told as to which of the concerned types can be possibly present in this or that class of living beings. Following are the classifications offered in this connection :

I Hot, Cold, Hot-cum-Cold
II Bodily, Mental, Bodily-cum-mental
III Pleasant, Painful, Pleasant-cum-painful
IV Voluntary, Involuntary
V Self-conscious, Not-selfconscious

Here ends our hurried survey of the cases where Prajñāpanā says things about soul. As can be seen, these cases cover a major part of the text but with a view to keeping the discussion within manageable limits we have given comparatively less prominence to the problems that have little ontological bearing

(v) Karma

In Prajñāpanā 5 consescutive chapters — viz. 23rd - 27th — are devoted to a treatment of the Karma doctrine while the chapter 36th (viz. Samudghātapada) has also to do with the same. The Prajñāpanā treatment of *karma* is not so important for its own sake as for the sake of the light it throws on the historical evolution of the Karma doctrine. Certainly, what Prajñāpanā says in this connection is much more systematic and comprehensive than what Bhagavatī says in its corresponding passages but it is so elementary when compared with the later karma-specialists' performance on the question. Revealing in its own way is the Prajñāpanā chapter 23rd (viz. Karmaprakṛtipada) which is supposed to enumerate the types and sub-types of Karmas and is divided into two sections. A closer study reveals that these two sections are in fact an earlier draft and a later draft of the solution of the same problem. The second section enumerates the types and sub-types in question in a way that is the same as found in the later Karma texts, but the first section exhibits certain oddities. Most striking is this latter section's enumeration of the sub-types of *nāma karmas*; the list runs as follows :

(1) *Śubhanāma* (auspicious *nāmakarma*) : *iṣṭaśabda* (desirable sound), *iṣṭarūpa* (desirable colour), *iṣṭagandha* (desirable smell), *iṣṭarasa* (desirable taste), *iṣṭasparśa* (desirable touch), *iṣṭagati* (desirable motion), *iṣṭasthiti* (desirable stature), *iṣṭalāvaṇya* (desirable comeliness), *iṣṭa-*

yaśaḥkīrti (desirable fame), *iṣṭautthāna-karma-bala-vīrya-puruṣakāra-parākrama* (desirable preparedness, action, strength, energy, manly valour), *iṣṭasvara* (desirable voice), *kāntasvara* (beautiful voice), *priyasvara* (lovable voice), *manojñasvara* (amiable voice) (14 items in all).

(2) *Aśubhanāma* (inauspicious *nāmakarma*); *aniṣṭa* (undesirable) *śabda*, *aniṣṭarūpa*,.........*aniṣṭasvara*, *akāntasvara*, *hīnasvara*, *dīnasvara* (again 14 items in all).

This list is unknown to the later Karma-specialists but Bhagavatī contains passages which represent a stage when it was in the process of being formulated. Thus in one passage are enumerated ten inauspicious experiences of a *nāraka* and they are the first ten items of the above sub-list of *aśubhanāmakarma*;[74] again, another passage says that a newborn babe will exhibit certain good or bad bodily traits in case he is in possession of the corresponding good or bad *karmas*, and here the professed list of traits includes the last four items of the above sub-list of *śubha* and *aśubha nāmakarmas*.[75] Then we have to take into account the following features of the account contained in the chapters 24th-27th.

I It confines itself to the 8 basic types of *karmas*

II It confines itself to the problems of *karmabandha* (karmic bondage) and *karmavedana* (karmic experience).

III It conducts its discussion without naming the 14 *guṇasthānas* (and it says nothing that might presuppose the positing of 2nd and 8th *guṇasthānas*).

Contrasted to these are the corresponding features of the later-day account, viz.

I It takes in its purview not only the 8 basic types of *karmas* but also the sub-types posited in each case.

II It raises the problems of *karma-bandha*, *karma-vedana* (usually called *karmodaya*) and *karma-sattā* (karmic abidance).

III It explicitly conducts its discussion in terms of the 14 *guṇasthānas*.

It is not difficult to see the direction of the advance made by the latter account over the former. As for the actual subjectmatter of the four Prajñāpanā chapters in question it is as follows:

24th Karmabandhapada

[*Bandha* of which *karmas* takes place along with the *bandha* of this or that *karma* ?]

25th Karmavedapada

[*Vedana* of which *karmas* takes place along with the *bandha* of this or that *karma* ?]

26th **Karmavedabandhapada**

[*Bandha* of which *karmas* takes place along with the *vedana* of this or that *karma* ?]

27th Karmavedavedapada

[*Vedana* of which *karmas* takes place along with the *vedana* of this or that *karma* ?]

The chapter 36th (viz. Samudghātapada) raises the problem of *samudghāta* (massive expulsion of *karma*) which is a special problem related to the Karma doctrine and was in discussion since olden days. Numerous passages of Bhagavatī speak of *samudghāta* but it is noteworthy that almost always what is spoken of is *maraṇa-samudghāta* and this suggests that the doctrine of sevenfold *samudghātas* is a relatively later development; the seventh type of *samudghāta* viz. *kevalisamudghāta* constitutes a special case and was of course often mentioned in Bhagavatī. Be that as it may, the present chapter of Prajñāpanā classifies *samudghātas* into the following seven types : (1) *vedanāsamudghāta* (2) *kaṣāyasamudghāta* (3) *maraṇasamudghāta* (4) *vaikriyasamudghāta* (5) *taijasasamudghāta* (6) *āhārakasamudghāta* (7) *kevalisamudghāta*.[76] Then we are told as to which types of *samudghātas* are possible in this or that class of living beings. Afterwards it is calculated as to how many times in past could this or that type of *samudghāta* have been performed by a member of this or that class, also as to how many times in future can that be done. Similarly, it is calculated as to how many times in past could this or that type of *samudghāta* have been performed by the members of this or that class all taken together, also as to haw many times in future can that be done. The chapter — and with it the whole text — ends with a detailed description of *kevalisamudghāta*.

This much should enable us to form a broad picture of the salient features of the Prajñāpanā treatment of *karma*.

(vi) Reality in General

Prajñāpanā contains numerous accounts of physical bodies and a careful study of them makes it crystal clear that such a body has to be viewed

(1) as made of certain number of atoms

(2) as occupying certain number of space-units

(3) as occupying certain number of time-units

(4) as possessing certain number of degrees-of-a-property-like-colour etc.

As a matter of fact, this way of looking at things proves most fruitful in the case of physical bodies — though certainly one can adopt it also in the case of soul and the remaining *astikāyas*. [In the case of soul and the remaining *astikāyas* one has to speak of constituent units (rather than constituent atoms); similarly, in the case of soul the propertiesconcerned are

cognition etc. while in the case of the remaining *astikāyas* they are *agurulaghu* (=neither-heavy-nor-light) etc.] All this is vital for a clear understanding of so much that Prajñāpanā contains — particularly because the text so frequently indulges in a calculation of relative numerical strength conducted in terms of *dravya, pradeśa, kṣetra, kāla, bhāva* etc. And yet the fact remains that Prajñāpanā does not raise the question of the nature of reality in general — nor does it in any other way anticipate the later Tattvārtha position that a real thing must be characterised by origination, destruction as well as permanence

Having dealt with Prajñāpanā let us have a look at certain minor Āgamic texts which seem to be its contemporary and which contain philosophical discussions. It will be convenient to take them up in the following order : Jīvājīvābhigamasūtra, Uttarādhyayanasūtra, Rājapraśnīyasūtra.

(B) JĪVĀJĪVĀBHIGAMASŪTRA

One who has gone through Prajñāpanā will find little new in the philosophical parts of Jīvābhigama and the text itself frequently asks the reader to complete its account with the help of the relevant Prajñāpanā passages. [Jīvābhigama is really important for the very extensive account of the world-continents and world-oceans, contained in its chapter III, an account which looks like the interpolation of an entire text called Dvīpasāgaraprajñapti within the body of Jīvābhigama]. What Jīvābhigama does is to classify the world of living beings variously in its various chapters — to be precise, to classify it into two types in the chapter I, into three types in the II, into four types in the III, into five types in the IV, into six types in the V, into seven types in the VI, into eight types in the VII, into nine types in the VIII, into ten types in the IX. These are all what might be called natural classifications; but in the chaper X the text goes on to undertake various two-fold classifications, various three-fold ones, various fourfold ones, and so on upto tenfold ones — this time mainly relying on the list of 24 *mārgaṇāsthānas* for the purpose (but towards the end reverting to natural classification). And in the case of each classification the following questions are raised :

(1) sub-classification
(2) life-duration
(3) period of continuous existence
(4) interval (=period of continuous non-existence)
(5) numerical relative strength

Now (1) is the subject-matter of the Prajñāpanā chapter I (viz. Prajñāpanāpada), (2) the subject-matter of its chapter IV (viz. Sthitipada), (3)-(4) that of its chapter XVIII (viz. Kāyasthitipada), (5) that of its chapter III (viz. Alpabahutvapada). Thus much that Jīvābhigama says is already present there in the relevant portions of Prajñāpanā. But there is one notable exception. In the chapter I of Jīvābhigama the classes concerned — viz *sthāvara*

(static) and *trasa* (mobile) (the former subdivided into *pṛthvī*, *jala* and *vanaspati*, the latter into *vāyu*, *agni*, *dvīndriya*, *trīndriya*, *caturindriya*, *pañcendriya*) have been studied in terms of 23 items; (it is only towards the fag end of the chapter that the above mentioned 5 questions have been raised). This list of 23 items is interesting inasmuch as 13 of these items also appear in the final list 20 *mārgaṇāsthānas*; but this means that the list of *mārgaṇāsthānas* was not yet ready when this chapter was written. On the other hand, the chapter X in the course of its extra-natural classification makes use of the list of 20 *mārgaṇāsthānas* and this means that the list was ready by the time this chapter was written. Really, Jīvābhigama seems to be a composite text with following parts :

(1) Chapters I-IX (minus the chapter I discussion in terms of 23 items and the chapter III account of world-continents and world-oceans)

(2) The chapter I discussion in terms of 23 items

(3) The chapter III account of world-continents and world-oceans

(4) Chapter X

(C) UTTARĀDHYAYANASŪTRA

Uttarādhyayana is a text chiefly devoted to the problems of conduct discussed at rather elementary level but in four of its chapters — viz. 28th, 33rd, 34th, 36th — it also raises philosophical issues. Thus the chapter 36th (viz. Jīvājīvavibhakti) seeks to offer a most basic account of the living and the non-living parts of the world — thus doing at an elementary level what Prajñāpanā does in its first chapter. But whereas the first chapter of Prajñāpanā contains a bare classification of the living world the present chapter of Uttarādhyayana also contains following informations about the different classes of living beings :

(1) location

(2) life-duration

(3) period of continuous existence

(4) interval

However, these informations too are already there in Prajñāpanā — (1) in Sthānapada (2nd), (2) in Sthitipada (4th), (3) and (4) in Kāyasthitipada (18th). There is however one noteworthy point in this connection. Prajñāpanā describes the classes of living beings taking them up in the simple order *ekendriya*, *dvīndriya*, *trīndriya*, *caturindriya*, *pañcendriya*, but Uttarādhyayana first divides the living beings into two broad classes — viz. *sthāvara* and *trasa* — and then sub-divides the former into three classes, viz. *pṛthvī*, *jala*, *vanasptī*, and the latter into three classes, viz. *agni*, *vāyu*, *udāratrasa* (it is the class *udāratrasa* that includes *dvīndriya*, *trīndriya*, *caturindriya*, *pañcendriya*).

As has already been noted, this procedure is adopted also in Jīvābhigama (and in later times Umāsvāti subscribes to it), but it was foreign to all old Āgamic texts (and it remains foreign to the Digambara texts). Then there are two Uttarādhyayana chapters 33rd and 34th (viz. Karmaprakṛti and Leśyā,; they too contain most elementary informations culled from the corresponding chapters of Prajñāpanā. But the Uttarādhyayana chapter 28th (viz. Mokṣamārgīya) breathes a different atmosphere; to be precise it breathes the same atmosphere as does Umāsvāti's Tattvārthasūtra. For this chapter speaks of a quadruple *mokṣamārga* — just as Tattvārthasūtra speaks of a triple *mokṣamārga;* and it describes *samyagdarśana* as faith in the nine enti. ties, viz. *jīva, ajīva, bandha, puṇya pāpa, āsrava, saṁvara, nirjarā, mokṣa* just as Tattvārtha describes *samyagdarśana* as faith in these very entities minus *puṇya, pāpa*. Again, it defines *dravya* in terms of *guṇa* and *paryāya* just as Tattvārtha does. (It can be seen that on each of these questions Tattvārtha represents a more refined position than Uttarādhyayana). Now all these three questions as posed here are unknown to the old Āgamic texts. True, while describing *samyagdarśana* Uttarādhyayana quotes 14 verses which also occur in Prajñāpanā in the course of its account of *darśanārya*. But the presence of these verses is anomalous at both the places, though for different reasons. Thus once these verses speak of *sarvapramāṇa* and *sarvanayavidhi* but these concepts, even if known to the age of Umāsvāti, were unknown to the age of the old Āgamic texts. Again, at one place these verses enumerate the entities whose existence is to be believed in — but the list contains just six items, viz *jīva, ajīva, puṇya, pāpa, āsrava, saṁvara*; this means that these verses were composed at a time when Uttarādhyayana list of nine *Tattvas* was not yet finally established. That is to say, these verses were composed after Prajñāpanā but before the Uttarādhyayana chaper 28th; later on they were interpolated in the former and borrowed in the latter,

(D) RĀJAPRAŚNĪYASŪTRA

The content of Rājapraśnīya is pretty miscellaneous but its philosophically most important part consists of the ten sūtras (Nos. 65-74) where the Jaina monk Keśi adduces a number of arguments to convince the heretic—king Paesī (Pradeśi) that soul is somthing different from body. Of these the most important ones are based on the consideration that soul is a real entity even if imperceptible just as so many physical things are real even if imperceptible. Towards the end of the conversation Keśi actually quotes that Bhagavatī list of ten things about which it is said that in their entirety they are known and seen only by a *kivalī*. As for the minor arguments, two are based on the consideration that post-mortem life in heaven and hell is a fact even if beings from these quarters seldom visit us on earth — there being definite factors responsible for the circumstance. Similarly, two of them are based on the consideration that even if possessed of the same soul

when young and when old a man is capable of performing many things when young and not capable when old—the reason being that the bodily organs at the man's disposal are competent in one case and not competent in the other. Lastly, the last argument is based on the consideration that the same soul can occupy an elephant's body in this life and an ant's in another—the reason being that it is capable of expanding and contracting just like the light of a lamp. Two things are noteworthy about this whole performance, viz. (1) a basic reliance on analogies while buttressing one's case, (2) allowing the opponent a full chance to present his case. The first is the relic of old days, the second a harbinger of the days to come. For in the age of logic we will find arguments pitted against arguments (not analogies pitted againt analogies) and the opponent allowed a full chance to present his case.

4 THE THIRD STAGE

The third stage in the evolution of the age of Āgamas has certain characteristic features of its own and there are certain texts which are its characteristic product. But in terms of absolute chronology this stage partly overlaps with what we are going to call the first stage in the evolution of the age of Logic. Roughly speaking, certain texts composed sometime during the first four or five centuries of the Christian era we are going to assign to the third stage of the age of Āgamas, and certain other texts composed sometime towards the end of the same period we are going to assign to the first stage of the Age of Logic (this stage also continuing somewhat beyond this period). And yet a difference between these two groups of texts has to be made. For the dominant subject-matter of the former group is the same as that of the texts of the age of Āgamas while the dominant subject-matter of the latter is the same as that of the texts of the age of Logic. For the present let us confine ourselves to the former group of texts whose chief distinguishing features are certain methodological tendencies but which also betray some growth of content. Among the chief innovations — methodological and otherwise — of the period are the following :

(1) the doctrine of *anuyogadvāras* in general and *nikṣepas* in particular
(2) the doctrine of *nayas*
(3) the doctrine of *pramāṇas*
(4) the massive working out of Karma doctrine.

Among the chief texts of the period are the following ;

(1) Anuyogadvārasūtra
(2) Nandīsūtra
(3) Āvaśyakaniryukti

(4) Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama

(5) Tattvārthasūtra (sabhāṣya)

It will be convenient to deal with these texts in the above order and this we propose to do next.

(A) ANUYOGADVĀRASŪTRA

As was hinted just above, the doctrine of *anuyogadvāras* was one of the innovations of the period but let it be noted that Anuyogadvārasūtra itself does not use the word *anuyogadvāra* in a much generalised form; and in any case, the doctrine of *anuyogadvāras* is not the only speciality of this text. The doctrine of *nikṣepas* was a special case of the doctrine of *anuyogadvāras*; but in the language of Anuyogadvārasūtra the former ought to be called the doctrine of 4 *nikṣepas* the latter the doctrine of all possible *nikṣepas*. A rough English equivalent for *anuyogadvāra* might be 'point of investigation' and the Jaina scholars of the period were certainly interested in drawing up such standing lists of points-of-investigation as could be used as and when need arose; besides, they would draw up a new such list if none among the standing ones was found suitable. For example, the following lists of *anuyogadvāras* are explicitly recognised in Tattvārthasūtrabhāṣya :

(i)	*nāma, sthāpanā, dravya, bhāva*	(4)
(ii)	*nirdeśa, svāmitva, sādhana, adhikarana, sthiti, vidhāna*	(6)
(iii)	*sat, saṅkhyā, kṣetra, sparśana, kāla, antara, bhāva, alpabahutva*	(8)
(iv)	*gati, indriya, kāya, yoga, kaṣāya, veda, leśyā, samyaktva, jñāna, darśana, cāritra, āhāra, upayoga*	(13)

Of these, the first is the list of 4 *nikṣepas* and is widely used in Anuyogadvāra, Āvaśyakaniryukti, Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama (while in the age of Logic *nikṣepa* constitutes one of the three main topics of epistemological enquiry, the other two being *pramāna* and *naya*). On the other hand, the second list though used in Āvaśyakaniryukti is not of frequent occurrence. The third list, again, is used in Anuyogadvāra, Āvaśyakaniryukti and Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama (in the first two with the addition of a new item, viz. *bhāga*) Lastly, the fourth list contains 13 of the 20 items that constitute the later Śvetāmbar Āgamic authors' list of 20 *mārgaṇāsthānas*, a list that occurs in Āvaśyakaniryukti; (these thirteen items minus one--viz. *upayoga*--are also 12 of the 14 items that constitute the Karma-specialists' list of 14 *mārgaṇāsthānas*). Besides, Anuyogadvāra often conducts its discussion in terms of such lists of *anuyogadvāras* as have for their items the four *nikṣepas* and several more (the number of additional items being different in different cases); this practice too is common to Āvaśyakaniryukti as well as Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama. Likewise, Anuyogadvāra often conducts its discussion in terms of some altogether new list of *anuyogadvāras* (the word *anuyogadvāra* being used in one such case), a pactice shared by Āvaśyakaniryukti and Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama.

It will however be instructive to note as to what problems have been discussed in Anuyogadvāra and in precisely what manner; in any case that alone will enable us to form an idea of the content of the text. The opening part of Anuyogadvāra tends to suggest as if the text is going to be some sort of commentary on Āvaśyakasūtra—rather on its first *adhyayana* called Sāmāyika. For here we are offered certain most basic informations about Āvaśyakasūtra, the whole concluding with the sentence: "Its first *adhyayana* is Sāmāyika and the following are its *anuyogadvāras*: *upakrama*, *nikṣepa*, *anugama* and *naya*."[77] Then follows the text proper divided into four parts, viz. *upakrama* etc. but in such a manner that its almost entire bulk is devoted to *upakrama*. Now in the preliminary part supposed to be offering basic informations about Āvaśyakasūtra we get the first taste of the doctrine of 4 *nikṣepas*; for almost the entire bulk of this part is devoted to a description of three things viz. *āvaśyaka*, *śruta* and *skandha* in terms of 4 *nikṣepas*. It is also interesting to note how the occasion for the discussion arises. We have been informed that Āvaśyakasūtra is in the form of one *śrutaskandha* divided into six *adhyayanas* (i. e. one chapter divided into six sections) and since in this statement there apparently occur three words *āvaśyaka*, *śruta* and *skandha* it is thought worthwhile to subject them to the process of description in terms of 4 *nikṣepas*. The crucial part of the doctrine of 4 *nikṣepas* is the distinction made between a thing called by the name concerned (e.g. by name *āvaśyaka*, *śruta* or *skandha*) viewed from the standpoint of *dravya* and a thing called by the same name viewed from the standpoint of *bhāva*. And roughly speaking, the standpoint of *dravya* is the standpoint of form or external appearance, while the standpoint of *bhāva* is the standpoint of spirit or internal reality. Whatever else is said in this connection is to be mechanically repeated in all cases. To take the example of *āvaśyaka* this is how matters stand in relation to the four *nikṣepas*:

(1) *nāma āvaśyaka* : anything arbitrarily given the name *āvaśyaka*.

(2) *sthāpanā āvaśyaka* : any physical thing given the shape of *āvaśyaka*.

(3) *dravya āvaśyaka*

(a) *āgamatodravya āvaśyaka* : one who knows *avaśyaka* but is not at present exercising the concerned cognitive function.

(b) *noāgamatodravya āvaśyaka* :

(i) *jñāyakaśarīra* : the dead body of one who had known *āvaśyaka*

(ii) *bhāviśarīra* : the newborn body of one who will know *āvaśyaka*

(iii) *tadvyatirikta* : *āvaśyaka* from the standpoint of former external appearance

(4) *bhāva āvaśyaka* :

(a) *āgamatobhāva āvaśyaka* : one who knows *āvaśyaka* and at present exercises the concerned cognitive function.

(b) *noāgamatobhāva āvaśyaka* : *āvaśyaka* from the standpoint of spirit or internal reality.[78]

Here whatever is said in connection with (1), (2), (3a), (3b (i)), (3b (ii)), (4a) is to be mechanically repeated in all cases; new things in each case will have to be said in connection with (3b(iii)) and (4b). Thus coming to the main part of the text we expect it to conain something said by way of explaining the Sāmāyika-adhyayana of Āvaśyakasūtra in terms of *upakrama*, *nikṣepa*, *anugama* and *naya*; as a matter of fact, what we actually find there is a general account of *upakrama* etc.— for most part, an account of *upakrama*, an account which has little to do with any sort of text-explanation at all. But the plan for arranging material in this part of the text is so devised that it contains most diverse doctrinal discussions, a good part of which is related to philosophy. Thus at one place[79](122) we get a detailed classification and subclassification of the whole world of living and non-living entities (something corresponding to the Prajñāpanāpada of Prajñapanā), at another place (142)[80] a detailed information about the number of bodies possessed by the different classes of living beings, at a third place (133)[81] detailed information about their body sizes, at a fourth place (139)[82] about their life-duration (these respectively corresponding to the Sarīrapada, Avagāhanāpada and Sthitipada of Prajñāpanā); similarly, at one place (144)[83] we get detailed information about the specific qualitative features of the living entities and the non-living ones (something corresponding to the Pariṇāmapada of Prajñāpanā); lastly, at one place (72-114)[84] we find numerous informations about the physical aggregates made up of different number of atoms, about those occupying different number of space-units, about those occupying different number of time-units (these again having certain Prajñāpanā passages for their foundation). However, in the case of the last-mentioned account certain new features make their appearance in Anuyogadvāra and they deserve consideration. Thus whereas Prajñāpanā had, in each of the three cases in question, simply spoken of the relative numerical strength of the physical aggregates possessing different number of units the present passage of Anuyogadvāra does something more. For one thing, the latter chooses, in each of the three cases, to divide the physical aggregates into those characterized by *ānupūrvī*, *anānupūrvī* and *avaktavya*—the first possessing more than

two units, the second possessing one unit, the third possessing two units. Then it seeks to answer questions about those classes and sub-classes of physical aggregates in terms of nine *anuyogadvāras*, viz. *sat*, *saṅkhyā*, *kṣetra*, *sparśana*, *kāla*, *antara*, *bhāga*, *bhāva*, *alpabahutva*. At the same time, it seeks to work out the alternatives that result from it being conceded that different parts of the same physical aggregate belong to different subclasses. And in connection with answering question in terms of *sat*, *saṅkhyā*, etc. as also in connections with working out the alternatives in question our text considers first the position of *naigama* and *vyavahāra nayas* then that of *saṅgraha naya*. Now for *naigama* and *vyavahāra* two physical aggregates of the same description are two such aggregates whereas for *saṅgraha* they are just one. The result is that in the case of it being conceded that different parts of a physical aggregate belong to different subclasses the total number of alternatives is 26 in the case of *naigama* and *vyavahāra* but 7 in that of *saṅgraha*.

However, the question of *naya* has been raised also in other parts of Anuyogadvāra. Thus in connection with the description of *āvaśyaka* undertaken in terms of 4 *nikṣepas* we are told that two cases of *dravyāvaśyaka* are treated as two such cases by *naigama* and *vyavahāra* while they are treated as one such case by *saṅgraha*; *ṛjusūtra* on the other hand insists that there can be just one case of *dravyāvaśyaka*; lastly, *śabdanaya* argues (rather the three *śabdanayas* argue) that *dravyāvaśyaka* is an impossibility because it is impossible that someone should know *āvaśyaka* and yet not exercise the concerned cognitive function.[85] In another connection it is laid down that the designation *śaṅkha* (conchshell) can possibly be attributed to three types of beings viz. (1) one who will become *śaṅkha* in the next birth; (2) one who will not only become *śaṅkha* in the next birth but has also accumulated the necessary *āyukarma*; (3) one who has not only accumulated the *āyukarma* in question but has also left the body of this birth and is on way to take up that of the next. Here we are told that according to *naigama*, *vyavahāra* and *saṅgraha* the designation *śaṅkha* can be attributed to all the three types in question, according to *ṛjusūtra* to the last two, according to *śabda* to the last one.[86] In a third place we are told that according to *naigama*, *saṅgraha* and *vyavahāra* a doctrinal text describes the author's own view, the rival view as also what is both, according to *ṛjusūtra* it describes only the first two of these, according to *śabda* only the first of these.[87] Then there is the passage where it is laid down that according to *naigama* and *vyavahāra* the designation *prasthaka* (grain measuring vessel) can be attributed to a *prasthaka* as such, according to *saṅgraha* to the *prasthaka* that is actually undertaking measurements, according *ṛjusūtra* to the *prasthaka* as also to the thing that is being measured, according to *śabda* either to one for whose sake *prasthaka* is made or to one who knows *prasthaka*.[88] Similarly, there is the passage where it is laid down that according to *naigama* and *vyavahāra* one

resides in a particular spot in one's house, according to *saṅgraha* in the couch on which one is seated, according to *ṛjusūtra* in the space-units which one is occupying, according to *śabda* in oneself.[89] Lastly, there is a passage which lays down that according to *naigama pradeśas* (units) belong to *dharma, adharma, ākāśa, jīva, pudgalaskandha, deśa* (part), according to *saṅgraha* they belong to the first five of these six, according to *vyavhāra* one should rather say that *pradeśa* is five-typed, according to *ṛjusūtra* one should rather say that *pradeśa* might be either *dharmapradeśa* or *adharmapradeśa*, or *ākśāapradeśa* or *jīvapradeśa* or *pudgalaskondhapradeśa*, according to *śabda* one should rather say that *pradeśa* is in *dharma* or that *psadeśa* is *dharma*, that *pradeśa* is in *adharma* or that *pradeśa* is *adharma*, and so on and so forth, according to *samabhirūḍha* one should say that *pradeśa* is *dharma*, that *pradeśa* is *adharma* and so on and so forth, according to *evambhūta* one should not at all speak of *pradeśas* inasmuch as *dharma, adharma*, etc. are all impartite entities.[90] All these instances of *nayas* make one thing clear, viz. that the seven *nayas* are conceived as increasing in the measure of sophistication exhibited, the following being the serial order : *naigama, saṅgraha; vyavahāra, ṛjusūtra, śabda, samabhirūḍha, evaṁbhūta*. But the fact that *naigama* and *vyavahāra* are so often bracketed together must create difficulty, for as a result of this it is not easy to see the precise point of sophistication underlying the *naya* scheme. Certainly, if *naigama* and *vyavahāra* are equally sophisticated and less sophisticated than *saṅgraha* then we cannot say that *saṅgraha* is more sophisticated than *naigama* and *vyavahāra* more sophisticated than *saṅgraha*. Then there is a particular difficulty with the three *śabdanayas*. Sometimes they speak on the same level as the earlier four *nayas* (though, of course, in a more sophisticated vein than the latter) but sometimes they speak on a different level altogether; in the latter cases we find the earlier four *nayas* speaking of the thing conceded but *śabdanayas* speaking of the person having a knowledge of this thing. [In these latter cases it will be more proper to call the last three *nayas jñāna-nayas*]. In any case, no instance discussed in Anuyogadvāra corroborates the picture of *śabdanayas* that is most usual with the later authors. Of course, towards the end Anuyogadvāra offers a general definition of each of the seven *nayas* and in the case of *śabdanayas* we here find being said something that looks like the statement of the later authors; (in these definitions difficulties arise rather with earlier three *nayas*)[91]. But that only confirms our basic point, for the precise difficulty is how to make tally with each other the instances of *śabdanayas* discussed in the body of the text and the definitions of them offered at the end of it.

Here a word might also be said about the *saptabhaṅgī* doctrine vis-a-vis Anuyogadvāra. We have already seen that the text enumerates the alternatives that result (in the case of *naigama-vyavahāra* and in the case of

saṅgraha) when it is conceded that the different parts of a physical aggregate might be characterised by *ānupūrvī*, *anānupūrvī* and *avaktavya*. In the case of *naigama-vyavahāra* these alternatives are 26, in that of *saṅgraha* 7. The noteworthy point is that the text makes no attempt to pinpoint the significance of the case with 7 alternatives, nor does it anywhere claim that its treatment of the feature *ānupūrvī* is a special case of a more fundamental doctrine—both of which it was expected to do had the *saptabhaṅgī* doctrine been a well-established doctrine by its time.

In relation to the problem of *pramāṇa* the Anuyogadvāra contribution is of no lasting value. Of course, it does not use the word *pramāṇa* in the sense of Umāsvāti and the later logicians but it does once describe as four types of *jñānas* what are in fact the four types of *pramāṇas* according to the Nyāya school.[92] However no attempt is here made to adjust this treatment of fourfold *jñāna* with the traditional treatment of fivefold *jñāna* (taken note of in the beginning of Anuyogadvāra itself)— as was, for example, done by the later logicians like Akalaṅka in the case of their newly formulated list of *pramāṇas*. The result is that the Anuyogadvāra account of *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *upamāna* and *āgama* remains more or less of a curiosity just like its account of 7 *svaras*, 8 *vibhaktis* and 9 *rasas*.

The details of the Karma doctrine are on the whole left untouched in Anuyogadvāra. But its treatment of the item *bhāva* in the list of *anuyogadvāras sat*, *saṅkhyā* etc. required something to be said in this connection. However, the text applies these *anuyogadvāras* to the case of physical aggregates and in that context it is deemed sufficient if these aggregates are characterised by *sādi pāriṇāmika*. For it is in the context of describing the qualities of soul that the remaining five types of *bhāva* make their appearance and it is they that contain reference to the details of the Karma doctrine. But at one place (126)[93] Anuyogadvāra has created occasion for a detailed description of all the six *bhāvas* in question, viz. *audayika* (those due to the effectuation of a *karma*), *aupaśamika* (those due to the subsidence of a *karma*), *kṣāyika* (those due to the cessation of a *karma*), *kṣāyopaśamika* (those due to the cessation-cum-subsidence of a *karma*), *pāriṇāmika* (those natural to a soul), *sāṁnipātika* (mixed). This position was not worked out in the old Āgamic texts and the Anuyogadvāra account itself is rather crude in comparision to corresponding Tattvārtha account that came later on. For example, the Anuyogadvāra list of *audayika bhāvas* includes *āhāraka*, *sāṁjñī*, *sayogī*, its list of *kṣāyika bhāvas* includes features resulting from the *kṣaya* of *vedanīya*, *āyunāma* and *gotra karmas*. Both these are rather obscure positions.

Lastly, let us note what Anuyogadvāra has to say on the problem of *guṇa* and *paryāya*. The word *guṇa* was unknown to the old Āgamic texts and *paryāya* was their word for properties. But by the time of Anuyogadvāra

the Jaina authors began to use both the words *guṇa* and *paryāya* and somehow to distinguish between them; (since there was no old tradition to be followed each author was somewhat free to work out a distinction for himself). According to Anuyogadvāra (123)[91] *guṇa* is to stand for what *paryāya* stood in old Āgamic texts while *paryāya* is to stand for a degree exhibited by some *guṇa* or other; for example, black colour is a *guṇa*, the minimum degree (or any higher degree) of black colour a *paryāya*.

In the body of Anuyogadvāra all the above philosophical discussions lie scattered in a rather haphazard form—not because the text has no plan for organizing its material but because this plan has little to do with philosophy. We have already taken note of the circumstance owing to which almost the entire text turns out to be a discussion of four topics viz. *upakrama*, *nikṣepa*, *anugama* and *naya* while almost the whole of this discussion remains engaged with the first of these topics. Some details of the performance deserve notice. *Upakrama* is described in two alternative ways. In the first case the description proceeds under the heads *nāma*, *sthāpanā*, *dravya*, *kṣetra*, *kāla*, *bhāva* (i. e. 4 *nikṣepas* with two additional items); the description is quite brief and unimportant. In the second case the description proceeds under the heads *ānupūrvī*, *nāma*, *pramāṇa*, *vaktavyatā*, *arthādhikāra* and *samavatāra* and here almost the whole bulk is taken up by the first three. As a matter of fact, all the instances of philosophical discussion considered above come from this very part of the text covering its first three heads—one exception being the reference to the definitions of *nayas* inasmuch as these occur in the fourth main part of the text called Naya. Besides, this part contains discussion of certain minor philosophical problems and that of certain non philosophical theoretical problems — e. g. problems related to grammar, poetics, music. But almost nowhere is it emphasised that this or that point of the discussion might be thus availed of in connection with the explanation of sāmāyika or in connection with the text-explanation in general. It is the heads vaktavyatā and arthādhikāra which are directly related to the problems of text-explanation but they are disposed of rather summarily; similarly, certain things said in connection with the second and third main parts of the text — called Nikṣepa and Anugama—are directly related to the problems of text-explanation but they too are disposed of rather summarily. This entire attitude of the author of Anuyogadvāra is somewhat intriguing. For the title of the text suggests as if it is devoted to the general problems of text-explanation, its opening section suggests as if it is devoted to an explanation of Āvaśyakasūtra, the last sentence of the opening section suggests as if it is devoted to an explanation of the Sāmāyika-adhyayana of Āvaśyakasūtra. But all this is a misleading suggestion. For the text seems to avoid—as though scrupulously—all entanglement with the problems of text-explanation. Thus it is not unlikely that the Jaina

authors of the period did use to explain texts in terms of *upakrama*, *nikṣepa*, *anugama*, and *naya* (in this connection sub-dividing *upakrama* into *ānupūrvī*, *nāma*, *pramāṇa*, *vaktavyatā*, *arthādhikāra* and *samavatāra*), but Anuyogadvāra manages to give us only the vaguest idea of how this was done.

(B) NANDĪSŪTRA

Nandısūtra is exclusively devoted to the problem of knowledge and the composition of a text of this type was in a way symptomatic. For the period was what might be called the eve of the Age of Logic and this age received its very name from the fact that in the mind of its savants the problem of knowledge was almost uppermost. Of course, the Jainas had been taking interest in the problem since olden days and we have already sought to reconstruct the earliest history of this interest. But the fact remains that so many details of the Jaina theory of knowledge were even now considerably vague and Nandī seeks to bring clarity to at least some of them. Now so far as the three extra-ordinary types of cognition, viz. *avadhi*, *manaḥparyāya*, *kevala* are concerned nothing much new required to be added to the already available account but the case was different with *mati* and *śruta*. For they constitute the comparatively neglected field of investigation and it was in this field that the Jainas had chiefly to contend with their rivals. Hence the special significance attached to the Nandı account of *mati* and *śruta*.

Nandī first of all divides *jñāna* into *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa* and this was something unprecedented. Of course, Anuyogadvāra had described *pratyakṣa* almost in the same words as Nandı but the former was working out a scheme that recognized four types of *jñāna*—viz. *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *upamāna*, *āgama*, a scheme which explicitly had *pratyakṣa* for one of its constituent items. But Nandı had to work out a scheme that recognized five types of *jñāna* viz. *mati*, *śruta*, *avadhi*, *manaḥparyāya*, *kevala*, a scheme which did not have *pratyakṣa* for one of its constituent items. So when Nandı maintained that *jñāna* is of two types viz. *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa*, the former subdivided into *indriya-pratyakṣa* and *anindriya-pratyakṣa*, the latter subdivided into *mati* and *śruta*, there was bound to arise a difficulty. For *anindriyapratyakṣa* included *avadhi*, *manaḥparyāya*, *kevala* and this means that in the present classification *indriya-pratyakṣa* was a superfluity when viewed in terms of the traditional scheme of fivefold *jñāna*. In any case, Nandı does not say a word as to what it understands by *indriya-pratykṣa* — except that it is of five types corresponding to the five sense-organs[95]. On the other hand, the Nandı account of *mati* — of six types corresponding to the five sense-organs and *manas* — is considerably illuminating. Thus it explains how the four consecutive processes *avagraha*, *īhā*, *avāya*, *dhāraṇā* are accomplished in the case of the five sense-organs and *manas* (dream being

considered as a case of *avagraha* etc. had through *manas*).[96] In this account *avagraha* really means *arthāvagraha*, for in the case of four sense-organs, viz. touch, gustatory, olfactory and auditory *arthāvagraha* is preceded by *vyañjanāvagraha*; Nandī describes how *vyañjanāvagraha* takes place in the case of auditory sense-organ [97]. All this gives a clear idea of the direction in which the mind of the Jaina theoreticians was moving when they were speaking of *mati* and its classification into *avagraha, īhā, avāya, dhāraṇā*; (obviously, here was being described a process which was described by others under the title *pratyakṣa*— though naturally the Jaina description of the process had its own special features). At the same time Nandī speaks of four additional types of *mati*, viz. *autpattikī, vainayikī, kārmikī, pāriṇāmikī*.[98] The later Jainas make no particular use of this classification — though in Bhagavatī it not only appears but appears in the company of *avagraha, īhā, avāya* and *dhāraṇā* themselves. The Nandī definitions of *autpattikī* etc. are not so much illuminating but in each case the text refers to certain stories supposed to be exemplifying the type-of-*mati* in question; the commentaries actually recount these stories and from them it becomes clear that what is being described in this connection are the types of cognitive dealings had by people in the course of their every day life. The Nandī account of *śruta* is also useful in its own way. *Śruta* is here classified into 14 types — in the form of 7 pairs-with-mutually-opposite-items. The first two pairs, viz. *akṣara-anakṣara, saṁjñī-asaṁjñī* are to be explained as cases of ordinary cognition-involving-the-use-of-words, the last five pairs as cases of cognition-of-scriptures. The first two pairs deserve serious study because they give us an idea of the precise Jaina concept of *śruta*[99]; (certainly, to do something like treating *śruta* as a case of cognition based on scriptures was an ordinary practice not confined to the Jainas alone). Thus the Jainas have to conceive *śruta* in such a manner that its possession becomes possible not only in the case of men and big animals but also in that of small insects, nay, even in the case of static-bodied beings. It is instructive to note that when Nandī wants to say that even in the case of the lowest type of living beings some amount of cognitive awareness is always present (otherwise they would be no living bodies but dead bodies) it uses the word 'verbal cognitive awareness' (*akṣara*) rather than 'cognitive awareness' pure and simple;[100] (of course verbal cognitive awareness i. e. *śruta* is necessarily accompanied by sensory cognitive awareness i. e. *mati*, but the Nandī usage is revealing). In any case *śruta* stands for that type of cognition which involves a reception—explicit or otherwise - of some word standing for the object being cognised, and the Jaina theoreticians feel that an implicit reception of words is possible even on the part of the lowest type of living beings. Really speaking, concept 'implicit reception of words' is fraught with difficulties. Or rather the question is as to what exactly is meant when *śruta* is declared to involve 'a reception of some word standing for the object-under-cognition',

for some sort of employment of some word standing for the object-under-cognition seems to take place also in the case of *mati*. This and similar obscurities left standing in the Nandı account of knowledge—left particularly owing to the rather laconic wording of the text— were sought to be removed by the Śvetāmbara authors coming in the age of Logic, the long series begining with Jinabhadra and ending with Yaśovijaya.

(C) ĀVAŚYAKANIRYUKTI

As is indicated by its title Āvaśyakaniryukti is a *niryukti* type of commentary on Āvaśyakasūtra. Towards the beginning of it—but after 77 verses dealing with the problem of knowledge have gone by—there occur three benedictory verses followed by 4 where the author promises to write *niryukti* on the following texts : Āvaśyaka, Daśavaikālika, Uttarādhyayana, Ācārāṅga, Sūtrakṛtāṅga, Daśāśruta, Kalpasūtra, Vyavahāra, Sūryaprajñapti, Ṛṣibhāṣita; then in one verse it is declared that here now follows Sāmāyikaniryukti as traditionally received. Now Sāmāyika is the first section of Āvaśyakasūtra and Niryukti on it continues till the verse no. 408 (in the edition of Maladhāri Hemacandra's commentary on Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya); then there should follow Niryukti on the remaining five sections of Āvaśyakasūtra (but these are left untouched by Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya). All this at once raises two questions : (1) why should the text abruptly begin with a treatment of knowledge (to be followed by benedictory verses) ? (2) What does the author mean by saying that what he proposes to present is Sāmāyikaniryukti as traditionally received ?

A close study of Sāmāyikaniryukti reveals that only 24 of its verses (viz. those numbering 383-406) are concerned with the actual wording of Sāmāyikasūtra while the rest are devoted to certain preliminary questions more or less remotely related to the problem of Sāmāyika. And a study of this vast mass of preliminary material suggests that it is too ill-assorted to be the composition of one author. The conclusion seems to be that in the Sāmāyikaniryukti part of Āvaśyakaniryukti the author who has promised to write Niryukti on 10 Āgamic texts has simply—at least for most part—collected the traditionally received material; (the earlier 77 verses dealing with the problem of knowledge too seem to be traditionally received and they have been placed where they are only because they are too much of a misfit elsewhere). The Niryukti on the remaining sections of Āvaśyakasūtra and that on the remaining 9 Āgamic texts in question might well be—at least for most part—the composition of one author. But it is the Sāmāyikaniryukti part of Āvaśyakaniryukti that is philosophically most important; to be more precise, even in the Sāmāyikaniryukti part of Āvaśyakaniryukti those verses are philosophically most important on which Jinabhadra commented in his Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya, and even in the Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya those verses are philosophically most important on which

Maladhāri Hemacandra commented. As such, this selected portion of the Sāmāyikaniryukti part of Āvaśyakaniryukti deserves a serious study and that we propose to undertake next.

The earlier 77 verses of Āvaśyakaniryukti dealing with the problem of knowledge are to be studied with Nandīsūtra (a good number of verses are common to both) but it is on hardly few questions that the former text has more important things to say than the latter; (e.g. the Āvaśyakaniryukti account of *avadhi* is much more comprehensive than the corresponding Nandī account).

Then follow 8 verses--3 benedictory verses, 4 setting forth the programme of Niryukti-composition, one proposing to narrate Sāmāyikaniryukti as traditionally received. The content of the next 35 verses is as follows :

86 : the relation of Niryukti to Sūtra
87 - 90 : the relation of Sūtra to *Tīrthankaras* and *Gaṇadharas*
91-101 : the importance of knowledge-coupled-with-conduct
102 : the acquisition of scriptural knowledge (*śruta*)
103 - 5 : the acquisition of religious faith (*samyaktva*)
106 - 20 : the acquisition of couduct (*cāritra*)

Then follows a verse that looks like a summary narration of the topics to be taken up, viz.

jiṇapavayaṇauppattī pavayaṇa egaṭṭhiyā vibhāge ya |
dāravihī ya nayavihī vakkhāṇavihī ya aṇuoge ||121||

And the content of the next eleven verses is as follows :

122 - 23 : the synonyms of *pravacana* and *sūtra*
124 : the synonyms of *anuyoga*
125 - 28 : the right and wrong types of text-explanation
129 - 32 : the right and wrong types of teacher-disciple relationship

Lastly follows the main text broadly divisible into four parts :

I 133-338 : the treatment of *Sāmāyika* under 26 heads *uddeśa, nirdeśa, nirgama* etc (i.e. Sāmāyikaniryukti proper)
II 339 - 82 : Namaskāraniryukti (i.e. treatment of *Namaskāra* under 11 heads *utpatti, nikṣepa, pada, padārtha* etc.)
III 383-406 : Sāmāyikasūtraniryukti
IV 407 - 8 : *jñānanaya* versus *kriyānaya*

Now here it can easily be seen that the verse 121 should properly come after the verse 86, for the verses 87-90 are plainly presenting what is mentioned as the first topic in the verse 121. As for the verses 91-120 they are saying something which rightly belongs to the main text (to be precise, to its part called Sāmāyikaniryukti proper). In all probability the verses 121,

87-90 and 122-32 are earlier specimens of a pre-occupation with the problem of text-explanation while the verses 91-120 are the earliest specimens of a pre-occupation with the problem of Sāmāyika. Nay, within the verses 91-120 themselves 91-101 seem to contain an earlier account of Sāmāyika couched in a non-technical language while 102-20 contain a later account of the same couched in the technical terminology of the Karma doctrine. As for the main text its verses 133-338 contain a still more advanced account of Sāmāyika written at a time when the list of 26 heads *uddeśa, nirdeśa, nirgama* etc had already been formulated; (within these verses themselves 291-320 take up the head '*Kva*' but the way this treatment is conducted under 33 sub-heads suggests that we are here having one more altogather independent, earlier account of *Sāmāyika*). And may be the Namaskāraniryukti part of the main text was another independent piece of discussion which was mechanically inserted in between the Sāmāyikaniryukti proper and Sāmāyikasūtraniryukti. Lastly, the last two verses of the main text too seem to be of an independent origin and they have been imported here for no specially pressing reason.

Be that as it may, the kernel of the Sāmāyikaniryukti part of Āvaśyakaniryukti lies on the one hand in its verses 133-338 which treat *Sāmāyika* under 26 heads *uddeśa, nirdeśa, nirgama* etc. (a treatment which we propose to call Sāmāyikaniryukti proper) and on the other hand in its verses 339-82 which treat *namaskāra* under 11 heads *utpatti, nikṣepa, pada, padārth* etc. (a treatment which we propose to call Namaskāraniryukti). For they are two illuminating cases of how the Jaina theoreticians of the period were treating important problems in terms of *anuyogadvāras*, standardized or otherwise. Thus by *sāmāyika* are to be understood the following four things :

(1) *śruta* (*samyak jñāna*)
(2) *samyaktva* (*samyak darśana*)
(3) *cāritrācāritra* } (*samyak cāritra*)
(4) *cāritra* }

And the list of 26 items made use of in connection with its treatment is a standardized list (it already occurs in the Anuyogadvāra account of Upodghātaniryukty anugama and certainly in our text the part where it is put to application can be called *upodghāta* i.e. introduction to Sāmāyikasūtraniryukti). Similarly, *namaskāra* is practically identical with *samyagjñāna* and the list of 11 items made use of in connection with its treatment is a non-standardized list. This means that we are here having before us a treatment of the important triple problem of *samyagjñāna, samyagdarśana, samyakcāritra* in terms of a standardized list of *anuyogadvāras* and a treatment of the important single problem of *samyagjñāna* in terms of a non-standardized such list. As already pointed out the remaining verses of the

Sāmāyikaniryukti part of Āvaśyakaniryukti are useful in their own respective ways but certainly they are relatively less useful.

Lastly a few words about the position of Āvaśyakaniryukti in relation to the question of doctrinal evolution. We have noted that four distinguishing features of the third stage of the Age of Āgamas are the doctrine of *anuyogadvāras*, the doctrine of *nayas*, the doctrine of *pramāṇas*, and the massive working out of the Karma doctrine. Now as for the doctrine of *anuyogadvāras* its frequent application is one of the most conspicuous features of Āvaśyakaniryukti—nay, that of the Niryukti-type of commentaries in general. And the doctrine of *nayas* too finds mention in Āvaśyakaniryukti at several occasions. At one place the definitions of the 7 *nayas* are given (the verses quoted in this connection being the same as occur in Anuyogadvāra). Here a curious sounding theory is also propounded, viz. that the seven *nayas* needed to be employed in former times but they need not be employed now (at the most the first three *nayas* need to be employed now), the reason being that in former times the Āgamic texts had not been divided subjectwise as is the case now after Āryarakṣita has executed such a division.[101] The exact import of the theory is not clear But what is really important is the incidental twofold division of *nayas* into *dravyārthika* and *paryāyārthika*. For this is an obviously logical division and as such has found so prominent a support at the hands of the authors of the Age of Logic; (certainly all this cannot be said about the sevenfold division of *nayas*.) Another twofold division of *nayas*—also somewhat important—is that into *vyavahāranaya* and *niścayanaya*; but a third such division, viz. that into *jñānanaya* and *kriyānaya* has played no important role in the development of the naya-doctrine. As for the doctrine of *pramāṇas* Āvaśyakaniryukti concedes its utility by offering a treatment of knowledge at the very outset, but the noteworthy thing is that it does not use the word *pramāṇa* or undertake a twofold division of *jñāna* into *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa*. Lastly, as regards the Karma doctrine the text evinces clear acquaintance with the later development when it describes the process called *śrutajñānaprāpti*, *samyaktvaprāpti* and *cāritraprāpti* — in the last case describing *upaśamaśreṇī* as well as *kṣapakaśreṇī*.

(D) ṢAṬKHAṆḌĀGAMA (and KAṢĀYAPRĀBHṚTA)

Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama is a very important Jaina text and for two considerably different reasons. For on the one hand it is a text regarded by the Digambaras as the oldest available containing Āgamic material, while on the other hand it is doubtless the oldest available text containing a vast mass of details relating to the Karma doctrine. In both cases numerous intricate questions require clarification and let us take up the two one by one.

The Digambaras concede that their oldest scriptural texts were 12 Aṅgas and that certain extra-Aṅga texts too came to enjoy the status of a

scripture; but they go on to add that all this text-mass was gradually lost to memory — the process continuing till 683 years after the death of Mahāvīra. By this date — so proceeds their version of the case — the texts in question were all completely forgotten and then somehow was composed Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama by way of salvaging at least some part of the contents of these texts. It is difficult to believe the story as it stands, for if by the time of the compostion of Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama the old Āgamic texts were in fact totally forgotten then it was in the very nature of things impossible for it to salvage any part of their contents. What seems to have happened is that in the times of Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama the Jaina authors had devised to compose such texts as would render superfluous a study of the old Āgamic texts like Bhagavatī, Prajñāpanā, Jīvābhigama, and this was true of the Śvetāmbara as well as Digambara authors. Thus a Śvetāmbara student could feel that his theoretical needs were fully sutisfied by the texts like Anuyogadvāra, Nandī, Āvaśyaniryukti, Tattvārthasūtra along with Bhāṣya, a Digambara student could feel that the same was done by the texts like Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama, Kaṣāyaprābhṛta, Mūlācāra, Tattvārthasūtra along with Sarvārthasiddhi. The only difference — in its own way remarkable — was that the Śvetāmbara camp thought it proper also to preserve the wordings of the old Āgamic texts while its Digambara counterpart refused to shoulder such a responsibility. All this accounts for the so striking a similarity that obtains between the theoretical views of the Śvetāmbaras and Digambaras in spite of the fact that the former uphold and the latter repudiate the authority of the now current Āgamic texts. In any case, Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama bears a clear imprint of being a product of the third stage of the Age of Āgamas. For example, the neat employment of the doctrine of 14 *mārgaṇā-sthānas*, 14 *guṇasthānas* and 14 *jīvasthānas* which is so distinguishing a feature of its sections I, II, III and VI was impossible at an earlier date; the same can be said about the neat employment of the doctrine of *anu-yogadvaras*, *nikṣepas* and *nayas* that finds place in its section IV and V.

Then we have to look at Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama in its capacity as a karma-text. Certainly, the first thing that a reader finds striking about this masterpiece is its so much preoccupation with the details of the karma-doctrine, details of which there was no hint in the old Āgamic texts. But a closer study reveals that the Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama version of the karma-doctrine is in many ways rather elementary when compared with the one available in the later karma texts—e.g. in Dhavalā which is Vīrasena's commentary on Ṣaṭkh-aṇḍāgama itself and in Pañcasaṅgraha which is an independent karma-text by the Śvetāmbara Candrarṣi. Thus the later authors conduct their treatment of *Karma* in the form of three exactly parallel divisions entitled *bandha*, *udaya* and *sattā*; but the problem of *sattā* is unknown to Ṣaṭkhaṇḍ-āgama while its account of *udaya* (offered under the title *vedanā* — an old

word) does not run exactly parallel to that of *bandha* and is devoted to comparatively elementary questions. It is only in the case of *bandha* that Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama has said something like the last word; for it discusses in full details not only the problem of *bandha* pure and simple but also that of *bandha* and *karaṇa* (the former being a general enquiry related to karmic bondage, the latter a special enquiry related to the actual process of karmic bondage). But as regards the remaining *karaṇas* i.e. as regards *saṅkrama, udvartanā, apavartanā, udīraṇā, upaśamanā, kṣapaṇā, nidhatti* and *nikācanā* Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama is again silent.

However, even if its treatment of *karma* is the most striking feature of Ṣatkhaṇḍāgama *karma* does not constitute its sole subject-matter. Thus its sections I (minus the *cūlikās*) and II are devoted to an account of soul while the huge Bandhana part of its section V (minus its small early portion which is of a miscellaneous character) is devoted to an account of matter. Again the Kṛti part of its section IV and the Sparśa, Karma and Prakṛti parts of its section V are devoted to certain miscellaneous discussions conducted in terms of this or that list of *anuyogadvāras*. This leaves the following parts of the texts as ones devoted to an account of *karma* :

(1) The *cūlikās* of the seciton I
(2) Section III
(3) The Vedanā part of the section IV
(4) Section VI

The last *cūlikā* of the Section I deals with a particular problem related to soul in general and some of them deal with rather minor problems related to the Karma doctrine, but four of them deal with the following major such problems :

I The classification and sub-classification of *karmas* (I *cūlikā*)
II The enumeration of *karmas* whose *bandha* is possible in this or that *guṇasthāna* (II *cūlikā*)
III The maximum duration and the minimum duration of different *karmas* (III-V *cūlikās*)

The second of these problems is dealt with at a somewhat greater length in the section III while the same is done at a very great length in the section VI — the latter account covering not only *bandha* pure and simple but also *bandha* qua *karaṇa*. The Vedanā part of the section IV deals with the problem of *karma-udaya*. The whole discussion is conducted in terms of 16 *anuyogadvāras* but the most important things have been said in connection with the *anuyogadvāras dravya, kṣetra, kāla, bhāva*; they respectively deal with the *pradeśa-, avagāhanā-, sthiti-* and *anubhāga-* aspects of *karmodaya*. Now this whole way of dealing with problem of *karmodaya* suggests that the author has not yet mastered it, *Dravya, kṣetra, kāla* and *bhāva* were

certainly 4 *anuyogadvāras* of very old standing but they as such were never used by the karma-specialists; and basing himself on the four *anuyogadvāras* (among others) the author of Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama was compelled to speak not only of the *pradeśa-*, *sthiti-* and *anubhāga-* aspects of *karmodaya* (which were after all taken note of by the karma-specialists) but also of its *avagāhanā* aspect (which never attracted the attention of the karma-specialists). The last point to be noted is that three of the present *anuyogadvāras*, viz. *dravya*, *kāla* and *bhāva* also contain *cūlikas* in which are discussed no problems of *karmodaya* but those of *bhandha* qua *karaṇa* — in *pradeśa-*, *sthiti-* and *anubhāga* aspects respectively; (it is not difficult to see why the *anuyogadvāra kṣetra* to which corresponds the *avagāhanā-* aspect contains no corresponding *cūlikā*).

Even this most cursory survey of the contents of Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama at once raises one question, viz. why did the author choose to write out his text in such an unsystematic form, particularly when the different parts of the text are themselves considerably systematic ? The answer seems to be that the different parts of the text were written by different hands at different times and that they were mechanically joined together at some later date. The material contained in the *cūlikas* of the section I was the earliest and it was this that formed the basis for the composition of the section III at a later time; in its turn, the section III itself formed the basis for the composition of the section VI at a still later time. In between the time of composing the section III and that of composing the section VI was composed the miscellaneous material on *bandha* qua *karaṇa* which now stands there in the form of those *cūlikas* to the Vedanā part of the section IV; this miscellaneous material formed the basis for the composition of the corresponding parts of the section VI. Thus it was that the section VI came to contain an elaborate account of both *bandha* pure and simple and the same qua *karaṇa*. Simiarly, the section II contains an early account of soul and it was this that formed the basis for the composition of the section I (minus its *cūlikās*) at a later time. It is also most likely that the sections II and III were contemporary of each other and so also were the section I (minus its *cūlikās*) and VI. Sections IV and V perhaps constitute one text in the form of an exposition of six topics, viz. *kṛti*, *vedanā*, *sparśa*, *karma*, *prakṛti*, *bandhana*. They came comparatively late but not necessariy later than the sections I (minus its *cūlikās*) and VI. The six topics in question have no intrinsic relation to each other and so there is no intrinsic necessity for section IV and V to go together. But as the case of Anuyogadvāra suggests the Jaina authors of the period would often resort to the practice of jointly discussing several topics with no intrinsic relation to each other; as a matter of fact, the Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama treatment of the four topics *kṛti*, *sparśa*,

karma and *prakṛti* looks very much like a piece taken away from some spot within the body of Anuyogadvāra. Of course, these precisely are the topics whose discussion is pretty miscellaneous inasmuch as it does not naturally fall within one of the three great divisions into which the Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama material can easily be resolved; (these divisions can be designated Jīvakhaṇḍa, Karmakhaṇḍa, Pudgalakhaṇḍa. But that is not the point. For the noteworthy thing is that the two important topics *vedanā* and *bandhana* here appear in the company of four such topics as are not only not important but have no intrinsic relation to those two important topics. [Vīrasena suggests that the six topics in question are the first six in a list of 24 which formed the contents of a Pūrva-text. Not only that, he from his own side offers an account of the alleged remaining 18 topics — in the course of which he discusses most of those problems which had attracted the attention of the post-Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama generations of Karma specialists. But little valuable emerges from all this For even if there was an old list of 24 topics as described by Vīrasena the items of this list could not have meant what Vīrasena takes them to mean.] The conclusion seems to be that somebody did discuss together the six topics in question which were unrelated to each other and of which two were important, four unimportant. Hence our surmise that the sections IV and V of Ṣaṭkahnḍāgama constitute one text and the reason why it should have come comparatively late is that it deals with the problem of *karmodaya* which was comparatively late to engage the attention of the Karma specialists. Be that as it may, sooner or later Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama received its present form and with such a text at his disposal the Digambara student could afford to dispense with the old Āgamic texts like Bhagavatī, Prajñāpanā, Jīvābhigama. That he did dispense with them early enough is almost certain. For hardly do we find a Digambara author refering to the wording of an Āgamic text — which would not have been the case if the repudiation of the current Āgamic texts was a comparatively late phenomenon.

In this connection let a few words also be said about Kaṣāyaprābhṛta. The text is less important in itself but more so on account of its two commentaries, an earlier one by Yativṛṣabha and a later one by Vīrasena. [The latter — the famous Jayadhavalā — was left incomplete by the author and was completed by his disciple Jinasena]. In any case, the over-all value of the small Kaṣāyaprābhṛta is much inferior to that of the voluminous Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama. For in Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama (made up of aphorisms) problems are treated in a very systematic form while looseness of form is a striking feature of Kaṣāyaprābhṛta (made up of verses). In the latter it often happens that the questions are just posed with no answer forthcoming; this, for example, is the case with the first six (out of fifteen) topics taken up for consideration (there is even doubt whether these are six topics —

also whether there are fifteen topics in all). And even when questions are followed by an answer the precise import of the answer not unoften remains uncertain. The text purports to be a general treatment of the problem of *mohanīyakarma* (though, technically speeking, *kaṣāya* is one subtype of one type of *mohanīyakarma*), but it is difficult for it — as it stands — to be a composition of one author. For in the first 12 verses we are here told that the text consists of 180 verses which are thus divided into 15 topics, then allegedly follow these 180 verses (in fact 221 and 12 more) where the first two again offer a list of topics to be discussed — this list not naturally tallying with the one submitted just before. The 180 verses become 221 (plus 12) because those to be numbered 3–8 (in all six) deal with an irrelevant topic, those to be numbered 12–46 (in all thirty five) with a topic not mentioned in either list-of-topics while those to be numbered 222–33 (in all twelve) are left unexplained even by the commentators; (in view of the fact that the printed text -- with Yativṛṣabha's commentary — starts its numbering from the twelve introductory verses we are not giving the actual serial numbers in question). But the archaism of the whole text does suggest that we are here having the oldest available specimen of describing the process called *samyaktvotpatti* (15 verses), *darśanamohanīyakṣapaṇā* (5 verses), *cāritramohanīya-upaśamanā* (8 verses) and *cāritramohanīyakṣapaṇā* (114 verses); (one verse devoted to *deśavirati*-cum-*sarvavirati* is too brief to be much informative). These topics thus account for 143 verses of the text which constitute its crux. Of the remaining 37 verses (they come before those 143) 5 give synonyms for the names of the 4 *kaṣāyas*, 16 describe the relative intensity of the different types of *kaṣāyas*, 7 offer a psychological account of one under the influence of a *kaṣāya*. These too are interesting — though not crucially important — topics. Then remaining 9 verses (they come first of all) — out of which, as mentioned earlier, two enumerate the topics to be discussed while seven pose (without answering) six elementary questions (rather question-series) regarding *mohanīyakarma*. The posure of these questions, again, is revealing — on account of its simplicity.[102]

(E) TATTVĀRTHASŪTRA (SABHĀṢYA)

In one sense Umāsvāti's Tattvārthasūtra is the crowning achievement of the age of Āgamas. For its ten chapters — composed of crisp Sanskrit aphorisms — lucidly summarize the Āgamic position on different important questions related to philosophy, ethics and mythology. The chapters I, II, V and VIII touch upon the problems of philosophy, the chapters VI – X those of ethics, the chapter III – IV those of mythology. Let us confine ourselves to the chapters devoted to philosophy and there it will be found that they discuss following problems :

Chapter I (1) *Mokṣamārga* (1)
(2) *Samyagdarśana* (2–3)

(3) *Saptatattva* (4)
(4) *Anuyogadvāra* (5, 7–8)
(5) *Pramāṇa* (6, 9–33)
(6) *Naya* (6, 34–35)
Chapter II (7) *Jīva* (1–52)
Chapter V (8) *Pañcāstikāya*-cum-*kāla* (1-28, 32–36,38–39)
(9) *Satsāmānya* (29-31,37,40-44)
Chapter VIII (10) *Karma* (1–26)

In this list following things are to be noted :
(a) the particular items
(b) their order
(c) space devoted to each.

A natural procedure would have been to start with the problems of the chapter V but in Umāsvāti's time it was the problems of the chapter I that had come to occupy the focus of the Jaina theoretician's attention. Hence his beginning his text with these problems. Now there is nothing strictly philosophical about the first three of these problems and so they need not detain us any more. But the fact that Umāsvāti has thought fit to write aphorisms on *anuyogadvāra*, *pramāṇa* and *naya* — and write them first of all — does suggest that these were then considered to be some of the most burning philosophical problems. Also to be noted is the fact that the problem of *pramāṇa* is treated at such a great length. Thus even if Umāsvāti is going to tell us in the chapter II that *upayoga* is the essential characteristic of a soul and that *upayoga* is to be subdivided into 5 types of *jñāna*, 3 types of *ajñāna*, 4 types of *darśana* he has taken care to discuss in advance — and discuss it under the title *pramāṇa* — the problem of *jñāna* and the allied problems of *ajñāna*.

The chapter II on the whole reproduces the traditional material relating to the problem of soul but it should be instructive to note as to what questions Umāsvāti does raise in this connection. They are as follows :

(1) *aupaśamika-*, *kṣāyika-*, *kṣāyopaśamika-*, *audayika-*, *pāriṇāmikabhāva* (1–7)
(2) *upayoga* (cognition) (8–9)
(3) *saṁsāri-mukta* (souls in bondage and released souls) (10)
(4) *samanaska-amanaska* (souls in possession of *manas* and those not in possession of it) (11)
(5) *trasa-sthāvara* (static-bodied and mobile-bodied souls) (12–14)
(6) *indriya* (sense-organ), *indriyaviṣaya* (object of a sense-organ), *indriya-svāmitva* (possession of a sense-organ), *sañjñitva* (possession of *sañjñā* i. e. higher cognition) (15–25)
(7) *vigrahagati* (process of transmigration) (26–31)

(8) *yoni*-cum-*janma* (birth-place and birth) (32–36)

(9) *śarīra* (body) (37–49)

(10) *veda* (sexual behaviour) (50–51)

(11) *apavartya*–, *anapavartya*–*āyu* (life liable to a premature expiry and life not liable to that) (52)

As has already been noted, the first of these questions was new to the age of Umāsvāti but the noteworthy thing about the rest is that they mostly relate to bodily activities.

In the chapter V the material related to *pañcāstikāya*-cum-*kāla* was almost all traditional but that related to *satsāmānya* was almost all new. However, here Umāsvāti's manner of arranging the material leaves something to be desired. This can at once be seen from the summary catalogue of the chapter's problems given above but more can be seen from the following details of this catalogue :

I *pañcāstikāya*-cum-*kāla* :
- (1) *pañcāstikāyasāmānya* (1–6)
- (2) *pradeśa* (7–11)
- (3) *avagāhanā* (size) (12–16)
- (4) *upakāra* (function) (*pañcāstikāya*-cum-*kāla*) (17–22)
- (5) *pudgala* (23–28)
- (6) *pudgalabandha* (formation of physical aggregate) (32–36)
- (7) *kāla* (38–39)

II *satsāmānya*:
- (1) *sat* (reality) (29)
- (2) *nityatva* (permanence) (30)
- (3) *arpita*–*anarpita* (relevance and non-relevance) (31)
- (4) *dravya* (substance) (37)
- (5) *guṇa* (quality) (40)
- (6) *pariṇāma* (property) (41–44)

Thus we find that certain problems related to *satsāmānya* are taken up in between the problems of *pudgala* and *pudgalabandha*, a thoroughly anomalous procedure. Again, the problem of *kāla* is introduced in between two problems related to *satsāmānya* — and to make matter worse *kāla* had to be somehow taken into consideration already in connection with the problem of *upakāra*. However leaving aside these difficulties — which are after all of a formal character — it can be said that Umāsvāti here provides us with a dependable catalogue of the important problems that had been raised in connection with *pañcāstikāya*-cum-*kāla* and *pudgala*. But as for the problems related to *satsāmānya* Umāsvāti is one of the pioneers to raise them; (this perhaps is one reason why this part of his discussion is so loosely arranged). Thus in three consecutive aphorisms Umāsvāti deals

with *sat* as characterised by *utpāda, vyaya, dhrauvya* — but it is easy to see that these three aphorisms fail to clinch the issue clearly. Similarly, the aphorism 37 defines *dravya* as possessed of *guṇa* and *paryāya*, the aphorism 40 defines *guṇa*, while the aphorisms 41-44 describe *pariṇāma* (to be understood as *paryāya*); all this too lacks desirable clarity. Certainly, it was in the age of Logic that the problem of *satsāmānya* was made the fulcrum of all ontological speculation while Umāsvāti's text manages to give us only a foretaste of this would-be endeavour.

In the chapter VIII Umāsvāti raises certain most basic questions related to the Karma doctrine and as follows :

(1) *bandhahetu* (causes of karmic bondage) (*1*)

(2) *bandha* (karmic bondage) (2-3)

(3) *bandhacatuṣṭaya* (the four types of karmic bondage) (4)

(4) *prakṛtibandha* (karmic bondage from the standpoint of karma-types) (5-14)

(5) *sthitibandha* (karmic bondage from the standpoint of duration) (15-21)

(6) *anubhāvabandha* (karmic bondage from the standpoint of intensity (22-24)

(7) *pradeśabandh* (karmic bondage from the standpoint of number of karma-particles) (*25*)

(8) *śubhakarma* (auspicious karmas) (26)

As has already been indicated this part of the text contains little new that was typical of the period. Only let us note that in connection with his treatment of *anubhāvabandha* Umāsvāti has considered the problem of *saṁkramaṇa* (which was certainly a new problem of the period) and that of *karmavedana* (=*karmodaya*) but not at all the problem that usually goes by the name *anubhāgabandha* or *rasabandha*.

Lastly, a few words about Umāsvāti's position in relation to the Āgamic texts now current. It is found that now and then Umāsvāti says things that go against what is said in these Āgamic texts For example, both Bhagavatı and Prajñāpanā maintain that *kevalajñāna* and *kevaladarśana* cannot proceed simultaneously, but Umāsvāti holds the opposite view[103]; (the Digambaras will here side with Umāsvāti as against Bhagavatī and Prajñāpanā). Again, both Bhagavatī and Prajñāpanā (even the Uttarādhyayana chapter 28) maintain that *kāla* is an independent *dravya* but Umāsvāti says that this view is upheld only by a section of the Jaina theoreticians[104]; (the Digambaras will here side with Bhagavatī and Prajñāpanā as against Umāsvāti). Similarly, both Bhagavatī and Prajñāpanā maintain that *manaḥparyāpti* is one type of *paryāpti* but Umāsvāti again says that this view is upheld only by a section of the Jaina theorteicians[105]; (the Digambaras will here side with Bhagavatı and Prajñāpanā as against Umāsvāti — though it is to be noted that Bhagavatı and Prajñāpanā always bracket *manaḥparyāpti* with *bhāṣāparyāpti* so that the total number of *paryāptis* is five even in their

case[106]). Lastly, Bhagavatī maintains that a soul remains *anāhāraka* for one *samaya*, two *samayas* or three *samayas* but Umāsvāti says — and so does Prajñāpanā — that it remains so for one *samaya* or two *samayas*[107]; (the Digambaras will here side with Bhagavatī as against Umāsvāti and Prajñāpanā). Then there is a case that deserves somewhat detailed consideration. We have earlier taken note of a standard formula which Bhagavatī and Prajñāpanā use in describing the process of the reception of pudgala-particles on the part of a soul. This formula is to be applied to all cases of pudgala-reception but it says that the particles concerned are subtle *as well as* gross. Now in many cases (e g. in the case of karma-reception) it is in the very nature of things impossible for the particles concerned to be gross, and so in these cases the formula creates difficulty for the later commentators. But Umāsvāti when he discusses the question in the course of his exposition of the Karma doctrine explicitly says that the particles concerned are subtle *not* gross[108]. Similarly, this formula says that the particles concerned are *anantarāvagāha* and the natural meaning of the word is 'immediately adjacent (to the soul)'. But the later standard position requires the meaning 'co-existent (with the soul)' and so the later commentators give this very meaning to that word Now Umāsvāti replaces the word *anantarāvagāha* by *ekakṣetrāvagāha*[109]. [In Bhagavatī itself it is once argued that the particles concerned are not *anantarāvagāha* but *ātmakṣetrāvagāha*[110] and Umāsvāti can claim to have followed this passage of Bhagavatī. But the point is that the standing formula contains the word *anantarāvagāha* which Umāsvāti rejects in favour of *ekakṣetrāvagāha*]. All this suggests that there were at least three wordings of the Āgamic texts, viz

(1) one that is preserved in the current Āgamic texts
(2) one that was available to the early Digambara authors
(3) one that was available to Umāsvāti.

Of course, the possibility is always there that the current Āgamic texts have experienced corruption — through inadvertance or otherwise. For example, it is quite possible that the insertion of *manaḥparyāpti* in the Āgamic list of *paryāptis* is a later corruption; similariy, the passage which lays down that the physical particles received by a soul must be *ātmakṣetrāvagāha* not *anantarāvagāha* must be a later interpolation. And the discrepancy between Bhagavatī and Prajñāpanā on the question of *anāhāra* needs an explanation. Be that as it may, the fact that Umāsvāti's text could be patronized by the Śvetāmbaras as well as Digambaras clearly proves that the Āgamic heritage available to the two sub-sects was substantially the same. That the Digambaras too were in possession of such a heritage — moreover, a heritage almost as rich as that possessed by the Śvetāmbaras — goes without saying; what happened is that they — unlike their Śvetāmbara colleagues — bid good-bye to the wording of this heritage after it stood incorporated in the systematic texts of later times.

CHAPTER III

THE AGE OF LOGIC

I ITS GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS AND ITS THREE STAGES

Like the age of Āgamas, the age of Logic too exhibits certain general characteristics and it is now time that we take due note of them. What a student of the Āgamic texts finds to be one of their most striking features is what might be called their 'closed door' atmosphere; for barring the solitary — though notable — exceptions of Sūtrakṛtāṅgasūtra none of these texts ever refers to a rival view that is known to us from other independent sousces. Truly Bhagavatī often relates dialogues where somebody reports to Mahāvīra — '*aṇṇautthiyā evaṁ vayanti* etc.' and the latter retorts '*aṇṇautthiyā jaṁ evaṁ vayanti taṁ micchā vayanti ahaṁ puṇa evaṁ vayāmi* etc.' But heretics thus animadverted are mostly of the nature of the proverbial 'men of straw'; in any case, the views attributed to them are hardly ever such as can be recognized as ones upheld by some well-established non-Jaina school of Indian philosophy. With particular force does this account apply to the texts belonging to the first and second stages of the age of Āgamas — though it remains essentially valid even in the case of those belonging to the third stage. For in this third stage a somewhat new element relevant for our present purpose seems to have been introduced in the form of the doctrine of 7 *nayas*. Certainly, it can plausibly be argued that the seven *nayas* of the Jaina theoreticians of the period represented so many non-Jaina ways of looking at things, ways with which these theoreticians had become acquainted in the course of their day-to-day missionary work. But the argument is weak and the fact seems to be that the advocates of 7 *nayas* are almost as much 'men of straw' as were those *aṇṇautthiyas* of Bhagavatī. In any case, no Āgamic text ever mention a well-established non-Jaina school of philosophy as an upholder of this *naya* or that. Of course, this does not mean that the doctrine of 7 *nayas* was formulated in utter isolation from the contemporary development taking place within the field of Indian Philosophy in general. But that is not the point. For to be sure not only the doctrine of 7 *nayas* but all doctrines too developed by the Jainas were formulated in close relationship to the developments taking place within the field of Indian philosophy in general — and how the task was executed in each period of history is to be laid bare by the historians of Jaina philosophy in particular and Indian philosophy in general. What is being emphasised is that even while developing the doctrine of 7 *nayas* the Āgamic texts make no explicit reference to a non-Jaina school of philosophy, nor can it be made out that such a reference

is implicitly present there. A second noteworthy feature of the Āgamic texts is the essentially dogmatic character of most of their formulations. In this connection again certain dialogues of Bhagavatī seem to form an exception. Nay, it is precisely such dialogues of Bhagavatī where Mahāvīra is represented as buttressing his contention with the help of some argumentation that are mostly old and mostly important. Of course, the argumemtation seldom amounts to something more than offering a more or less striking analogy but that is what is to be expected in the case of such a generally old piece of theorization. The point is that barring the Bhagavatī passages in question almost the entire bulk of Āgamic texts is in the form of bold assertions. In the age of Logic something opposite happens on both these counts, for now we come across texts where the non-Jaina schools of philosophy are explicitly named and criticised and texts where assertions are always followed by more or less cogent arguments supporting them. Of course, the two tendencies grew gradually so that there are texts where they present themselves in an incipient form and texts where they do so in a pronouced form.

Viewed in this light the first important Śvetāmbara texts belonging to the age of Logic are Siddhasena's Sanmati, Mallavādī's Nayacakra and Jinabhadra's Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya; the first important Digambara texts Kundakunda's Pañcāstikāya, Pravacanasāra, Samayasāra and Samantabhadra's Āptamīmāṁsā. And all these are the texts which we intend to assign to what we are going to call the first stage of the age of Logic. The second stage of the age is represented by the Śvetāmbara Haribhadra and the Digambara Akalaṅka and Vidyānanda, the third stage by the Digambara Prabhāchandra and Śvetāmbara Abhayadeva, Vādīdeva and Yaśovijaya. In the case of each of these stages there arise important — and rather intricate — problems of evaluation, and so they have to be taken up one by one.

In the case of the first stage the three Śvetāmbara texts concerned, viz. Siddhasena's Sanmati, Mallavādī's Nayacakra and Jinabhadra's Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya deserve careful consideration inasmuch as they vividly exemplify— each in its own manner — as to what was meant by the advent of the age of Logic. The most outstanding feature of Sanmati is its handling of the traditional doctrine of seven *nayas*; in fact, it will be no exaggeration to say that through it the text has set the pace for the whole subsequent age. In this connection Siddhasena skillfully shifted the centre of attention from the sevenfold division of *nayas* into *naigama*, *saṅgraha* etc. to their twofold division into *dravyāstika* and *paryāyāstika*. This way he sought to bring the doctrine of *nayas* into harmony with the dominant contemporary tendency of Jaina thought in the field of ontology. For as the example of Umāsvāti clearly indicates the Jainas of the period were defining reality as possessed

of origination, destruction and premanence. There was no old Āgamic tradition of doing so and the new tendeney doubtless grew under the shadows of the Buddhist vs. Brahmanic controversy as to the definition of reality. Thus whereas the Buddhists were maintaining that reality is ever-changing and the Brahmanical philosophers were outright opposed to their view the Jainas came out with the suggestion that reality is ever-changing and yet permanent. It was an old Jaina position that *dharma*, *adharma*, *ākāśa*, souls and atoms are so many permanent substances but it was always conceded that all these substances possess properties that might come and go; (as for the composite physical substances the position was that their constituent atoms are permanent even if they themselves must originate and perish). It was in this background that one had to understand the Bhagavatī contention that an atom, a soul, a *nāraka* was permanent from the standpoint of *dravya* and transient from that of *paryāya* or *bhāva*. Of course, the contention was not a recurring theme of Bhagavatī and certainly it did not mean that everything whatsoever is a permanent substance possessed of ever changing properties. But in the age of Umāsvāti it became a cardinal Jaina thesis that everything whatsoever is permanent from the standpoint of *dravya* and ever-changing from that of *paryāya*; (as already hinted, in the case of composite physical substances the thesis amounted to maintaining that they are permanent in so far as their constituent atoms are so while they are ever-changing in so far as their own properties are so — but the hint was always there that even composite physical substances are more or less permanent substances even if not absolutely permanent ones). Thus Siddhasena in effect suggested that a physical substance is absolutely permanent qua a physical substance, that it is more or less permanent qua a lump of clay or a jar, that it is absolutely transient qua a seat of its momentry properties. From this it also follows that two physical substances are absolutely alike in so far as both are phyical substances, that they are partly alike in so far as one of them is a lump of clay the other a jar, that they are not at all alike in so far as each is a seat of its own momentary properties. Using the terminology of the doctrine of *nayas* Siddhasena would say that from the standpoint of *saṅgrahanaya* physical substance is just a physical substance (better still, a substance), from the standpoint of *vyavahāranaya* it is a lump of clay or a jar, from that of *ṛjusūtranaya* it is a seat of its momentary properties. That all this was not implied in the traditional doctrine of *nayas* can be gathered from a perusal of the Anuyogadvāra formulation on the subject — a particularly strong argument in support of such a view being that there was yet another *naya* viz. *naigama* of which Siddhasena just took no notice. And yet Siddhasena made out as if he was only amplifying the traditional doctrine of *nayas*. Since on Siddhasena's showing the *saṅgraha* and *vyavahāra nayas* conceded that a physical substance was a more or less permanent substance while the *ṛjusūtranaya* laid

all-out emphasis on its momentary properties he suggested that the former two *nayas* belong to the category *dravyāstika*, the last to the category *paryāyāstika*. [Siddhasena spoke not a word about the remaining three *nayas*— except that they too belong to the category *paryāyāstika* whose root-naya is *ṛjusūtra*]. But it is doubtful if the traditional seven *nayas* were meant to be thus subdivided into the categories *dravyāstika* and *paryāyāstika*. Be that as it may, the essence of the naya-doctrine was seen by Siddhasena to lie in the following two positions:

(i) a physical substance is absolutely permanent qua a physical substance, it is more or less permanent qua a lump of clay or a jar, it is absolutely transient qua a seat of its momentary properties;

(ii) two physical substances are absolutely alike in so far as both are physical substances, they are partly alike in so far as one is a lump of clay the other a jar, they are not at all alike in so far as each is a seat of its momentary properties.

Through the first of these positions the Jainas became participant in the Buddhist vs. Brahmanic controversy on the question of *kṣaṇikatva-nityatva*, through the second in that on the question of *sāmānya-viśeṣa*. Siddhasena's dicussion of the questions was a good model for the later authors and so he was treated as an authority in the Śvetāmbara as well as Digambara camps; (however, these authors seldom followed Siddhasena's practice of completely ignoring *naigamanaya* and of making no more than a passing mention of the three *śabdanayas*).

Let us also briefly consider certain minor contributions made by Siddhasena. Thus he takes note of the doctrine of four *nikṣepas* — saying that *nāma-*, *sthāpanā-* and *dravya-nikṣepas* belong to the category *dravyāstika*, *bhāvanikṣepa* to the category of *paryāyāstika*; but he does nothing by way of elaborating his contention. Similarly, he lays down the seven alternative ways of describing a thing that are the subject-matter of the *Saptabhaṅgī* doctrine — to be precise, of this doctrine in one of its two versions — but his amplification of the same is contained in just one verse which, unfortunately, is utterly obscure in its meaning. Again, he seeks to argue against the position that *guṇa* and *paryāya* are two different concepts. In Umāsvāti's time it was gradually becoming a fashion with the Jaina authors to distinguish between *guṇa* and *paryāya* but no such distinction was made in the old Āgamic texts. Appealing to the authority of these texts Siddhasena makes out some sort of case in support of his view but the distinction had come to stay even if the subsequent authors were not always unanimous as to their understanding of the same. Lastly, Siddhasena argued that *jñāna* and *darśana* are not two different concepts; on his view certain cases of *jñāna* as traditionally understood are to be called *jñāna* as well as *darśana*

while the rest are to be called *jñāna* but not *darśana*. On this question too Siddhasena was hardly followed by any subsequent author.

The value of Mallavādī's Nayacakra lies in an altogether different direction. He is reputed to have been a commentator of Sanmati but his Nayacakra betrays little specific influence of this text. For one thing, Mallavādī, unlike Siddhasena, gives recognition to *naigamanaya*, understands *vyavahāranaya* as the standpoint of non-philosophical commonsense, and treats the three *śabdanayas* on the equal footing with the rest. Of course, Mallavādī's real task is to offer an account of some seventeen philosophical positions and treat each as a case of this or that *naya*, but on this question too Siddhasena had something to say. For he has told us that the Sāṅkhya philosophy is a case of *dravyāstikanaya*, the Buddhist philosophy a case of *paryāyāstikanaya* while the Vaiśeṣika philosophy a case of mechanical juxtaposition of the two. It is not much difficult to see what Siddhasena is driving at — particularly in view of the fact that he has been followed by certain later authors whose elaborate treatment of the question makes things tolerably clear. But Mallavādī's assignment of the different philosophical positions to different *nayas* is all his own; the following is how it stands in a nutshell:

1 *Vyavahāranaya* :	1	the ritualist Mīmāmsā doctrine
2 *Sangrahanaya* :	2	five monistic doctrines centred on *Puruṣa*, *Niyati*, *Kāla*, *Svabhāva*, *Bhāva*
	3	two dualistic doctrines one centred on *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* the other on God and the world
	4	the doctrine of the equal efficacy of *puruṣārtha* and *karma*
3 *Naigama* :	5	the doctrine centred on dualism of *dravya* and *kriyā*
	6	the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of six *padārthas*
4 *Ṛjusūtra* :	7	the Jaina doctrine of *Syādvāda*
5 *Śabda* :	8	the doctrine of *śabdanaya*
	9	the doctrine of *avaktavyavāda*
6 *Samabhirūḍha*:	10	the doctrine of aggregate-devoid-of-an-underlying-substance
7 *Evambhūta* :	11	the doctrine of *kṣaṇikavāda*
	12	the doctrine of *Śūnyavāda*-cum-*Vijñānavāda*

Mallavādī's account of these doctrines — in each case followed by critical comments — is most elaborate but he never argues why a doctrine is to be assigned to this or that *naya*; (for all practical purposes he simply does the assignment and considers his task to be over). Maybe in his time that much is sufficient, but a modern reader who has formed his notion

of *nayas* from the later texts — and has even taken due note of the Āgamic treatment of the same — will find it difficult to see the logic of Mallavādī's performance, at least to see it with desired clarity. Even more bewildering is Mallavādī's assignment of the above 17 doctrines to 12 categories which seem to be his own creation — at least we know of no earlier or later author who employed them. The seventeen doctrines in question arranged in a serial order are given above; the twelve categories in question similarly arranged are given below:

1 *vidhiḥ*	— affirmation
2 *vidhervidhiḥ*	— affirmation of affirmation
3 *vidhervidhiniyamam*	— affirmation-cum-limitation of affirmation
4 *vidherniyamaḥ*	— limitation of affirmation
5 *vidhiniyamam*	— affirmation-cum-limitation
6 *vidhiniyamasya vidhiḥ*	— affirmation of affirmation-cum-limitation
7 *vidhiniyamasya vidhiniyamam*	— affirmation-cum-limitation of affirmation-cum-limitation
8 *vidhiniyamasya niyamaḥ*	— limitation of affirmation-cum-limitation
9 *niyamaḥ*	— limitation
10 *niyamasya vidhiḥ*	— affirmation of limitation
11 *niyamasya vidhiniyamam*	— affirmation-cum limitation of limitation
12 *niyamasya niyamaḥ*	— limitation of limitation

In this connection again Mallavādī does not argue why a particular doctrine is to be assigned to this or that category; but here an additional difficulty is that unlike the seven *nayas* these categories are found described nowhere else.

These defects of Mallavādī's text are certainly formidable and they must have been at least partly responsible for the neglect it suffered at the hands of subsequent generations. (No later author ever quoted a specific view of Mallavādī developed in Nayacakra and the text itself is now to be restored from Siṁhasūri's commentary on it). But the text deserves serious study for it is the earliest available specimen of a Jaina's thorough acqaintance with the contemporary systems of Indian philosophy, a feature absent not only in the Āgamic text including Tattvārthasūtra but even in Sanmati.

Jinabhadra's Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya is another important early text belonging to the age of Logic. Written in the form of a commentary on Āvaśyakaniryukti the text does not much concern itself with the views of the rival systems of philosophy; in this sense it rather breathes the atmosphere of the age of Āgamas. However, the text is not wholly devoid of occasional references to Buddhists and Vaiśeṣikas and in one particular section viz. Gaṇadharavāda so many rival philosophical views e. g. *ekātmavāda*, *bhūtacaitanya*-

vāda, śūnyavāda are criticised *en masse*; (it is however curious that nowhere in this text is a specific Sāṅkhya view ever mentioned). In any case, the text is doubtless worthy of the age of Logic. For its treatment of various philosophical problems is so elaborate and so masterly that it has often served as a model to the acutest brains produced by the age of Logic. For example, Yaśovijaya, the last titan of the age of Logic, in his treatment of *Anekāntavāda* heavily depends on Sanmati on the one hand and Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya on the other; similarly in his treatment of epistemological problems he heavily depends on Syādvādaratnākara on the one hand and Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya on the other. Certainly, Jinabhadra's account of seven *nayas*, his treatment of the problem of *dravyāstika* vs. *paryāyāstika naya* and his occasional application of the *Naya* doctrine to certain specific cases throw ample light on this rather ticklish subiect-matter of Jaina philosophical studies. On his showing *saṅgrahanaya* represents the standpoint of emphasis on the general at the cost of the particular, *vyavahāranaya* that of emphasis on the particular at the cost of the general while *naigamanaya* that of emphasis on both but conceived as mutually independent; as against all these *ṛjusūtranaya* represents the stanpoint of emphasis on the momentary particular. It will be instructive to compare Jinabhadra's account of the first four *nayas* with Siddhasena's account of the first three (there being no *naigama* according to the latter). Then as against Siddhasena who just ignores three *śabdanayas* Jinabhadra offers a lucid account of them. It is also characteristic of Jinabhadra that he offers an account of seven *nayas* in one part of his text and treats the problem of *dravyāstika* vs. *paryāyāstika* in another; (of course, the occasion for doing so was provided by Āvaśyakaniryukti but the noteworthy thing is that Jinabhadra availed of it). It can easily be seen that the former discussion represents a comparatively early stage and the latter a comparatively late stage in the evolution of *Anekāntavāda* (Non-absolutism). An even earlier stage than the one represented by the former discussion is to be noticed in the various places where the *Naya* doctrine is applied to certain specific cases. Here the discussion is often conducted on the same old level as was to be seen in the case of Anuyogadvāra treatment of the problem. Jinabhadra's treatment of the doctrine of four *nikṣepas* is also elaborate and illuminating but his reference to the *Saptabhaṅgī* doctrine is extremely summary (covering just two verses) and fails to be informative. Similarly, Jinabhadra's treatment of epistemological problems appearing in connection with his commentary on the very first 77 verses of Āvaśyakaniryukti is extremely useful. For instance, here he says so many important things about the precise relationship — exhibiting similarities as well as dissimilarites — that obtains between *mati* and *śruta*. Lastly, also useful are two more or less massive collections of ontological discussions — the more important one occurring in connection with Gaṇadharavāda the less important one in connection with Nihnavavāda.

Kundakunda is the first Digambara author who is considerably affected by the initial strivings of the age of Logic. His philosophical masterpieces are three — Pañcāstikāya, Pravacanasāra, Samayasāra — to be studied in this very order. In Pañcāstikāya he discusses the doctrine of *Pañcāstikāya*, the doctrine of *Navatattva*, the doctrine of *Mokṣa* but the whole discussion starts with a treatment of the problem of *dravya*, *guṇa*, *paryāya*, and that of *utpāda*, *vyaya*, *dhrauvya*, a procedure that is symptomatic. However, on the whole the level of discussion in Pañcāstikāya is comparatively elemen tary. A comparatively advanced level of discussion appears in Pravacanasāra which is divided into three sections, viz. Jñānādhikāra, Jñeyādhikāra, Cāritrādhikāra; of these the first two raise philosophical questions of considerable importance. Thus in Jñānādhikāra there occurs an ontological analysis of the cognitive, emotive and affective states of a soul — the emphasis being on the point that what happens to a soul as a results of its association with an alien element, viz. matter is not something really its own. And like Pañcāstikāya, Jñeyādhikāra begins with an important discussion on the problem of *dravya*, *guṇa*, *paryāya* and that of *utpāda*, *vyaya*, *dhrauvya*; the remaining section is made up of a small part treating *pañcāstikāya* and a large part treating soul. Here again it is emphasised that what matter does to a soul is not something essential to this soul. Now observations about the essential dissimilarities obtaining between soul and matter which occupy so much part of Pravacanasāra (and which in a rudimentary form appear in the Mokṣa part of Pañcāstikāya as well) are the solid basis on which is erected the superstructure of Samayasāra — in a way, a unique document in the whole philosophical literature of the Jainas. Employing the terminology of *vyavahāranaya* and *niścayayanaya* Kundakunda here argues that an account of a soul in terms of what happens to it as a result of its association with matter is its account from ths standpoint of *vyavahāranaya* (practical standpoint) while an account of it in terms of what happens to it all by itself is its account from the standpoint of *niścayanaya* (definitive standpoint). True, distinction between *vyavahāranaya* and *niścayanaya* is as old as Bhagavatī but Kundakunda's so massive a recourse to it was startling. Moreover, there was an important difference of nuance. For according to Bhagavatī *niścayanaya* tells us all that is the case whereas *vyavahāranaya* tells us only that part of it which is important from the standpoint of everyday life; as against this, Kundakunda was suggesting that *vyavahāranaya* tells us all that is the case whereas *niścayanaya* tells us only that part of it which is important from the standpoint of higher spiritual life. For certainly, as a Jaina Kundakunda could not maintain that nothing happens to a soul as a resul of its association with matter; he could only emphasize that what thus happens is something that is not bound to happen for ever (and hence something that is not important from the standpoint of higher

spiritual life). Be that as it may, an iteresting fact of the *Naya* doctrine was brought to light by Kundakunda in his Samayasāra.

The last important author of what we have called the first stage of the age of Logic was the Digambara Samantabhadra whose Āptamımāṁsā is a philosophical text of first-rate importance. For it was in Āptamımāṁsā that for the first time a basic use was made of the *Saptabhangı* doctrine in connection with formulating philosophical problems. The doctrine was somehow in the air ever since the day of Bhagavatı and in Sanmati it was actually laid down in full. Even Umāsvāti seems to have been acquainted with what Siddhasena says but the surmise is not beyond doubt. For in the course of his Bhāṣya on the aphorism concerning *arpita-anarpita* Umāsvāti speaks of a fourfold division of judgment into *dravyāstika*, *mātṛkāpadāstika*, *utpannāstika* and *paryāyāstika*; the meaning of the division is not much clear but while explaining the fourth item Umāsvāti says that a thing is there from the standpoint of its own properties, it is not there from the standpoint of alien properties, while it is indescribable from the standpoint of both these sets of properties, and he concludes by saying that alternatives are to be formulated on the basis of a consideration of parts. The meaning seems to be that two of the three features in question, viz. is, is-not, indescribable can appear in two different parts of a thing (and this can happen in three ways) while all three can appear in three of its parts (and this can happen in just one way). Thus together with the original three we will get seven alternatives in all, that is, the same as Siddhasena speaks of. But the possibility is not ruled out that Umāsvāti is referring not to these seven alternatives but to those 23 that had made their appearance in Bhagavatı. Kundakunda too, in both Pañcāstikāya and Pravacanasāra, summarily refers to the seven alternatives of the *Saptabhangı* doctrine though in both he actually quotes only the first four of them and in the former alone does he say in so many words that the alternatives are seven in all. Moreover, it is not certain whether Kundakunda conceives *saptabhangı* after the manner of Siddhasena or he does so after the manner of Samantabhadra. For with Samantabhadra the first two alternatives are the same as those with Siddhasena but the rest emerge differently. Thus according to the former a thing both is and is not when the standpoint of its own properties and that of the alien ones are applied successively while it is indescribable when they are applied simultaneously; as for the last three alternatives they on this view emerge when the standpoint of the fourth alternative is applied along with that of first, second and third respectively. This difference obtaining beween the two versions of *Saptabhangı* is noteworthy but let it be clearly recognised that it does not touch the essence of the matter. For the essence of the *Saptabhangı* doctrine lies in maintaining that a thing is characterised by two mutually contradictory properties at

one and the same time. And this way of looking at things was certainly a comparatively later growth. True, even in Bhagavatī a question was often answered in terms of two mutually contradictory features, for instance, when it was said that during the process of transmigration a being possesses body and also does not (the formar when *taijasa* and *kārmaṇa* types of bodies are taken into consideration the latter when the remaining types), or that during the same process a being possesses sense-organs and also does not (the former when *bhāvendriyas* are taken into consideration the latter when *dravyendriyas*). But these could hardly be called cases of vindicating *Anekāntavāda*. Some sort of a move in that direction was made in connection with formulating the doctrine of seven *nayas*, for here two *nayas* (e.g. *saṅgraha* and *ṛjusūtra*) seem to have been so conceived that they take diametrically opposed stands on one and the same questions. But even the *Naya* doctrine as originally understood does not have it for its central feature that diametrically opposed stands be taken on one and the same question. It was only when the sevenfold division of *nayas* was replaced by a twofold division that the assignment of two mutually contradictory features to the same thing at the same time became a central feature of the *Naya* doctrine. However, the twofold division of *nayas* into *dravyāstika* and *paryāyāstika* was made possible by the earlier evolved tradition of difining reality as possessed of origination, destruction and permanence. Thus the real credit for sowing the seed of *Anekāntavāda* within the field of Jaina philosophical speculation goes to the present definition of reality. To be sure, change and permanence constitute the first pair of contradictory features whose joint observation all around led the Jaina theoreticians to formulate and elaborate the doctrine of *Anekāntavāda*. For starting from here they soon discovered that similarity and dissimilarity, unity and plurality, separateness and non-separateness, relatedness and non-relatedness etc. constitute other important pairs of contradictory features which characterise things no less markedly than does the pair consisting of the contradictory features change and permanence. A clear-cut enumeration of the doctrine of *Anekāntavāda* as covering these and similar phenomena of 'co-presence of the opposites' is the real contribution of Āptamīmāṁsā; that the text proceeds within the over-all framework of the *Saptabhaṅgī* doctrine is but a question of form.

Here we close our summary perusal of the texts composed in the first stage of the age of Logic. All these texts bear, in one way or another, the stamp of being a product of an age of transition. Sanmati, Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya and the writings of Kundakunda are so much permeated with the spirit of the age of Āgamas that it will be advisable to characterise them as semi-Āgamic texts. It is only insofar as these texts develop the doctrine

of *utpāda, vyaya, dhrauvya* or that of *nayas* — particularly, the *dravyāstika* and *paryāyāstika* that they say something appropriate to the age of Logic. For these doctrines have laid the foundations of *Anekāntavāda* — which certainly is a characteristic feature of the age of Logic. In the case of Nayacakra difficulties arise from another direction. Its mastery of the contemporary non-Jaina systems of philosophy leaves little to be desired, dut the text is no model for a criticism of these systems undertaken from the Jaina standpoint. As a matter of fact, the text does not even claim that the systems in question have been criticised from the Jaina standpoint, for what has been presented is the criticism of an outgoing system on the part of the incoming one. Really, however, the criticism part of the text almost always contains, in an anomalous fashion, something or else which a Jaina alone could say while the rest of this part contains little to which a Jaina could take exception. But the fact remains that the criticism of the systems in question would have been somewhat different had it been offered in the name of a Jaina himself. As for Āptamīmāṁsā it gives no evidence of its author being so thorough a student of the contemporary systems of philosophy as was the author of Nayacakra, but the framework worked out here for criticising these systems proved to be a major helpful model for subsequent authors. Certainly, the task of the Jaina authors belonging to the second stage of the age of Logic was to command a Nayacakra-like mastery over the contemporary systems of philosophy and subject them to criticism mainly in terms of the model provided by Āptamīmāṁsā (partly also in an independent manner). In the Śvetāmbara camp the task was undertaken by Haribhadra in his Anekāntajayapatākā, in the Digambara camp by Akalaṅka and Vidyānanda in their several masterpieces. So it is to these authors that we turn next.

Haribhadra was a polymath whose intellectual endeavour compassed an unusually large number of fields but Anekāntajayapatākā was doubtless his philosophical *magnum opus*. The text did not receive due attention on the part of later generations (even Yaśovijaya chose to write a commentary not on it but on Śāstravārtāsamuccaya which was a comparatively elementary philosophical text coming from the pen of Haribhadra). But the fault lay not so much with Anekāntajayapatākā as with theo ver-all situation that emerged historically and the question deserves a close consideration. As compared to Āptamīmāṁsā Anekāntajayapatākā is a much advanced text and for the most part while arranging its material it adopts the former's model minus its essential trappings. Thus in its first four chapters it respectively deals with the following pairs of contradictory features :

(1) Existence-Non-existence
(2) Permanence-Transience
(3) Genaral-Particular
(4) Describable-Indescribable

[The remaining two chapters proceed in an independent manner and they respectively take up the following topics :

(5) refutation of *Vijñānavāda* (idealism)

(6) refutation of *Kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda* (momentarism)

But as compared to Nayacakra Anekāntajayapatākā is a much poor text so far as it concerns the question of mastering the contemporary systems of philosophy; and for a Śvetāmbara text this was definitely a sign of degeneration. Little wonder that a long gap separated Haribhadra from the next great Śvetāmbara authors who wrote on philosophical topics. These authors were Abhayadeva who commented on Sanmati and Vādideva who composed Syādvādaratnākara; however even in their case inspiration and impetus came not from Haribhadra but from the Digambara authors like Prabhācandra and his great predecessors Vidyānanda and Akalaṅka. Of course, Prabhācandra himself stood to Vidyānanda is somewhat the same relation as Haribhadra did to Mallavādī — in both cases the later author was an inferior genius. But that is a different question and the fact remains that in the second stage of the age of Logic — a stage covering Haribhadra, Akalaṅka, Vidyānanda—ideas that historically proved pregnant came not from Haribhadra but from Akalaṅka and Vidyānanda. It was in the third stage of the age of Logic —a stage covering Prabhācandra, Abhayadeva, Vādideva, Yaśovijaya— that Śvetāmbara authors once more have a clear lead over their Digambara counterparts. But that again is a different question and will be taken up in due course. For the present let us only remark that Anekāntajayapatākā deserved a better tale that history meted out to it.

Akalaṅka was a typical product of the age of Logic and the whole range of its activities, which was philosophical through and through, carries a meaning. Thus he wrote a commentary on Tattvārthasūtra, a commentary on Āptamīmāṁsā, four independent texts, viz. Laghīyastraya Nyāyaviniścaya, Pramāṇasaṅgraha, and Siddhiviniścaya, dealing with philosophical topics in general, *pramāṇa, naya* and *nikṣepa* in particular. Through his commenary on Tattvārtha, the great Tattvārtharājavārtika, Akalaṅka sought to present the Āgamic material in a language and style befitting the age of Logic. But here there was little scope for an originality in content and Akalaṅka hardly made an attempt in that direction. The case was different with Āptamīmāṁsā where content was considerably expanded by Akalaṅka in his commentary Aṣṭaśatī. This in a way amounted to making good a deficiency that vitiated Āptamīmāṁsā. For this text as it originally stood was rather poor in content, though brilliant in form. Lastly, in his independent writings Akalaṅka continued the creative philosophical activity initiated in Aṣṭaśatī but here the very framework within which the discussion was conducted was the author's own

creation; and this aspect of the question is of considerable importance. For as time passed Akalaṅka became more and more keenly aware that the Jainas were yet without a real doctrine of *pramāṇas*. He, of course, knew that the tradition spoke of a fivefold division of *jñānas*; nay, in Rājavārtika he had himself offered a lucid exposition of this traditional understanding of the subject. But he felt that the traditional list of 5 *jñānas* was no match for the lists of *pramāṇas* that were being offered by the different non-Jaina schools of Indian philosophy, e.g. by the Buddhist, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā schools. So he devised a new such list for his camp and its items were as follows : *pratyakṣa, smṛti, pratyabhijñā, tarka, anumāna, āgama*. The chief merit of this list was that it included two items, viz. *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* which were there in almost every other non-Jaina list and which were not clearly provided for in the traditional list of five *jñānas*. Of course, Akalanka also sought to demonstrate that the six items of his list were reducible to the five items of the traditional list. In this connection the task in essence was to show how *indriyapratyakṣa, smṛti, pratyabhijñā, tarka* and *anumāna* were cases of *matijñāna*; (*āgama* could well be treated as a synonym for *śruta* while *avadhi, manaḥparyāya* and *kevala* treated as cases of *atīndriyapratyakṣa*). This required a thorough evaluation of the traditional concept of *mati* but Akalaṅka did nothing of the sort and mainly relied on Umāsvāti's declaration to the effect that *mati, smṛti, sañjñā, cintā* and *abhinibodha* are *anarthāntara*, a declaration which itself stood in need of a critical examination. On the other hand, Akalanka thoroughly examined — and did so again and again — the meaning he had decided to bestow on the six members of his list of *pramāṇas*. The result was that the Jainas came to have a well considered list of *pramāṇas* which was a good enough match for the various non-Jaina lists then current. Besides, Akalaṅka almost always sought to append to his treatment of *pramāṇas* a treatment of *nayas* and *nikṣepas* but there was not much original in this latter treatment. Even then this part of Akalaṅka's writings has to be studied seriously and compared with the corresponding part of Jinabhadra's Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya; for in both cases there was a serious attempt to give logical shape to two traditional doctrines which were not so logical to begin with. In any case, it was almost always with a view to dealing with *pramāṇa, naya* and *nikṣepa* that Akalaṅka undertook to compose independent texts; (Siddhiviniścaya has a somewhat broader canvas). But the discussion in these texts is not epistemological in the narrow sense of the term. For one thing, a treatment of *pramāṇa* almost involves a treatment of *pramāṇa-viṣaya* and the latter is a purely ontological enquiry; but even otherwise there are numerous occasions when a treatment of *pramāṇa, naya* or *nikṣepa* involves a treatment of ontological problems; (as just hinted Siddhiviniścaya treats a few ontological problems quite independently as well).

The last author belonging to the second stage of the Age of Logic was Vidyānanda. As we have seen, Akalaṅka had conducted his thought-experiment on three different levels and in each case he was some sort of a pioneer. But Vidyānanda had received in heritage all that Akalaṅka was able to achieve. So the first task before him was to integrate into one whole the different strands of Akalaṅka's legacy and then there was the obvious task of augmenting the riches received by way of inheritance. Vidyānanda performed these tasks by composing two immortal works, viz. Tattvārthaślokavārtika which is a commentary on Tattvārthasūtra and Aṣṭasahasrī which is a commentary on Aṣṭaśatī (the latter written in such a style that the whole of Aṣṭaśatī stands incorporated within the body of Aṣṭasahasrī). [Vidyānanda is also the author of several independent texts but they are not so important]. In Aṣṭasahasrī the pattern followed was broadly the same as that in Akalaṅka's Aṣṭaśatī inasmuch as here various non-Jaina philosophical positions were subjected to criticism in terms of the model set up by Āptamīmāṁsā; (only Vidyānanda's penetration into the depths of problems was decidedly superior). But in Tattvā. rthaślokavārtika, the earlier and the more important work, Vidyānanda planned his whole strategy by himself. Of course, there are occasions here when Vidyānada, like Akalaṅka, presents the Āgamic material in a language and style befitting the age of Logic — only doing so at a deeper level — but that is not so noteworthy. What is really noteworthy is that in this text Vidyānanda creates numerous occasions when he can launch an independent criticism against various non-Jaina positions. The idea is that in these cases, unlike in Aṣṭasahasrī, Vidyānanda was not bound to attack his rivals only from the standpoint of *Anekāntavāda*. For example, in the course of his very long introductory remarks preceding the first aphorism Vidyānanda maintains that only a Jaina Tīrthaṅkara is in a position to undertake religious preaching that is all valid; in this connection he shows how the same is impossible on the part of an omniscient being conceived after the fashion of the Sāṅkhyas, of God conceived after the fashion of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, of a Buddha conceived after the fashion of the Buddhists[1]. Immediately afterwards it is maintained that only a soul conceived after the fashion of the Jaina can receive such a religious preaching; and in this connection Vidyānanda shows how the same is impossible on the part of a soul conceived after the fashion of the Cārvākas, Buddhists, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, Mīmāṁsakas, Sāṅkhyas[2]. Both these disussions are extremely rich in philosophical content and yet the occasion for them is Vidyānanda's own free creation. Again, take Vidyānanda's commentary on the aphorism listing the six *Anuyogadvāras* viz. *nirdeśa, svāmitva, sādhana, adhikaraṇa, sthiti, vidhāna*. Students of the Āgamic texts know what these items mean but Vidyānanda has nothing to do with that, for he has here thought fit to criticise the following six philosophical positions :

(i) that the real is indescribable
(ii) that dependent is an impossible relation
(iii) that causation is an impossible relation
(iv) that location is an impossible relation
(v) that everthing is essentially momentary
(vi) that all things belong to one and the same type.

(The first five are Buddhist positions, the sixth a monist one)[8]. This discussion too is rich in philosophical content and the occasion for it too is almost Vidyānanda's own free creation. And the cases like these are numerous enough in Tattvārthaślokavārtika. Lastly, the problems which Akalaṅka had dealt with in his independent writings, viz. the problems connected with *pramāṇa*, *naya*, *nikṣepa* Vidyānanda takes up in the appropriate part of Tattvārthaślokavārtika. As has already been noted the aphorisms of Tattvārtha were explained by Akalaṅka on more or less traditional lines but these very aphorisms were explained by Vidyānanda in the light of the innovations introduced by Akalaṅka himself in the field of the treatment of *pramāṇa*, *naya* and *nikṣepa*. Certainly the discussion of *pramāṇa*, *naya*, *nikṣepa* occurring in Vidyānanda has a definite advantage over that occurring in Akalaṅka in that the latter was the first experimenter in the field the former the consummate master of the situation. Be that as it may, Tattvārthaślokavārtika and Aṣṭasahasrī represent the high water-mark of philosophical speculation undertaken in the second stage of the age of Logic.

The Digambara author who followed Vidyānanda was Prabhācandra and as has already been hinted he was an inferior genius as compared to the former. This is the reason why Vidyānanda has to be treated as the last author of the second stage of the age of Logic and Prabhācandra the first Digambara author of its third stage. Vidyānanda had surveyed whole of contemporary philosophical scene in the light of Akalaṅka's discoveries but he was himself possessed of a deeply penetrating insight; Prabhācandra too surveys the contemporary philosophical scene in the light of Akalaṅka's discoveries but his insight had its limitations. The result was that Vidyā nanda gave us two of the most advanced philosophical texts coming from the pen of a Jaina while Prabhācandra gave us two text-books to be used by fairly gifted school-boys. Of these latter one was Nyāyakumudacandra, a commentary on Akalaṅka's Laghīyastraya, the other Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa, a commentary on Māṇikyanandī's aphorisms entitled Parīkṣāmukha. Parikṣāmukha neatly summarises Akalaṅka's epistemological theses and is divided into six chapters respectively dealing with *pramāṇasāmānya*, *pratyakṣapramāṇa*, *parokṣapramāṇa*, *pramāṇaviṣaya*, *pramāṇaphala* and *pramāṇābhāsa*. Laghīyastraya really consists of two texts, the former divided into five chapters respectively dealing with *pratyakṣapramāṇa*, *pramāṇaviṣaya*, *parokṣapramāṇa*, *āgama*, *naya*, the latter being of the form of one chapter dealing

with *pramāṇa, naya, nikṣepa*. Thus Prabhācandra based himself on two texts, one that was less systematic but written by Akalaṅka himself, the other that was more systematic but written by one who followed Akalaṅka. And in this connection he could manage to take within the purview of his discussion a large number of philosophical problems epistemological as well as ontological; (many of the problems occur in both the texts). But certainly the range of Prabhācandra's enquiry was less comprehensive than that of Vidyānanda and his treatment of topics less advanced than that of the latter. As a matter of fact, a study of Prabhācandra is a good preparation for that of Vidyānanda, that it is a good preparation argues Prabhācandra's worth, that it is only a preparation argues his limitation.

Prabhācandra was the last great Digambara author to have written on philosophical questions, and the second important author of the third stage of the age of Logic was the Śvetāmbara Abhayadeva who wrote a voluminous commentary on Sanmati. [Even if Abhayadeva came before Prabhācandra there is an advantage in considering him after the latter]. But Abhayadeva was interested not so much in making clear the positions maintained in Sanmati as in independently treating such philosophical problems as to him appeared important. The result is that hardly a fifth part of Sanmatiṭīkā explains the wording of the original text while the rest is a miscellaneous collection of independent philosophical discussions connected in more or less far-fetched manner with some word or other of the original text. Take for example the very first verse of the text. In the course of commenting on it Abhayadeva discusses — and at great length — the following problems :

1. *Prāmāṇya-svatastva-paratastva* (the problem whether knowledge is self-valid or otherwise)
2. *Vedāpauruṣeyatvavāda* (the problem of Veda being an impersonal composition)
3. *Sarvajñavāda* (the problem of omniscience)
4. *Īśvaravāda* (the problem of God)
5. *Ātmaparimāṇa* (the problem of the size of soul)
6. *Mokṣasvarūpa* (the problem of the nature of *mokṣa*)

And yet the fact is that the wording of the verse provides no natural occasion for all this discussion; in any case, the verse is too unimportant to warrant such an inordinately long comment. Similarly, the second verse provides no natural occasion for the extremely lengthy discussion on the problem of word-meaning relation indulged in by Abhayadeva in the course of commenting on it. Then a verse in Sanmati says that *ṛjusūtra* is the basic *paryāyāstikanaya* while the remaining *paryāyāstikanayas* are its branches and sub-branches[1]; in the course of commenting on it Abhayadeva elaborately presents and criticises the philosophical standpoints upheld by the

Sautrāntikas, Yogācāras and Mādhyamikas, a discussion not much relevant so far as the wording of the text is concerned. Again, another verse lays down a distinction between *jñāna* and *darśana*[5] and in the course of commenting on it Abhayadeva offers an extremely lengthy treatment of the diverse epistemological problems, a treatment hardly germane to what the text says. Lastly, in one verse it has been said that Kaṇāda endorses the standpoint of *dravyāstikanaya* as well as *paryāyāstikanaya* but he is nevetheless wrong inasmuch as he takes the two in isolation from each other;[6] in the course of commenting on it Abhayadeva undertakes an extremely lengthy exposition-cum-criticism of the Vaiśeṣika ontological positions, a discussion out of proportion to the significance of the original statement. These cover almost all the major cases where Sanmatiṭikā undertakes an important philosophical discussion. In their own right they are all worthy of a most serious attention, the only difficulty with them being that they have been offered in the name of commenting on a text with which they have little intrinsic relation; (in the process it so happens that the really important utterances of the original text stand comparatively neglected). Now in all philosophising Abhayadeva was considerably indebted to his Digambara predecessors. But it is curious to note that in his long treatment of epistemological problems Akalaṅka's classification of *pramāṇas* has been disposed of in just few lines; there too it is mentioned as a veiw of '*kecit*' and contrasted to the *Saiddhāntika* view (i.e. to the traditional view which Akalaṅka had virtually set aside)[7]. Be that as it may, Sanmatiṭikā is the next Śvetāmbara text after Nayacakra where due survey has been undertaken of the contemporary philosophical scene.

The process of an over-all philosophical stock-taking initiated by Abhayadeva in Sanmatiṭikā was continued by Vādideva in Syādvādaratnākara. The formal structure of Syādvādaratnākara resembles that of Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa in an extremely close manner. Let us recall that following Parīkṣāmukha Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa is divided into six chapters respectively dealing with *pramāṇa-sāmānya*, *pratyakṣapramāṇa*, *parokṣapramāṇa*, *pramāṇaviṣaya*, *pramāṇaphala*, *pramāṇābhāsa*. Syādvādaratnākara is similarly divided into eight chapters respectively dealing with *pramāṇasāmānya*, *pratyakṣapramāṇa*, *parokṣapramāṇa* (minus *āgama*), *āgamapramāṇa*, *pramāṇaviṣaya*, *pramaṇaphala*-cum-*pramāṇābhāsa*, *naya*, *vāda*. Not only that, in each chapter Vādideva has first composed aphorisms closely following Parīkṣāmukha and then written a commentary on them closely following Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa, (to be precise Vādideva's aphorisms bear the title Pramāṇanayatattvāloka while Syādvādaratnākara is the name of his commentary on the same). Now when we further recall that Parīkṣāmukha is a neat summary of the whole body of Akalaṅka's epistemological theses then Vādideva turns out to be the first Śvetāmbara author to have given a full-

throated support to the innovations introduced by Akalaṅka in the field of epistemology. Thus it will be an instructive study to compare Abhayadeva's indebtedness to his great Digambara predecessors and Vādideva's indebtedness to the same. Certainly, had Vādideva not adopted the attitude he did the subsequent Śvetāmbara performance in the field of philosophical speculation — which in fact means the Jaina performance in the field of philosophical speculation undertaken in the third stage of the age of Logic — would have been markedly poorer than it actually was. Of course, there were points — though minor—on which Vādideva differed from his Digambara pedecessors and his range of enquiry was somewhat broader than that of Prabhācandra — if not also than that of Vidyānanda — but that is a different matter. What is being emphasised is that Vādideva placed the Śvetāmbara camp in the direct line of advance that was being pursued by the entire Jaina camp — which in fact means the Digambara camp — ever since the time of Akalaṅka. The significance of this step becomes still clearer when we consider the achievements of Yaśovijaya, the last great author belonging to the age of Logic.

Yaśovijaya had thoroughly mastered the rich Śvetāmbara philosophical heritage that stood culminated in Sanmatiṭīkā and Syādvādaratnākara. And this means that he had at his disposal also the old treatment of the problems relating to *jñāna, naya, nikṣepa, saptabhaṅgī* and *Anekāntavāda*, a treatment presented in the texts like Anuyogadvāra, Nandī, Āvaśyakaniryukti, Tattvārthabhāṣya, Sanmati and Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya. As things stand, it was not possible for the Digambara authors to pay special attention to these old texts, and so in his treatment of philosophical problems Yaśovijaya was bound to proceed beyond Vādideva who had only his Digambara predecessors to fall back upon. Certainly, a unique feature of Yaśovijaya's writings is a combination of the findings of the pre-Akalaṅka and post-Akalaṅka phases of Jaina philosophical speculation, for the latter his chief source being Vādideva. Of these writings the most important are three texts devoted to the problems of *Anekāntavāda*, viz. Nayarahasya, Anekāntavyavasthā and Nayopadeśa and two texts devoted to the problems of epistemology, viz. Tarkabhāṣā and Jñānabindu; also noteworthy are his commentary on Haribhadra's Śāstravārtāsamuccaya and that on Vidyānanda's Aṣṭasahasrī. On the whole, however, Yaśovijaya, like Akalaṅka, was at his best not in his commentaries on old Masters but in his independent texts. And like Vidyānanda, he was extremely well-versed in the contemporary systems of Indian philosophy. Besides he possessed a brain whose acuteness was unparallelled; (how far this was due to his devoted study of Navyanyāya is a debatable point but that he had drunk deep into the intrieacies of this branch of Indian Logic is beyond doubt). All this marks Yaśovijaya a higher ori-

ginal phenomenon. Of course, he himself would not lay much claim to originality and in a way this will not be a case of false modesty. For indeed the chief merit of Yaśovijaya's writings lies in making clear to us the meaning of the cardinal utterances — often obscurely worded and often mutually conflicting — of the old masters from the author of Anuyogadvāra down to the author of Syādvādaratnākara. But the context for his doing so is his own creation and that is something marvellously original. It is in this sense that Yaśovijaya's independent writings, even if essentially of the nature of an exegesis on old text-passages, are genuinely independent; and it is in this sense that they well stand comparison with Akalaṅka's independent writings.

In the background of this elementary acquaintance with the authors of the age of Logic let us try to work out its general characteristics. Taken as a whole the age exhibits the following chief tendencies:

(i) to vindicate the doctrine of *Anekāntavāda*
(ii) to establish a particular doctrine of *pramāṇas*
(iii) to evaluate the non-Jaina philosophical views
(iv) to defend the traditional Jaina philosophical views

The first tendency was the earliest to emerge. As a matter of fact, it had made its appearance as early as the third stage of Āgamas itself— that is to say, as soon as the doctrines of *naya* and *nikṣepa* were first formulated. In the first stage of the age of Logic these doctrines were further refined and the doctrine of *Saptabhaṅgī* first formulated. With the formulation of the *Saptabhaṅgī* doctrine the issue was finally clinched and in future it became one endeavour of all Jaina authors to demonstrate how a thing could be possessed of two mutually contradictory features at one and the same time — this demonstration amounting to a vindication of the doctrine of *Anekāntavāda*. Things were something different with the doctrine of *pramāṇas*. Here no radical departure from the tradition was intended till as late as the time of Akalaṅka who himself in his Rājavārtika offered just the traditional account of *jñānas*, to be precise, Umāsvati's slightly modified version of this account. It was in the independent writings of Akalaṅka that a new docrine of *pramāṇas* was first envisaged and it soon became the doctrine acceptable to the entire Jaina camp. However, as the example of Yaśovijaya vividly shows even a late Jaina author could find no difficulty in undertaking an elaborate defence of both the tradional account of *jñānas* and Akalaṅka's doctrine of *pramāṇas*. So the tendency to establish a doctrine of *pramāṇas* has to be divided into a pre-Akalaṅka phase and a post-Akalaṅka phase. As for tne third tendency noted above, viz. the tendency to evaluate the non-Jaina philosophical views it was certainly a most noteworthy feature of the age of Logic. But in an early author like Siddhasena

or Kundakunda it was not much marked; (on the other hand, from Haribhadra onwards there could be found no author who did not exhibit it in considerable degree). Moreover, this tendency was seldom present in isolation; that is to say, it was usually present either in the company of the first tendency noted above or in the company of the second. As for the fourth tendency noted above, viz. the tendency to defend the traditional Jaina philosophical views, it was mostly confined to notes that were of the form of a commentary on an Āgamic text, e.g. Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya, Rājavārtika, Tattvārthaślokavārtika; (the third tendency appeared in the company of the fourth as well but the latter was itself rather rare). All this means that the content of the literature of the age of Logic is divisible into three parts, viz.

(i) that related to the doctrine of *Anekāntavāda*

(ii) that related to the doctrine of *pramāṇas*

(iii) that related to the traditional Jaina philosophical views

And in connection with each there is to be expected an evaluation of the related non-Jaina philosophical views; (iv) besides, there are passages where an independent evaluation of the non-Jaina philosophical views has been undertaken. The point can be concretely illustrated with reference to the texts we have chosen to take into consideration; let us take them one by one.

1. Sanmati

(i) Chapter I and III	:	(i) *Anekāntavāda*
(ii) Chapter II	:	(ii) *pramāṇa*

2. Nayacakra

(i) The whole text	:	(iv) An independent evaluation of the non-Jaina philosophical views

3. Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya

(i) The *jñāna* part	:	(ii) *pramāṇa*
(ii) The *naya-nikṣepa* part	:	(i) *Anekāntavāda*
(iii) Gaṇadharavāda and certain other passages	:	(iv) an independent evaluation of the non-Jaina philosophical views.
(iv) Certain passages	:	(iii) A defence of the traditional Jaina philosophical views

4–6. Pañcāstikāya, Pravacanasāra, Samayasāra

(i) Pañcāstikāya and Pravacanasāra (minus certain passages)	:	(iii) a defence of the traditional Jaina philosophical views

(ii) Samayasāra plus certain passages from Pañcāstikāya and Pravacanasāra :	(i) *Anekāntavāda*

7. Āptamīmāṁsā

(i) The whole text :	(i) *Anekāntavāda*

8. Anekāntajayapatākā

(i) Chapters I–IV :	(i) *Anekāntavāda*
(ii) Chapters V–VI :	(iv) An independent evaluation of the non–Jaina philosophical views

9–14. Rājavārtika, Aṣṭaśatī, Laghīyastraya, Nyāyaviniścaya, Pramāṇasaṅgraha, Siddhiviniścaya

(i) Rājavārtika :	(iii) A defence of the traditional Jaina views
(ii) Aṣṭaśatī and the *Naya-nikṣepa*–part of Laghīyastraya etc. :	(i) *Anekāntavāda*
(iii) The *pramāṇa* part of Laghīyastraya etc. :	(ii) *pramāṇa*
(iv) Certain passages of Siddhiviniścaya :	(iv) An independent evaluation of the non–Jaina philosophical views.

15–16. Tattvārthaślokavārtika, Aṣṭasahasrī

(i) Aṣṭasahasrī and the *naya–nikṣepa* part of Tattvārthaślokavārtika .	(i) *Anekāntavāda*
(ii) The *pramāṇa* part of Tattvārthaślokavārtika :	(ii) *pramāṇa*
(iii) Certain passages of Tattvārthaślokavārtika :	(iii) A defence of the traditional Jaina views
(iv) Certain passages of Tattvārthaślokavārtika :	(iv) An independent evaluation of the non–Jaina philosophical views.

17–18. Nyāyakumudacandra, Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa

(i) The *naya–nikṣepa* part of Nyāyakumudacandra :	(i) *Anekāntavāda*
(ii) Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa and the *pramāṇa* part of Nyāyakumudacandra :	(ii) *pramāṇa*

19. Sanmatiṭīkā

(i) The text-portions following Sanmati	:	(i)-(ii) *Anekāntavāda* and *pramāṇa* (in the manner stated above in connection with Sanmati)
(ii) The text-portions independent of Sanmati	:	(iv) An independent evaluation of the non-Jaina philosophical views

20. Syādvādaratnākara

(i) The *naya* part	:	(i) *Anekāntavāda*
(ii) The *pramāṇa* part	:	(ii) *pramāṇa*

21-25. Nayarahasya, Anekāntavyavasthā, Nayopadeśa, Tarkabhāṣā, Jñānabindu

(i) Nayarahasya, Anekāntavyavasthā, Nayopadeśa	:	(i) *Anekāntavāda*
(ii) Tarkabhāṣā, Jñānabindu	:	(ii) *pramāṇa*

This, however, is the barest skeleton of the relevant information but before the necessary details are filled up let us say a few words about certain general considerations that are to be kept in view in the case of the four items in question; we take them up one by one.

(i) The doctrine of *Anekāntavāda* was doubtless the most characteristic and most conspicuous of the Jaina philosophical views upheld during the age of Logic. In some form or other it was maintained and defended by all the authors we are going to discuss; (even Mallavādī whose text was outwardly of the form of a general evaluation of the non-Jaina philosophical views said a lot by way of vindicating *Anekāntavāda*). It is therefore necessary to take note of the precise manner in which this or that author has made his contribution towards the development of *Anekāntavāda*. Some of the authors have done so through an independent exposition of the doctrines of *naya*, *nikṣepa* and *saptabhaṅgī*, some through a commentary on some early author's exposition on the same; then there are occasions when an author has indicated *Anekāntavāda* without basing himself on the doctrines in question. In every case the attempt has been to point out that to be characterised by two mutually contradictory features at one and the same time is the very nature of a real thing.

(ii) As for the doctrine of *pramāṇas* it might first of all be noted that much that has been said in this connection has no ontological significance and will be neglected by us. It is mainly while discussing the nature of *pramāṇaviṣaya* that a genuine ontological problem has been considered but here too a good part of the discussion is devoted to showing how a real thing is characterised by two contradictory features like permanence and

transience, generality and particularity, etc. etc., that is, to developing an aspect of the doctrine of Anekāntavāda. Then there are certain ontological discussions in connection with the question as to how knowledge is related to the knowing subject on the one hand and object known on the other; in the same context are taken up questions concerning the make-up of sense-organs and concerning their mode of operation, also the question concerning the possibility or otherwise of the omniscience. Lastly, there has been a consideration of the question as to whether physical things which are alleged to be the object of knowledge do really exist; (it is a subjective idealist contention, opposed by the Jainas, that physical things do not exist).

(iii) By a defence of the traditional Jaina philosophical views is to be understood a defence of the Āgamic philosophical views undertaken by the authors belonging to the age of Logic. In their connection we will have to neglect the authors who only commented on the old Āgamic texts, though even such authors are not entirely free from the influence exerted by the dominant tendencies of the age of Logic. To be sure, even the doctrines of *naya* and *nikṣepa* (in some sense even the doctrine of *saptabhaṅgī*) are old Āgamic doctrines but in view of the special importance attached to them they have to be treated separately; similarly, a good part of the doctrine of *pramāṇas* is of an Āgamic origin and yet has to be treated separately on account of its special importance. For the rest the discussions aimed at defending the old Āgamic views lie scattered in the texts of the age of Logic and do not constitute a much important part thereof.

(iv) Since texts belonging to the age of Logic are in most cases devoted either to a vindication of the doctrine of *Anekāntavāda* or to a development of the doctrine of *pramāṇas* or to a defence of the traditional Jaina philosophical views it is in these very three contexts that they also undertake a general evaluation of the non-Jaina philosophical views. Very rarely has such an evaluation been undertaken in a context of some other type.

These preliminary remarks should serve to introduce the following analysis of the texts of the age of Logic; these are being taken up stage-wise and authorwise (as was also earlier done when the content of these texts was subjected to a summary consideration).

II THE FIRST STAGE

(A) SIDDHASENA

(i) Anekāntavāda

The problems of *Anekāntavāda* have been discussed by Siddhasena in the first and third chapters of Sanmati. Interesting is his general definition of *naya*, for he says, 'there are as many views of the form of *nayas* as there

are the ways of speaking, while there are as many rival (non-Jaina) tenets as there are views of the form of *nayas*'. (3.47). Just before he has remarked : 'A well presented view of the form of *naya* only lends support to the Āgamic doctrines while the same, if ill presented, destroys both (i.e. itself as well as its rival)' (3.46). And this is how he concludes : 'Kapila's philosophy is a statement of the *dravyāstika* viewpoint while Buddha's that of the *paryāyāstika*. As for Kaṇāda, his doctrine, even if supported by both viewpoints is false inasmuch as each here gives primacy to itself and is independent of the other'. (3.48-49). These utterances give a nice clue to the atmosphere in which the doctrine of *nayas* was first formulated and then underwent development. For it seems that the Jaina theoreticians of the period had somehow come to the conclusion that the so many non-Jaina philosophical views are just so many one sided expressions of truth and that their task simply was to point out how this or that philosophical view was actually a one-sided expression of truth. On the face of it, the task was rather unwieldy. For the philosophical views of a school deal with so many aspects of truth and so the first thing to do is to enumerate the aspects under which philosophical views are to be evaluated. For example, there is an aspect of temporality and evaluated under it one one-sided view is that things ever remain the same and another that they become different. In the language of Siddhasena the former is *dravyāstikanaya* while an instance of it is Sāṅkhya philosophy, the latter is *paryāyāstikanaya* while an instance of it is Buddhist philosophy. Now leaving aside the consideration that the designation *dravyāstikanaya* might well apply to the Sāṅkhya doctrine of *puruṣa* but not to the allied doctrine of *prakṛti* the fact remains that temporality is not the only aspect under which philosophical views are to be evaluated. Now the traditional doctrine of *nayas* speak not of two *nayas*, viz *dravyāstika* and *paryāyāstika* but of seven *nayas*, viz. *naigama, saṅgraha, vyavahāra, ṛjusūtra, sāmprata, samabhirūḍha, evaṁbhūta;* and in this connection, Siddhasena simply ignores *naigama* while submitting that *saṅgraha* is *śuddhadrayāstikanaya, vyavahāra aśuddhadravyāstikanaya, ṛjusutra* the basic *paryāyāstika, sāmprata* etc. the derivative *paryāyāstikanayas* (1.4-5). This tends to suggest that the traditional doctrine of *nayas* took into consideration just the aspect of temporality. However, let us notice another trend of Siddhasena's thought. For he distinguishes between *vyañjanaparyāya* and *arthaparyāya*, the former meaning something like general and hence 'nameable characteristic', the latter particular hence 'unnameable characteristic.' Thus according to him a thing in so for as it is called by a name is similar to all the things called by the same name while in so for as it is a unique thing it is unnameable (3.5.). This implies that views can also be evaluated under the aspect of kinship - where one one-sided view will be that a thing is absolutely similar to another thing, another that it is absolutely dissimilar to the latter. Therefore, Siddhasena might also speak of a twofold division of *nayas* into *vyañjanaparyāya* and

arthaparyāya while submitting that *saṅgraha* is *śuddhavyañjanaparyāya*, *vyavahāra aśuddhavyañjanaparyāya*, *ṛjusūtra* the basic *arthaparyāyanaya*, *sāmprata* etc. the derivative *arthaparyāyanayas*. This will tend to suggest that the traditional doctrine of *nayas* also took into consideration the aspect of kinship. Now even granting that Siddhasena will say all this — which is doubtful inasmuch as the only twofold division of *nayas* he allows for is that into *dravyāstika* and *paryāyāstika* - the fact remains that the precise import of the traditional doctrine of *nayas* is pretty obscure. In any case Siddhasena's actual silence about *naigama* and his virtual silence about the three *śabdanayas* make it difficult for us to make out as to how he viewed the traditional doctrine taken in its totality. Again, the way Siddhasena speaks in details of *dravyāstikanaya* and *paryāyāstikanaya* makes it certain that the only aspect he took into consideration in this connection was the aspect of temporality. He actually says; 'There is no *paryāya* without *dravya*; certainly, the triplet origination, permanence, destruction constitutes the defining characteristic of *dravya* (better, of *sat*)' (1.12). Now the distinction of *dravya* and *paryāya* is certainly very old and deeper consideration of it must have led to the definition of *sat* as a permanent *dravya* possessed of ever changing *paryāyas*; this, in turn must have led to Siddhasena's twofold division of *nayas* into *dravyāstika* and *paryāyāstika*. But the original doctrine of seven *nayas* seems to have been too heterogeneous to be amenable to a clear-cut division of this sort. However, even if not literally loyal to the spirit of the traditional doctrine of *nayas* Siddhasena makes an important contribution to the doctrine of *Anekāntavāda* inasmuch as he concretely applies it to a most fundamental pair of contradictory features, viz. permanence and transience Thus the idea that a thing, even while undergoing continuous change, somehow retains its identity all the while is explained by him through the illustration of an adult person who, though no more a child, is ashamed of his misdeeds of childhood and who, though not yet an old man, takes measures to ensure happy prospects in his old age. (1.43-46).

On the question of *nikṣepa* Siddhasena says little and something not much important. For he only tells us (1.6) that the first three *nikṣepas*, viz. *nāma*, *sthāpanā*, *dravya* belong to *dravyāstika*, while the last, viz. *bhāva* belongs to *paryāyāstika*, a statement which, unless further amplified, means little. Similarly, on the question of *Saptabhaṅgī* Siddhasena says little and something quite obscure. For after laying down the seven constituent statements of *Saptabhaṅgī* (in one of its two versions) he says (1.41) : 'Thus in *arthaparyāya* there is the way of speaking with seven alternatives while in *vyañjanaparāya* there is *savikalpa* and *nirvikalpa*'. The meaning of the statement is not at all clear. However, Siddhasena evinces clear awareness of one use to which the *saptabhaṅgī* doctrine was put by later authors, viz. to demo-

natrate the general co-presence of contradictory features in one and the same thing. Thus elsewhere he argues that body and soul are neither absolutely identical nor absolutely different from each other (1.47-50), that religious teaching has for its constituents *hetuvāda* and *āgamavāda* (3.43-45), that exclusive reliance on *Jñāna* and exclusive reliance on *Kriyā* are two one-sided views (3.68), and so on and so forth. True, Siddhasena does not connect these positions of his with the *Saptabhaṅgī* doctrine but that is a different matter. For that only shows that the tendency to a universal applicion of *Anekāntavāda* had made its appearance early enough, even if neither the traditional doctrine of seven *nayas* nor the division of *nayas* into *dravyāstika* and *paryāyāstika* was in a position to do full justice to this tendency. Lastly, there is anoher noteworthy thing – this time a case of omission—about Siddhasena's vindication of *Anekāntavāda*. He seldom takes into consideration the relevant views upheld by the non-Jain philosophical schools. The most conspicuous was his statement to which reference has already been made and in which he calls the Sāṅkhya view a case of *dravyāstikanaya,* the Buddhist view a case of *paryāyāstika* view, the Vaiśeṣika view a case of mechanical mixture of the two. But even here the statement has been left un-amplified. Certainly, the whole of Sanmati gives the impression of being a document addressed to an orthodox Jaina who is however open to Siddhasena's pleading for fresh thinking on this or that question.

(ii) Pramāṇa

The second chapter of Sanmati raises epistemological issues but in a rather narrow context, viz. in the cotext of the question whether an omniscient person has *jñāna* and *darśana* simultaneously. The traditional Āgamic position was that he does so alternatively but certain recent authors had come to hold the other alternative; Siddhasena, opposing both, came out with the suggestion that in the case of an omniscient person *jñāna* and *darśana* mean one and the same thing. In this connection he based himself on the general consideration that *jñāna* and *darśana* are not at all two things but that certain cases of *jñāna* are also the cases of *darśana* while certain other cases of *jñāna* are no cases of *darśana*. What Siddhasena needed therefore was a proper definition of *darśana* and the following is how he formulated it : "That *jñāna* is *darśana* whose object does not come into contact with a sense organ or is not at all an object of sensory cognition; however, this object should not be a future object or anything of the sort to be cognized through inference" (2.25). Since on Jaina view eye is the only sense-organ that does not come into contact with its object this definition amounted to saying that visual perception and mental perception are cases of *jñāna* as well as *darśana* while non-visual sensory perception and inference are cases of *jñāna* but not

of *darśana*. Here Siddhasena also explains how the *avadhi* and *kevala* types of cognition belong to the former group, the *manaḥparyāya* and *śruta* types of cognition the latter groups. All this envolves a radical departure from traditional views and is also interesting, but since it has little ontological bearing we take leave of it.

(B) MALLAVĀDĪ

(I) General Evaluation of the non-Jain Philosophical views

Mallavādī's Nayacakra is an important text, not only for the students of Jaina philosophy but also for those of Indian philosophy in general. For even if a convinced Jaina Mallavādī was an extremely thorough student of contemporary systems of Indian philosophy, a qualification few Jaina authors before and after him exhibit in as good a measure as he does. Unfortunately however his text has not come down to us in its original form and what we have to content ourselves with is a restoration made from the commentary of one Siṁhasūri, who, of couse, seems to have known his task fairly well. Not much time perhaps elapsed between Mallavādī and Siṁhasūri, for just like the former the latter too is well acquainted with Diṅnāga but has heard of no Dharmakīrti; (in the case of Siṁhasūri silence about Dharmakīrti can possibly be due to the fact that he was commenting on a per-Dharmakīrti text but the probability rather is that he himself came before Dharmakīrti). Even then the difference between Mallavādī's own text and this text as restored from Siṁhasūri's commentary is obvious. However, our text is so unique that even a not completely satisfactory restoration of it ought to be a veritable boon to the students of Indian philosophy. And the following is wherein lies its uniqueness.

Nayacakra is written in the form of a marathon debate taking place between some seventeen disputants where the incoming one criticises the outgoing one before presenting his own case. Among themselves these disputants exhaust almost all the most representative systems that dominated the contemporary philosophical scene. And the style of the text is throughout advanced scholarly. All this goes to make Nayacakra a wothy predecessor of Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha, to be precise, a 5th- 6th century A. D. version of Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha, which is doubtless more scholarly than Sarvadarśanasṅgraha and, unlike it, is dovoted to both an exposition and criticism of the philosophical systems under consideration Then let us add to it the circumstance that the 5th-6th centuries A.D. are the period from which not very many philosophical texts have come down to us so that Nayacakra representation of a system can well be treated as a brief but solid cotemporary text devoted to this system. Thus in view of the all-out inportance of Mallavādī's performance it will be advisable for us to look at the contents of Nayacakra, briefly and chapterwise; (in order to give a concrete idea of

the procedure adopted throughout the text the first chapter is being summarised somewhat in details).

Chapter I

The standpoint adopted in this chapter can be called the standpoint of 'anti.philosophy.' Naturally it has no predecessor against whom to level criticism but its nature being what it is it too finds no difficullty in starting with a criticism of certain philosophical positions. Thus declaring himself to be a spokesman of worldly commonsense the advocate of the standpoint in question initiates his case as follows: " A thing is as people take it to be. Since it makes no sense to treat *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* either as a thing's own content or as a content alien to this thing it is improper for the doctrinal texts to demarcate themselves from it (Commentary : from popular standpoint, that is to say)" (p.II). The idea is that it is a mistake to regard either *sāmānya* or *viśeṣa* as either essential to a thing or as superimposed on it from outside; that *sāmānya* is essential to a thing is a Sāṅkhya position, that *viśeṣa* is essential to it a Buddhist position, that both *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* are imposed on a thing from outside is a Vaiśeṣika position. Here the noteworthy thing is that the present disputant's criticism against the positions in question is essentially the same as that of a Jaina, even if the former is a confessed enemy of all philosophising as the latter most certainly is not. After finishing with these positions the disputant takes up the question of causal relationship and begins by saying: " How does it concern us whether there is a cause or there is an effect ? Who can put an end to *vādas* (i.e. doctrinal views)"? (34-35). And it is interesting to note how Siṁhasūri comments on the statement; thus he says, "The same......disputant avers : who can put an end to *vādas*, that is to say, to *ekāntavādas* (i.e. one-sided views) ? In other words, Siṁhasūri finds little difficulty in interpreting the present disputant's anti-vāda position as Jaina's anti-ekāntavāda position. And this is how the present disputant polemises against causal determination : " There is no definiteness about the presence or otherwise of the effect in the cause. For the effect is present or absent when the cause is present; again, it is present or absent when the cause is absent." (36). Here again he is having in mind the Sāṅkhya position according to which the effect is present in the cause and the Buddhist-cum-Vaiśeṣika position according to which it is absent there. The net outcome ot the whole discussion conducted so far is as follows: " Let it therefore be understood that a doctrinal text yields no such result as stands over and above the popular usage; so it is useless to compose doctrinal texts with such a purpose in view. Of course, a doctrinal text might be of use in telling us that one who desires such and such a reward ought to perform such and such an act" (44-45). Here a hint is given to the effect that present disputant is some kind of Mīmāṁsā realist, an impression to be confirmed when the next disputant criticises

this one. Then follows the contention, elaboratly defended, that if ordinary perception is not accorded a final authority any number of nonsensical propositions can be sought to be proved (46). Finally, there is a long refutation of Dinnāga's theory of perception with a view to proving that ordinary preception has nothing to do with the same as concelved by Diṅnāga. In this connection there occurs a criticism of the position that many physical things can well be the object of one single perception– in the course of which it is said : "This will mean seeking refuge with the Lord of Doctrinal views, and we have no quarrel with him. For he is certainly the Lord of the whole world. He comes to the rescue of a world-element when it is on the verge of disappearance. As for how it means seeking refuge with him, it is because the *rūpāyatana* (physical aggregate) has been admitted to be of a multiple nature" (83). This criticism over there is a brief submission to the effect that similar difficulties arise in connection with the Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika theories of perception, the reason being that ordinary perception reveals reality to be unlike what these theories maintain, just as it reveals it to be unlike what Diṅnāga theory maintains.

Chapter II

This chapter contains a representation of five *advaitavādas*, viz. *purṣādvaitavāda*, *niyati-advaitavāda*, *kālādvaitavāda*, *svabhāvādvaitavāda*, *bhāvādvaitavāda*, – where the next one criticises the earlier one; as for *puruṣādvaitavāda* it starts with a criticism of the standpoint of the earlier chapter, the sum and substance of it being that knowledge is required even in order to understand a Vedic injunction like '*agnihotraṁ juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ*' (= one desirous of heaven ought to perform the *yajña* named *Agnihotra*). The point is brought home by raising difficulties against many posssible interpretations of the injunction on question and finally pointing out: " Moreover, as a result of thus accepting what is got after removing ever new anomalies the recourse is taken to cogitations-of-a-human-origin just as it is done in the case of an ontological doctrine such as a one-sided acceptance of *sāmānya* or the like." (149) This part of the criticism is not philosophically much important but a really important discussion ensues when *asatkāryavāda* .is refuted and (*satkāryavāda*) maintained (160 ff). It is not important how the rival is maneouvred into maintaining *asatkāryavāda* but the present *asatkāryavāda* vs. *satkāryavāda* controvesry is a prototype for many forthcoming controversies touching upon the same subject. In all these controversies the *Satkāryavādī* argues that if the effect is absent there before its production why it should not behave like a sky-flower, that is, why it should ever be produced at all; on the other hand, the *Asatkāryavādī* argues that if the effiect is present there before its production why it should not behave like the cause, that is, why it should not be present there for all to see. Then begins a representation of *puruṣādvaitavāda* proper where the central proposition is that all

phenomenon must be one of the four possible states of the sole world-cause *puruṣa*, viz. deep sleep, dream, wakefulness, the fourth state (absolute wakefulness). *Niyati-advaitavāda* criticises *puruṣa-advaitavāda* on the ground that a person only too often undergoes suffering – which means that he is not a free agent but an agent pre-determined in a particular fashion. *Kālādvaitavāda* criticises *niyati-advaitavāda* on the ground that even a pre-determined event cannot occur except at a particular time. *Svabhāva-advaitavāda* criticises *kālādvaitavāda* on the ground that even for an event to occur at a particular time the things involved in it must have a paricular nature of their own. Lastly, *bhāvādvaitavāda* criticises *svabhāva-vāda* on the ground that there are no diffierent things to have a particular nature of their own but just one thing behaving in the way it does.

Chapter III

In this chapter there appear two doctrines, viz. the Sāṅkhya doctrine of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* and the Vaiśeṣika (rather unnamed) doctrine of the divine creator and the created world. The chapter begins with a polemic against *puruṣādvaitavāda* (a polemic to be extended to the remaining *advaitavādas*), the central point of the criticism being that on the *advaitavāda* position it is difficult to envisage a relation between the posited sole world-cause and its various states. Then follows a brief representation of the Sāṅkhya position according to which *prakṛti* undergoes multifarious transformations to yield the things of the world while *puruṣa* enjoys these things without undergoing any kind of transformations. In its turn this Sāṅkhya position is elaborately criticised by the *Advaitavādī*, thus forming an exception to the rule that in Nayacakra a position is criticised by its immediate successor. The point of criticism is interesting, viz. that *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* cannot behave as they do without each other's help – which, in turn, means that they cannot but be essentially identical with other. Lastly comes the advocate of divine creation who too criticises Sāṅkhya for its position that the passive *puruṣa* guides the activities of *prakṛti*, his own position being that an active God guides the activities of the things of the world.

Chapter IV

This chapter contains a representation of the doctrine that *puruṣa* and its *karmas* are two all-sufficient factors to account for the multiplicity of world phenomena. Hence it begins with a criticism of the theistic position on the ground that God has no necessary role to play in the happenings of the world. Later on the chapter also contains a criticism of the doctrine that the *puruṣa's* endeavours and no *karmas* account for the multiplicity of world-phenomena as also of the doctrine that *karmas* and no *puruṣa's* endeavours accout for the same.

Chapter V

This chapter contains a representation of the position that *dravya* and *kriyā* are two absolutely distinct factors in world-phenomena. Hence it begins with a general criticism of the earlier theories which had spoken as if the posited world-cause and its states are somehow one with each other. According to this position *dravya* is that world-factor which ever remains absolutely the same while *kriyā* that which becomes different every next moment.

Chapter VI

This Chapter contains a representation of the Vaiśeṣika view and it begins with a criticism of the earlier view on the ground that a *dravya* absolutely untouched by *kriyā* is a non-entity, for such a *dravya* cannot exhibit the three essential characteristics of a real entity, viz. origination, destruction and permanence. At the end of this criticism *satkāryavāda* is refuted and *asatkāryavāda* maintained, it being understood that the earlier view somehow involves *satkāryavāda*. In this connection an interesting distinction is made (p. 597) between absolute non-existence (*atyanta asattva*) and conditional non-existence (*saviśeṣaṇa asattva*) and it is argued that it is only an absolutely non-existent thing that never comes into existence while a conditionally non-existent thing comes into existence when appropriate conditions are available.

Chapter VII

This chapter contains a criticism of the Vaiśeṣika position, made from the standpoint of *syādvāda*. The chapter begins with the elaborate criticism of *asatkāryavāda* and ends with an elaborate criticism of *ṣaṭpadārthavāda*; In between the two there occurs a positive defence of *syādvāda*[8].

Chapter VIII

The chapter contains a representation of what the Jaina theoreticians call *śabdanaya*. It begins with a brief criticism of the view that *abhāva* is as much a constituent of the real as is *bhāva*, a view maintained by *syādvāda*; (on the present disputant's view *bhāva* alone constitutes the real). But its criticism is directed against several other doctrines viz.

(i) The doctrine of primacy of name (the *nāmanikṣepavāda*)

(ii) The doctrine of primacy of word (Bhartṛhari)

(iii) The doctrine of impartite word-meaning (of Vasurāta, the preceptor of Bhartṛhari)

(iv) The doctrine of primacy of configuration (of the *sthāpanānikṣepavāda*)

(v) The doctrine of demarcation (of Diṅnāga).

On his own part the *śabdanayavādī* maintains that the meaning of a word consists of both the general and the particular, with emphasis on the particular.

Chapter IX

This chapter contains a representation of what might be called *avaktavyavāda*. It begins with a criticism of *śabdanayavāda* on the ground that no relation can be envisaged to obtain between the general and the particular, just as no relation can be envisaged to obtain between fuel and fire. In the course of argument this thesis is extended to all possible relationship.

Chapter X

This chapter contains a representation of what might be called *rūpādisamudāyavāda*, that is, of the view that the real is but a conglomeration of qualities-devoid-of-an-abiding-substance. It begins with a criticism of *avaktavyavāda* on the ground that a real *avaktavyavāda* must be absolutely speechless, a self-defeating position. Towards the end of the chapter (p. 1076) it is maintained that a real undergoes no origination or destruction of any sort.

Chapter XI

This chapter contains a representation of what might be called *kṣaṇikavāda*. It begins with a citicism of *rūpādisamudāyavāda* on the ground that an entity that undergoes no origination or destruction is a non-entity. In the course of argument the thesis is maintained that all destruction of a thing is causeless and that this is why this thing must necessarily be momentary.

Chapter XII

This chapter contains a represntation of *śūnyavāda*; that is, of the position that things of the world are essenceless (*niḥsvabhāva*). It begins with a criticism of *kṣaṇikavāda* on the ground that an alleged *kṣaṇika* entity must first come into existence before it is associated with a *kṣaṇa* but that in that case it ceases to be a *kṣaṇika* entity. Towards the end of the chapter (p. 1150) it is suggested that it will also do if things of the world are called not essenceless but something of the nature of consciousness on the ground that they are necessarily objects of consciousness. So the doctrine of the chapter can also be called *Vijñānavāda*.

Chapter XIII

This chapter brings forth no new doctrine but contains *puruṣādvaitavādī's* criticism of *Śūnyavāda* on the ground that to say anything about things of the world is to say something about their essence, that is, that the doctrine of essencelessness is an impossible doctrine. As for *Vijñānavāda* it is said that correctly conceived it ought to be identical with *puruṣādvaitavāda*.

Chapter XIV

This chapter too brings forth no new doctrine but simply says that the old circle of criticism and counter-criticism can now repeat itself and that the repetition itself can go on for ever. The conclusion to be drawn is that the doctrines earlier set forth will lead one nowhere when taken in isolation, for in that case a rival will never be late to appear on the scene; on the other hand, these doctrines become important instruments of discovery when they join hands with each other as is the case when *syādvādī* Jaina weilds them.

This roughest outline of the contents of Nayacakra does no justice to the powerful array of arguments marshalled by Mallavādī on behalf of these so many doctrines in the relevant parts of his text. But it should suffiice for our present purpose. For it can now easily be seen that the doctrines in question are all more or less influential doctrines of Mallavādī's times. Certainly, the doctrines of *niyati*, *kāla* and *svabhāva* were at least as old as Svetāśvatara Upaniṣad, the doctrine of *puruṣādvaitavāda* (with no tinge of *māyāvāda*) was the culmination point of the Upaniṣadic speculation, while the doctrine of *bhāvādvaitavāda* (with its strong tinge of *māyādvāda*) represented that trend of post-Upaniṣadic Brahmanical speculation which ultimately led to the formulation of *māyāvāda* at the hands of Gauḍapāda, Śaṅkara and their disciples. Similarly, Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika were two systems that dominated the Brahmin's philosophical speculation for the pretty long period of time - the former in the immediate post-Upaniṣadic era, the latter sometimes afterwards. And Diṅnāga doubtless ushered in a real revolution in the Buddhist philosophical camp, a revolution for which the ground was prepared by the Ābhidharmika speculations on the one hand and the *Śūnyavāda-Vijñānavāda* speculations on the other. Lastly, a pre-occupation with the problems of grammar was leading certain thinkers in the direction of formulating philosophical positions of a far-reaching type; of these positions the most wellknown - and perhaps the most daring — was that of Bhartṛhari but the position maintained in the chapter V of Nayacakra seems to be another such position. A close study of Nayacakra leaves no doubt that Mallavādī was thoroughly acquainted with all these most important contemporary tendencies of Indian philosophy.

But when all is said and done it remains to be pointed out that it would have been better if Mallavādī wrote his text in the form of a uniform exposition-cum-criticism of the philosophical systems in question — not in the form of one system criticising another and then presenting its own case. Of course, it is well known to the students of Indian philosophy that much criticism that is here usually levelled against a system is common criticism that can be shared by all who choose to criticise this system; even then there are always parts of such criticism that can be levelled by one author

but not at all by another. In the case of Mallavādi's text too we find that much criticism that is here levelled by one system against another is such as can be levelled against it by any other system. And even in the remaining part of his presentation of such mutual criticism Mallavādi is almost always careful not to put into a disputant's mouth something which he as a matter of fact would not say, but there are exceptions of one particular kind. For, now and then Mallavādi will make a disputant plead quietly to charge that he is embracing the Jaina position in connection with the question under consideration — something which this disputant will never in fact do. (Remember how the disputant of the first chapter appealed to the authority of the Lord of Doctrinal views, meaning of course the Jaina doctrine of *syādvāda*[9]). Hence it is that it would have been better if Mallavādi gave us *his* exposition of a philosophical system and *his* criticism of it; (that would have meant some change — extremely insignificant, on the whole — in the criticism part of the text as it now stands but it would have been definitely more honest).

This is about all that can be said about the solid contribution of Mallavādi's Nayacakra but a debatable point remains to be raised. For in the twelve chapters of his text Mallavādi has not only given us critical exposition of some seventeen philosophical systems but he has also thought fit to assign these systems to the traditional seven *nayas* and to the twelve categories *vidhi*, *vidhi-vidhi*, etc. On the face of it this part of his endeavour deserves equally — if not more — serious attention; for an average student of Jaina philosophy will be most interested in knowing what a titan like Mallavādi has to say by way of evaluating the non-Jaina philosophical systems in terms of the doctrine of *Anekāntavāda* as traditionally developed. However, such a student is bound to be disappointed inasmuch as Mallavādi has treated this question in a most perfunctory fashion. Thus at the fag end of each chapter he raises the question as to which of the seven traditional *nayas* would accomodate the system (or systems) dealt with in it. In each case the answer forthcoming is extremely brief; in fact, it virtually amounts to a mere naming of the *naya* concerned, for what then follows is a terse particular etymology of the word *dravya* in the case of the first six chapters and and that of the word *paryāya* in the case of the last six (it being understood that the three *nayas* covered in the first six chapters are *dravyāstikanaya* while the four coverd in the last six are *paryāyāstikanaya*). And in most cases whatever little is said makes little sense precisely because it seems to have little relation to what we otherwise know about seven *nayas*. Not that the accounts of these *nayas* available elsewhere are free from difficulties, but they certainly give us a fairly clear idea of what sort of considerations were raised in connection with elaborating the

concept of this or that *naya*. And these considerations lose almost all meaning in the context of Mallavādī's text. Essentially the same sort of difficulty arises in connection with those twelve categories. Here again somewhere in the course of the exposition (or expositions) contained in a chapter it is summarily given out why the chapter is supposed to be devoted to this or that category, say, *vidhi* or *vidhi-vidhi*. Here again the statement is too brief to be enlightening. And since these twelve categories are in all probability Mallavādī's own novelty we do not even have a chance to check up his statements against the corresponding accounts available elsewhere. So as things stand it is difficult to make out why Mallavādī assigns this or that system to this or that from among his twelve categories, just as it is difficult to make out why he assigns it to this or that from among the traditional seven *nayas*. It seems that this circumstance had no little share in determining the historical fate of Mallavādī's text. In those medieval times a philosophical text would get due publicity only in case it satisfied some felt intellectual need of the religious sect to which it belonged and the Jaina sect did then felt the need for having a critical exposition of the contemporary philosophical systems, preferably expositions couched in terms of the doctrine of seven *nayas*. Mallavādī came out with a masterly critical exposition of the contemporary philosophical systems but it was not conducted in terms of the doctrine of seven *nayas*; what is worse, he sought to create the impression that it was actually thus conducted. Subsequent generations perhaps felt that they were too incompetent to fathom Mallavādī's logic (otherwise they should be able to see how the master had made use of the doctrine of seven *nayas*). The result was that they kept on declaring that Mallavādī was the greatest of logicians (*anu Mallavādinaṁ tārkikāḥ* as Hemacandra pithily remarked) and yet kept on ignoring his text. This explains why no later author, not even the great Yaśovijaya who had made for his personal use a copy of Siṁhasūri's text which is happily with us, made any explicit reference to Mallavādī's characteristic views as developed in his *magnum opus*.

(C) JINABHADRA

(i) Anekāntavāda

In his Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya Jinabhadra makes extremely useful contribution to Jaina philosophy in general and the Jaina doctrine of *Anekāntavāda* in particular. Towards the end of the text there occur following verses helpful to an understanding of the *naya* doctrine :

(1) The general, the particular, the just born, the actual alone, that which is different when a different word is used, that which conforms to the meaning of the word used — these are what are stated by *saṅgraha* etc.

(2) These are to be reduced to the couple *dravyāstika* and *paryāyāstika* as also to the remaining such couples; again, these couples are to be reduced to each other.

(3) According to *dravyāstika* the real is *dravya*, according to *paryāyāstika* it is *paryāya*; according to *arpitanaya* it is the particular, according to *anarpitanaya* it is the general.

(4) *Vyavahāra* which follows the popular usage says that the black bee (*bhramara*) is black, *niścaya* which states the ultimate truth says that it possesses all the five colours.

(5) Or *vyavahāra* follows the view upheld by some one *naya* — not all the views upheld by the *nayas* taken in their totality; *niścaya*, on the other hand, follows the views upheld by all the *nayas* — which means it follows the ultimate truth.

(6) *Jñānanaya* says that everything depends on *jñāna* while *kriyā* is useless; *kriyānaya* says that everything depends on *kriyā*. The correct position is to accept both." (3586–91)

These verses are fairly indicative of the various directions in which the Jaina mind moved in the course of developing the doctrine of *nayas*. What is particularly noteworthy in this connection is that the doctrine of seven *nayas* (here to be called the doctrine of six *nayas*, *naigama* being absent) represents just one of these directions. Of course, it is also here recommended that the different classifications of *nayas* are to be reduced to each other but in view of the fact that the different classifications are based on different considerations the task does not seem to be easy. For example, if *saṅgrahanaya* emphasises the general and *vyavahāranaya* the particular then the former can be called *anarpitanya* the latter *arpitanaya*; similarly, if *ṛjusūtranaya* emphasises the state of being just born (i. e. being immediately present) it can be called *paryāyāstikanaya*. But it will not be easy to reduce *saṅgraha*, *vyavahāra* and *ṛjusūtra* either to the couple *dravyāstika–paryāyāstika* or to the couple *anarpita–arpita*. And the three *śabadanayas* seem to be based on considerations that have little to do with either couple. Similarly, different are considerations lying at the basis of the couple *vyavahāranaya–niścayanaya* (in both its versions) and the couple *jñānanaya-kriyānaya*. This should become clear from a close examination of Jinabhadra's own detailed account of seven *nayas*, that of the couple *dravyāstika-paryāyāstika* and that of the couple *vyavahāra-niścaya* which occur in the different parts of his text — the first in vv. 2180–2274, the second in vv. 414–26. Besides, there are occasions when the doctrine of seven *nayas* is applied to different specific cases and here we often come across statements based on an altogether different understanding of this or that from among the seven *nayas*. The whole situation is somewhat reminiscent of the old *anuyogadvāra* but the

important thing is that in Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya there has been a neat crystallisation of what might be called the chief account of seven *nayas*. As a matter of fact this chief account of seven *nayas* the account of *dravyāstika-paryāyāstika* and the account of *vyavahāra-niścaya* are Jinabhadra's real contribution to the doctrine of *nayas*. Let us consider these three one by one.

(i) On Jinabhadra's showing *naigama*, *saṅgraha* and *vyavahāra* differ from each other on account of their different attitudes as to the question of the ontological status of generality and particularity. Thus according to *naigama* generality and particularity differ from each other as also from the thing they characterise, according to *saṅgraha* generality is real but particularity false, according to *vyavahāra* particularity is real but generality false. [On an alternative understanding of *vyavahāra* it becomes identical with *vyavahāra* of the couple *vyavahāra-niścaya* but let us ignore that]. In the case of *naigama* we are even told that Kaṇāda's philosophy is an instance of it but Jinabhadra does not seem to have in mind any particular philosophy as an instance of *saṅgraha* or *vyavahāra*. As a matter of fact, Jinabhadra's account of *naigama* is virtually a Vaiśeṣika account of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* but it is difficult to think of a philosophical school which would endorse his account of *saṅgraha* or *vyavahāra*. For instance, the advocate of *saṅgraha* maintains that tree (i. e. tree in general) is real but mango (i.e, mango-tree) is false while the advocate of *vyavahāra* maintains the opposite position; but no philosopher ever maintained either of these positions. As for *ṛjusūtranaya* it, according to Jinabhadra, admits the sole reality of what is immediately present and what is one's own. Now so far as it concerned the admission of the sole reality of what is immediately present this certainly looks like a Buddhist position even if Jinabhadra makes no assertion to that effect. Lastly, take the three *śabdanayas*, viz. *śabda*, *samabhirūḍha*, *evaṁbhūta*. It is somewhat difficult to see what distinguishes *śabda* from *ṛjusūtra*. Jinabhadra offers three alternatives in this connection, viz.

(a) *Ṛjusūtra* accepts all the four *nikṣepas* but *śabda* accepts *bhāva-nikṣepa*; (hence it was said that the subject-matter of *śabda-naya* is 'the actual alone').

(b) Both *ṛjusūtra* and *śabda* admit the sole reality of what is immediately present but the latter views it as described in terms of one of the constituent propositions of the *Saptabhaṅgī* doctrine.

(c) *Ṛjusūtra* maintains that a word with a different gender, tense, etc. is the same word but *śabda* maintains that it is a different word.

Here is what distinguishes *samabhirūḍha* from *śabda* : according to the latter a thing described by a word is the same as that described by one of its synonyms, accordingly to the former a thing described by a word is

different from that described by one of its synonyms. And here is what distinguishes *evambhūta* from *samabhirūḍha* : according to the latter a thing is described by a word even in case it does not correspond to the description yielded by the etymology of this word, according to the former a thing is described by a word only in case it corresponds to the description yielded by the etymology of this word.

(ii) On Jinabhadra's showing *dravyāstika* maintains that the continuously existing substance is real, its successively emerging properties false while *paryāyāstika* maintains that the successively emerging properties are real the continuously existing substance false. This description broadly corresponds to that of *saṅgraha* and *vyavahāra*, it being conducted in terms of *dravya* and *paryāya* whereas the latter was conducted in terms of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*. Again it is difficult to think of a philosophical school that will answer to Jinabhadra's description of *dravyāstika* but the Buddhist can well be treated as an advocate of *paryāyāstika*; (as a matter of fact, *paryāyāstika* of this account is virtually identical with *ṛjusūtra* included among the seven *nayas*).

(iii) Lastly, on Jinabhadra's showing *niścayanaya* maintains that an act is done only when it is being done at present while *vyavahāra-naya* maintains that it is done only when the process of doing it is over. For instance, *vyavahāranaya* would say that a jar is produced when the process of producing it is over whereas *niścayanaya* would say that throughout the period of this process different things are produced at different moments (jar being produced at the last moment.) As thus understood *niścayanaya* turns out to be virtually identical with *ṛjusūtranaya*; (as a matter of fact when Jinabhadra in his account of the first *nihnava* presents a defence of *ṛjusūtranaya* he borrows so many crucially important verses from the present account of *niścayanaya*). However, this version of *vyavahāra-niścaya* is different from both versions referred to earlier. For earlier we were told that for *vyavahāra* the black bee is black while for *niścaya* it is possessed of all the five colours; again, we were there told that *vyavahāra* defends some one of the possible *nayas* whereas *niścaya* defends all of them. Now the former of these has been presented as an alternative understanding of *vyavahāranaya* included among the seven *nayas*. As for the latter it too somehow comes to view when at the conclusion of the account of seven *nayas* it is suggested that the relation between one of the seven *naya* and the seven taken together is the same as that between *śruta* etc. and *kevala*; the idea is that one of the seven *nayas* cognizes in part what the seven *nayas* cognize in its totality just as *mati*, *śruta*, *avadhi* or *manaḥparyāya* cognizes in part what *kevala* cognizes in its totality.

These may be regarded as Jinabhadra's central formulation on the question of *naya*; (the rest which are of a miscellaneous character may be

ignored.) But how to evaluate them is a task. As can be easily seen Jinabhadra has brought within the purview of his discussion the following four problems :

(1) The problem of the general and the particular

(2) The problem of the continuous substance and its ever-emerging properties

(3) The problems of word-meaning

(4) The problem of practical truth and ultimate truth

Of these the first two are philosophically most important, for they were destined to provide the firm foundation on which the doctrine of *Anekāntavāda* was to be built. As for the problems of word-meaning it never assumed a very important significance in the context of Jaina philosophical speculations while the prablem of practical truth and ultimate truth proved to be important in one particular sense. For the Jaina theoreticians were bound to maintain that the various non-Jaina philosophies are so many partial expressions of truth while Jaina philosophy is a complete expression of the same, and in this connection the conceptual couple *vyavahāra-niścaya* in one of its versions was abviously of use. Be that as it may, Jinabhadra's treatment of the problems of *sāmānya-viśeṣa* and *dravya-paryāya* is most crucial to his treatment of the problem of *naya*.

As for the doctrine of *nikṣepas* Jinabhadra was thoroughly conversant with the niceties of the rather cumbresome piece of speculation. This is evident from his discussion of *maṅgala* occurring at the very beginning of his text; (what is here said about *nāma*, *sthāpanā*, *dravya* and *bhāva* is later tacitly assumed whenever the occasion arises). But towards the end of this discussion Jinabhadra suggests alternative definitions of *nāma*, *sthāpana*, *dravya*, *bhāva*, definitions which are philosophically most enlightening. Here are his words. "Or *nāma* is the name of a thing, *sthāpanā* its configuration, *dravya* its cause, while *bhāva* is its self in the form of an effect" (60). Not only that, he then goes on to describe, at some length, four one-sided views which respectively, emphasise the importance of *nāma*, *sthāpanā*, *dravya* and *bhāva* as thus understood. And this is how he begins his critical comments against these views : "The *nayas* thus quarrel with each other on the basis of a false dogmatism while the Jaina doctrine which comprehends all the *nayas* is absolutely free from fault." (72). Thus Jinabhadra makes the doctrine of *nikṣepas* serve the same purpose as the doctrine of *nayas*, that is, the purpose of categorising and assessing one-sided philosophical views. He actually says : "Whatever thing is there in the world is possessed of four features (viz. *nāma*, *sthāpanā*, *dravya*, *bhāva*)" (73); again, "these four features are to be attributed to everything just like the three features origination, etc. (i.e. origination, destruction, permanence)" (74).

(ii) Pramāṇa

Jinabhadra's treatment of *pramāṇas* is thoroughly Āgamic in the sense that it preceded Akalaṅka's treatment of the same. For Akalaṅka gave an entirely new turn to the whole discussion so much so that on the question of *pramāṇas* it seems somewhat odd to think of Jinabhadra as a predecessor of Akalaṅka. [By way of contrast, let us note that on the question of *Anekāntavāda* Jinabhadra is certainly a worthy predecessor of Akalaṅka]. However, Jinabhadra's treatment of *pramāṇas* is also not thoroughly Agamic inasmuch as it is based on a logical consideration of the issuess involved. As a matter of fact, Jinabhadra's treatment of *pramāṇas* and Akalaṅka's treatment of the same have to be viewed as two co-ordinate growths of the age of Logic, the former working within the traditional framework the latter working within a framework that better conformed to the fashion of the period. Of course, Jinabhadra himself implicitly makes some sort of distinction between a treatment of *pramāṇas* and a treatment of *jñānas*, for whenever he speaks of *pramāṇas* he speaks of *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *āgama* while he never assigns the epithet *pramāṇa* to *mati*, *śruta*, etc. This means that Jinabhadra too was somehow aware of the demands of the fashion of the period but he deemed it improper to replace an account of *mati*, *śruta*, etc. by that of *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *āgama*. The result was that his references to *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *āgama* (all called *pramāṇa*) remained incidental while his really significant epistemological discussion centred around the treatment of *mati*, *śruta*, etc (all called *jñāna*). To put it in a nut-shell Jinabhadra's problem in this field was to show how the traditional concept of *mati* and *śruta* account for the whole range of ordinary cognition. For *mati* seemed to be identical with determinate perception and *śruta* identical with scriptural knowledge. Even extending the meaning of *śruta* so as to bring under it all cases of the acquisition of a knowledge of word-meaning there remained inference to be accounted for and the problem of inference was in a way the key problem of the age of Logic. As if in order to meet this difficulty Jinabhadra extended the meaning of *mati*, for in his eyes it was no more just determinate perception but also included all post-perceptual consideration of the nature of the object perceived. For he contended that what was *apāya* in determinate perception became *avagraha* in the first stage of further consideration, what was *apāya* in this first stage became *avagraha* in the second stage, what was *apāya* in the second stage became *avagraha* in the third, and so on till deemed necessary (v. 285). And certainly Jinabhadra's endeavour is comparable to Akalaṅka's much better known innovations according to which *smṛti*, *pratybhijñā*, *tarka* and *anumāna* were inserted in between *mati* understood as determinate perception and *śruta* understood as scriptural knowledge. However, Jinabhadra's treatment of *jñānas* hardly raises any ontological issues of vital importance and we therefore proceed with the matter no further.

(iii) Defence of the traditional Jaina philosophical views

In Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya a massive collection of ontological speculations occurs at two places — one the section called Gaṇadharavāda and the other the section called Nihnavavāda. But in view of the total character of the contents of these sections it will be more reasonable to consider them under the next head 'A General Evaluation of the non-Jaina Philosophical Views'. On the other hand, some amount of ontological material lies scattered in the different parts of the text and a part of it may be treated as a defence of the traditional Jaina views; (on the whole this does not amount to much and in the case what we get is not a systematic exposition of the Jaina philosophical views, but it will be useful if we take note of it in the present part of our discussion on Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya). For example, somewhere towards its beginning Āvaśyakaniryukti briefly refers to the process called *samyaktvaśreṇī*, *upaśamaśreṇī* and *kṣapakaśreṇī* and Jinabhadra comments on the original by undertaking a fairly lengthy description of these processes.[10] Similarly, in Namaskāraniryukti *Siddha* has been mentioned as one of the five objects of veneration and in this connection a brief reference has been made to the process called *kevalisamudghāta* and *śaileśīkaraṇa* and the state called *siddi*; here too Jinabhadra comments by way of dilating upon these processes and this state[11] (incidentally considering in all its ramifications the question whether a *kevalī* has *jñāna* and *darśana* simultaneously or alternately).[12] Again, some useful discussion occurs in Upodghātaniryukti under the heads *kāla*, *kāraṇa* and *lakṣaṇa*. Thus in the course of his account of *kāla* Jinabhadra variously emphasises that *kāla* is not an independent substance but just a characterising feature of other substances, though on that account it might itself be called a substance in a figurative[13] sense. Here we also find discussed an important question related to the *karma* doctrine, viz. how is it possible to get rid of a *karma* even before the time that is due for its expiry ?[14] Again, in his account of *kāraṇa* Jinabhadra classifies it in four ways, viz.

(1) *Kāraṇa* of the form of the same substance (as *kārya*) and *kāraṇa* not of this form

(2) *Nimittakāraṇa* and *naimittikakāraṇa*

(3) *Samavāyikāraṇa* and *asamavāyikāraṇa*

(4) *Kartṛ-*, *karma-*, *karaṇa-*, *sampradāna-*, *apādāna-*, and *adhikaraṇa-kāraṇa*[15]

And two things are noteworthy about the discussion on *lakṣaṇa*. First, the sub-head Sāmānyalakṣaṇa has been divided into two types, viz. *arpita* and *anarpita*, the latter standing for similar features the former for the dissimilar ones;[16] (let us recall that Jinabhadra has once spoken of *anarpitanaya* and *arpitanaya* just as he usually speaks of *dravyāstikanaya* and

paryāyāstikanaya. Secondly, under the sub-head Utpādavyayamalakṣaṇa Jinabhadra discusses how a thing is characterised by origination and destruction at one and the same time.[17] Lastly, another substantial discussion of ontological problems, to be precise, of those centred around the notion of *karaṇa* (doing) occurs in connection with the explanation of the word *karomi* in the Sāmāyikasūtra-niryukti-part of the text.[18]

(iv) A General Evaluation of the non-Jaina philosophical Views

In Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya an evaluation of the non-Jaina philosophical views occurs in two rather peculiar context; (for the rest the text hardly ever takes note of a rival philosophical position, the exception being a few stray references to the Vaiśeṣikas and Buddhists). For at one place the situation has been so contrived that Mahāvīra seeks to convince his eleven would-be *gaṇadharas* one by one by arguing against eleven non-Jaina views one by one, this preaching constituting the celebrated *Gaṇadharavāda*.[19] At anothr place are described seven (plus one) heresies alleged to have arisen within the Jaina Church in the course of time, these heresies being called *nihnava* and each involving an acceptance of some non-Jaina position or the other.[20] The case of *nihnvas* is more interesting though the Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya material related to them is less rich in content. For with the Śvetāmbara Jaina *nihnavas* are almost as much of a recognised institution as are the seven *nayas* with all Jainas; (the Digambara Jainas know of no *nihnavas* and as a matter of fact the alleged advocates of the eighth *nihnava* are the Digambaras themselves. The noteworthy thing is that most of the *nihnavas* have to do with ontological matters; thus

(1) the first *nihnava* maintains that an act is done not when it is being done at present but when the process of doing it is over;

(2) the second *nihnava* maintains that it is only the last constituent unit of a soul that is to be called soul — and not also its remaining constistuent units;

(3) the third *nihnava* maintains that a monk should do no honours to anyone for everyone can possibly be a god in disguise (while it is sin for a monk to do honours to a god);

(4) the fourth *nihnava* maintains that a thing lasts for not more than one moment;

(5) the fifth *nihnava* maintains that one can possibly experience two pieces of cognition at one and the same time;

(6) the sixth *nihnava* maintains that things of the world are broadly divisible not into two classes, viz. *jīva* and *ajīvā* but into three, viz. *jīva*, *ajīva* and *nojīva*;

(7) the seventh *nihnava* maintains two positions, viz. (a) that *karma* touches a soul just superficially but does not penetrate it so as to get linked to its each and every constituent unit, (b) that one's moral vows should refer to a period of unlimited duration (and not to a period of life-long duration, say);

(8) the eighth *nihnava* maintains that a monk should go stark naked.

As can already be seen it is only the third *nihnava*, eighth *nihnava* and one part of the seventh *nihnava* which do not pertain ontological matters. Now Jinabhadra ably presents the standpoint of each *nihnava* and then criticises it from the Jaina standpoint. In this connection one thing is noteworthy. Most of the positions constituting a *nihnava* are unknown to us from other sources and the tradition might be right that these traditions represented minor deviations of certain Jaina theoreticians themselves. But the first, fourth and sixth *nihnavas* deserve some further thought. The view criticised by the first *nihnava* is frequently maintained view of Bhagavatī viz, that an act is done only when it is being done at present; (as a matter of fact the view is defended in the very first dialogue of Bhagavatī). But Jinabhadra treats it as a view upheld by *ṛjusūtranaya* and this means that according to him it is only a partially correct view. On the other hand, a reading of the relevant passages of Bhagavatī leaves one in no doubt that the text considers the view in question to be a totally correct view. The simple fact is that Bhagavatī had not yet learnt to speak in the language of partial vs. total truth, a language characteristic of the *naya* doctrine. Jinabhadra himself roundly admits it when in his treatment of the problem of *vyavahāra* vs. *niścayanaya* he makes the *niścayanaya* maintain the same view as was criticised by the first *nihnava*. For to say that this was a view upheld by *niścayanaya* virtually amounted to saying that it was a totally correct view. But this would look like making an undue concession to the Buddhist and the balance seems to have been struck by criticising the fourth *nihnava*. For the fourth *nihnava* is too abviously a Buddhist position and Jinabhadra almost says it in so many words. Thus in his criticism of the first *nihnava* Jinabhadra concedes the element of truth contained in the Buddhist position while in his criticism of the foruth *nihnava* he takes exception to the element of untruth contained therein. The difficulty connected with the sixth *nihnava* is of another type. The central contention of this *nihnava* is that a full-fledged living being is *jīva* while a part separated from it is *no-jīva*; for instance, a whole lizard (of-the-type-Iguana) is *jīva* while its chucked off tail is *no-jīva*. As against this Jinabhadra maintains that a living being is *jīva*, an inanimate thing is *ajīva*, a part separated from an inanimate thing is *no-ajīva*—but *no-jīva* is just a synonym for *ajīva*. This is not much important. But the noteworthy thing is that Jinabhadra somehow connects the present *nihnava* with the Vaiśeṣika school; for we are told

that the advocate of this *nihnava* was defeated when the following 36 items were examined under the four heads *jīva, ajīva, no-jīva, no-ajīva* :

(1) 9 *dravyas*	(4) *sattā, sāmānya, sāmānya-viśeṣa* (3 items)
(2) 17 *guṇas*	(5) *viśeṣa*
(3) 5 *karmas*	(6) *samavāya*

These are certainly Vaiśeṣika categories but it is difficult to make out what the *nihnava* in question has to do with the Vaiśeṣika school. It seems that historical references made in connection with the seven (or eight) *nihnavas* are not literally true. In this connection it will be instructive to recall an obscure historical reference made in connection with the doctrine of seven *nayas*. For following Āvaśyaka-niryukti Jinabhadra says that the doctrine of seven *nayas* was well applicable in former times when each scriptural passage was to be explained as a passage dealing with ethical, didactic, cosmographic and philosophical matters but that is ceased to be the case (at the most the first three *nayas* are now applicable) when different scriptural texts began to be explained as texts dealing with ethical, didactic, cosmographic and philosophical matters[31], a statement which, as it stands, makes little sense. It seems that a pre-occupation with the problem of partial truth led to the formulation of the doctrine of seven *nayas* as well as the doctrine of seven (or eight) *nihnavas* while the historical references made in connection with both are somehow of the nature of an after-thought.

In Gaṇadharavāda Jinabhadra has found it possible to discuss certain philosophical questions of most fundamental importance — in each case presenting the standpoint of a rival and counterposing against it the corresponding Jaina standpoint. Some of these rivals are clearly recognizable as advocates of certain well-known schools of Indian philosophy. For example in the first discussion (as already hinted, there are eleven in all) which seeks to prove the existence of soul and in the third which seeks to disprove that consciousness is a property of physical elements the rival concerned is the materialist. However, in the former discussion there also occurs an incidental refutation of the doctrine of one soul — which must have been the doctrine advocated by certain Upaniṣadic circles. Again, in the fourth discussion the rival is represented as denying the reality of physical elements and this means that he ought to be a Vijñānavādı Buddhist. But Jinabhadra's charge against him is that if he is ready to deny the reality of so palpable a thing as physical elements then he should also deny the reality of consciousness which is after all something subtle; this way the rival is reduced to the position of a Śūnyavādı Buddhist and tackled as such. In the second discussion, the rival is opposed to the doctrine of *karma* in general and its Jaina version in particular; in the first capacity he must be a materialist, in the second capacity he could be a believer in the doctrine of *karma*

but no Jaina. Here four discussions in a way constitute the cream of Gaṇadharavāda though important things have been said also in the case of the remaining seven which treat the following topics :

(5) Refutation of the doctrine that the next life is similar to this one.
(6) Proof for worldly bondage and release from it
(7) Proof for the existence of *devas*
(8) Proof for the existence of *nārakas*
(9) Proof for the existence of good *karmas* and bad
(10) Proof for the next life
(11) Proof for the release from worldly bondge

As can be seen, these are no philosophical questions of fundamental importance and the discussion related to them frequently borrows verses after verses from the earlier part. Broadly speaking, these seven discussions can be said to pertain to the problem of *bandha-mokṣa*, a problem which is a continuation of the problem of *karma* touched upon in the second discussion. Thus what Jinabhadra essentially does in Gaṇadharavāda is :

(1) to demonstrate that soul exists (I and III)
(2) to demonstrate that physical elements exist (IV)
(3) to demonstrate that *karma* exists (II, V–XI)

(Of course, the second item is not so much a demonstration of existence of physical elements as refutation of *Śūnyavāda*).

(D) KUNDAKUNDA

(i) Defence of the Traditional Jaina philosophical views

In the case of Kundakunda it will be advisable first to dispose of his treatment of the traditional Jaina philosophical views — not only because such a treatment is not a characteristic activity of the age of Logic but also because it is not a characteristic activity of Kundakunda himself. For Kundakunda deserves attention chiefly because of the special trend of thought he developed in his Samayasāra, a text which markedly deviates from the usual manner of Jaina's presentation of his philosophical views. But before writing Samayasāra Kundakunda wrote Pañcāstikāya and Pravacanasāra and in these texts he stands much close to the orthodox positions. Thus in Pañcāstikāya he gives an account of five *astikāyas*, nine *tattvas*, and *mokṣa*, and this can even serve as a handy introduction to the fundamentals of Jaina philosophy. Similarly, in Pravacanasāra he discusses on a somewhat advanced level certain particular problems related to cognitions, emotions, affections, etc. and those related to soul, physical elements and the like; this discussion, again, is considerably illuminating. All this is traditional material in the strict sense of the phrase but in both Pañcāstikāya and Pravacanasāra Kundakunda also discusses the problem of *dravya*, *guṇa*, *paryāya* and that of *utpāda*, *vyaya*, *dhrauvya*, two problems which had come

to the forefront relatively late. These problems too Kundakunda treats in a commendable fashion. These sides of Kundakunda's endeavour are to be kept in mind if we are to properly evaluate the performance he put up in Samayasāra. For they make one thing clear, viz. that Kundakunda was well acquainted with the traditional Jaina philosophical views and also with the tendency towards *Anekāntavāda* that had lately emerged. And yet he also thought it proper to tread a somewhat new path on which he virtually remained a lone traveller. But let us try to be fair to Kundakunda. For what was his running theme in Samayasāra had already found accasional expression in Pañcāstikāya and Pravacanasāra; not only that, it had found expression there in a form that would not sound particularly jarring to an average Jaina ear. This means that Kundakunda's innovation somehow had its roots in the traditinal world-thought.

Thus in Samayasāra Kundakunda was going to emphasize that what happens to a soul on account of its association with matter is nothing essential to the nature of soul. The question was touched upon in Pañcāstikāya vv. 60-69 which seek to throw light on the mutual relationship obtaining between a soul conceived as a spiritual entity and a *karma* conceived as a physical entity. Here already Kundakunda had come out with the idea that a soul is the main cause (*kartā*) of what happens to itself and an occasioning cause (*nimitta*) of what happens to a *karma* while a *karma* is similarly the main cause what happens to itself and an occasioning cause of what happens to a soul. Again, here in vv. 154-59 it was clearly laid down that all inflow of *karma* — good or bad — is something alien to a soul while *jñāna* and *darśana* are alone what are essential to it; in this connection it was pointedly made out (vv. 160-61) that *samyaktva, jñāna, cāritra* are *mokṣamārga* only from the practical standpoint while the real *mokṣamārga* consists of just *jñāna* and *darśna* — that is, of those two essential properties to a soul. Similarly, in Pravacanasāra-jñeyādhikāra vv. 92-93 it was declared that a soul does nothing to karmic matter while in 68-70 that it does nothing to the matter of the form of body, *manas* or speech (the idea being that whatever it does it does to itself). Lastly, in Pravacanasāra-jñānādhikāra vv. 56-58 it was argued that knowledge had with the help of sense-organs is *parokṣa* (lit. had through something alien to itself) while in v. 76 that pleasure had with the help of sense-organs is actually pain. All this contained the standpoint of Samayasāra in a germ form and was yet not much far from the traditional standpoint. For it was after all a traditional position that a soul's association with matter is something accidental and that therefore the account of a soul's own nature must contain no reference to matter. But the tradition also emphasized that a worldly soul is such a soul precisely because of its association with matter and that therefore the account of a worldly soul must contain reference to

matter. As a matter of fact, Kundakunda's own treatment of ontological problems in Pañcāstikāya and Pravacanasāra took due note of this aspect of the situation; for in these texts what he was chiefly interested in offering was an account of the worldly souls and the inanimate surrounding in which they find themselves. Even Kundakunda's assertion that a soul is the chief cause of itself and an occasioning cause of *karma* while a *karma* is the chief cause of itself and an occasioning cause of a soul was not out of tune with the traditional teaching. For some sort of distinction between material cause and accessory cause is always legitimate to make even if there was no explicit tradition of doing so, and Kundakunda's chief cause and occasioning cause are virtual synonyms for material cause and accessory cause respectively. Nay, even the tradition of referring to sense-organs as something alien to a soul was slowly emerging. For that alone will explain why the Jaina theoreticians had begun to call sense-perception a *parokṣa* type of cognition. Certainly, Kundakunda was not the first or only Jaina author to define the *parokṣa* type of cognition as the type of cognition had through instruments alien to a soul (say, through sense-organs). It was only when Kundakunda, in Pravacanasāra, came out with the thesis that a soul does nothing to karmic matter or to matter of the form of body, *manas* or speech that he sounded unorthodox. Apparently, the master Kundakunda was here going back on his own earlier view that a soul and a *karma* are each other's occasioning cause. In any case, a thesis like this constitute's Kundakunda's transition-point in his journey away from the traditional stand-point and towards the standpoint of Samayasāra.

(ii) Anekāntavāda

In Samayasāra too Kundakunda for once (vv. 86–90) repeated his old view that a soul and a *karma* are each other's occasioning cause. But here his emphasis was on the point that they are so only from the practical standpoint whereas from the definitive standpoint each of them is its own chief cause. For the rest the whole of this text is a standing harangue against all talk of a relationship between a soul and a matter. Towards the very beginning (v. 13) we are told that the practical standpoint is the standpoint of untruth while definitive standpoint is the standpoint of truth — so that even to concede that from the practical standpoint a soul and matter do enter into mutual relationship amounts to saying that they in fact do nothing of the sort. What Kundakunda does is simply to take up numerous positions that were traditionally maintained as to the nature of a soul and deny them outright — always emphasising, explicitly or otherwise, that *darśana* and *jñāna* are alone what characterise a soul. Thus he declares : "I am purely of the form of *darśana* and *jñāna*, an entity ever incorporeal; even an iota of another

thing does not belong to me" (43). And one of the first things that are denied of a soul is its being characterised by *jñāna, darśna, cāritra*, a hallowed traditional position. 'The cogniser (soul)", says Kundakunda, "is said to possess *jñāna, darśana, cāritra* but in fact it is a pure cogniser possessed of neither *jñāna*, nor *darśana* nor *cāritra*" (7). [This was said also in Pañcāstikāya in a passage already referred to]. Elsewhere (vv. 55-60) a long list of features is denied of a soul; it begins with colour, smell, taste, touch and ends with *jīvasthānas* and *guṇasthānas*. Once (350-51) it is argued that to say that a soul creates for itself a body of one of the six types (viz. the five *sthāvara* types and one *trasa* type) is like saying that Viṣṇu creates the world. These utterances are typical of Samayasāra and sufficient to disturb an average Jaina reader. Not that such a reader is unaccostomed to the talk of a distinction between *vyavahāranaya* and *niścayanaya* but he expects *niścayanaya* to be a fuller description of reality than *vyavahāranaya* whereas Kundakunda seems to adopt the opposite mode of argumentation. For instance, the whole truth about a soul is that in its worldly state it is associated with matter while in its state of *mokṣa* it is free from it; this should be called an account of soul from the standpoint of *niścayanaya*. As against it either part of this total proposition should be called an account of a soul from the standpoint of *vyavahāranaya*. Kundakunda, on the other hand, would say that the former of these parts is an account of a soul from the standpoint of *vyavahāranaya* and the latter that from the standpoint of *niścayanaya*. But as Jinabhadra's case should make it clear it was possible to view the distinction between *niścayanaya* and *vyavahāranaya* in more ways than one and so the procedure adopted by Kundakunda was not outright impermissible. What was really un-Jaina-like was Kundakunda's thinly veiled insinuation that the standpoint of *vyavahāranaya* is a totally false standpoint. To be sure, it should be impossible for a Jaina to concede that a soul enters into no relation whatsoever with matter; all that he can allow is that this relation is liable to cease altogether. Be that as it may, Kundakunda's Samayasāra certainly adds a new dimension to the discussion concerning the problem of *vyavahāra* vs. *niścayanaya* and that is its contribution to the doctrine of *Anekāntavāda*.

(E) SAMANTABHADRA

(I) Anekāntavāda

Samantabhadra's Āptamīmāṁsā deserves a special mention in an account of the history of Jaina philosophy for more reasons than one. For one thing it had the good fortune of being commented on by such stalwarts as Akalaṅka and Vidyānanda, the touch of whose pen might convert even rubbish into gold. But the text itself was meritorious inasmuch as the fundamentals of *Anekāntavāda* had found in it a most clear-cut formula-

tion — one solid reason why it recommended itself to Akalaṅka and Vidyānanda. Siddhasena and Jinabhadra had doubtless developed numerous elements of *Anekāntavāda* but they chose to work within the framework of the doctrine of *nayas* which had obvious limitations. To be sure, these authors also saw to it that this doctrine be so understood that its contribution to *Anekāntavāda* should be maximum possible, but that did not compensate for the basic deficiencies vitiating the original doctrine itself. Moreover, these authors did not make serious or sustained efforts to evaluate from the standpoint of *Anekāntavāda* the contemporary systems of Indian philosophy. Even Mallavādī whose study of these contemporary systems was remarkably thorough did not care to evaluate them from the standpoint of *Anekāntavāda*. True, he now and then did criticise a philosophical position from the standpoint of *Anekāntavāda* but that was not his constant practice. What is worse, he gave the impression that what he was above all doing was to evaluate selected philosophical systems from the standpoint of *Anekāntavāda* even if this evaluation was conducted within the framework of the doctrine of seven *nayas* and that of twelve categories, viz. *vidhi*, *vidhividhi* etc. But as we have already seen, this was not the case and whatever Mallavādī did in this connection was done in a most perfunctory fashion. The situation undergoes as refreshingly welcome change with the advent of Samantabhadra with his Āptamīmāṁsā

Samantabhadra had a clear consciousness of what constitutes the central contention of the doctrine of *Anekāntavāda*, viz. that a thing must be characterised by two mutually contradictory features at one and the same time. He also realised that the doctrine was applicable rather universally; that is to say, he felt that taking any thing and any feature at random it could be shown that this thing is characterised by this feature as also by the concerned contradictory feature. In order to vindicate his position Samantabhadra examined the following ten pairs of contradictory features :

(i) existence and non-existence
(ii) oneness and separateness
(iii) permanence and transience
(iv) 'difference between cause and effect, substance and property, etc.' and 'identity between cause and effect, substance and property etc.'
(v) 'relativity of substance-property relationship' and 'non-relativity of substance-property relationship.'
(vi) 'reliance on reason' and 'reliance on scripture'
(vii) 'pan-internalism' and 'pan-externalism'
(viii) 'reliance on faith' and 'reliance on endeavour'
(ix) 'injury done to other a sin, pleasure given to other a virtue' and 'injury done to oneself a virtue, pleasure given to oneself a sin'

(x) 'ignorance leading to worldly bondage' and 'ignorance leading to *mokṣa*'

Of these (viii)-(x) pertain to the field of ethics, (vi) to that of epistemology, the rest to that of ontology. Confining ourselves to Samantabhadra's treatment of the ontological pairs let us note that he always first considers two onesided views and then offers a synthesis of the two — this synthesis constituting the Jaina view of the matter. Of the two one-sided views one bases itself on one member of the given pair of contradictory features, the other on the other. Thus the following six pairs of mutually contradictory views are here constituted in all :

I (i) Only positive entities exist and no negative ones
(ii) Only negative entities exist and no positive ones

II (i) All things are absolutely one with each other
(ii) All things are absolutely separate from each other

III (i) Everything is absolutely permanent
(ii) Everything is absolutely transient

IV (i) A cause is absolutely different from its effect, a substance from its properties, and so on and so forth
(ii) A cause is absolutely identical with its effect, a substance with its properties and so on and so forth

V (i) The properties of a substance are absolutely dependent on their substance
(ii) The properties of a substance are absolutely independent of their substance

VI (i) Whatever exists exists in the form of a mental happening
(ii) Whatever exists exists in the form of an outward happening

Against each of these one-sided views Samantabhadra urges more or less penetrating difficulties but he never names the advocate of a view under consideration. However, in some cases the identity of the rival is unmistakable. For example, the advocate of II (ii), III (ii), IV (ii), V (i) must be a Sautrāntika Buddhist, that of VI (i) a Vijñānavādī Buddhist, that of IV (i), V (ii) a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The advocate of I (ii) is a nihilist, that of II (i) a monist. The advocate of VI (ii) might be a Mīmāṁsaka according to whom all cognition is valid. The view I (i) might be attributed to all those schools which deny the reality of 'non-existence' and the view III (i) to a school insofar as it posits an absolutely unchanging entity — e. g. to Sāṅkhya insofar as it posits *puruṣas*. The variety of Samantabhadra's field of investigation is really remarkable and it gives him ample opportunity to test his own *anekāntavādī* conviction against so many more or less influential philosophical doctrines of his times. And even if Samantabhadra's treatment of problems lacked due thoroughness it had the unique advantage of being

conducted within an extremely neat framework. Little wonder this framework became model for subsequent generations of Jaina philosophers — of philosophers whose grasp of problems was deeper than Samantabhadra's own.

Another aspect of Samantabhadra's performance also deserves notice. He apparently attaches utmost importance to the *Saptabhaṅgī* doctrine and in fact makes it the starting point of his investigation. The form in which he presents the doctrine first appears in Āptamīmāṁsā and is different from that in which it appears in Siddhasena's Sanmati. Attention has already been drawn towards this circumstance and the fact is not much important. What is noteworthy is Samantabhadra's attributing the name '*naya*' to each of the seven alternative propositions of this *Saptabhaṅgī* doctrine. Similarly noteworthy is his attributing the name '*Syādvāda*' to the totality of these propositions. Samantabhadra submits that one difference between the omniscient person's cognition on the one hand and *Syādvāda* and *Naya* on the other is that the former comprehends everything simultaneously the latter do so successively (v. 101). Similarly, he submits that even if both *Syādvāda* and the omniscient person's cognition comprehend eveything the former is a case of mediate cognition, the latter that of immediate cognition (v. 105). All this is indicative of certain undercurrents of the Jaina thought of the period. That *naya* is a partial expression of truth was a comparatively old idea, but by *naya* were to be undersood the seven *nayas naigama*, *saṅgraha* etc. or the two *nayas dravyāstika*, *paryāyāstika* or the two *nayas vyavahāra*, *niścaya*; on the other hand, the *Saptabhaṅgī* doctrine had come to the fore-front in comparatively recent times and there were no tradition of associating with it the name '*naya*'. Again, *Syādvāda* could be treated as a synonym for *Anekāntavāda* and the mere fact that the constituent propositions of the *Saptabhaṅgī* doctrine used the word '*syāt*' was no sufficient ground for identifying *Syādvāda* with this doctrine. It was perhaps thought that since the *Saptabhaṅgī* doctrine enables us to express the whole of truth and since *Syādvāda* (=*Anekāntavāda*) represents the whole of the truth the *Sabtabhaṅgī* doctrine (rather the various possible *Saptabhaṅgī* schemes taken in their totality) should be treated as the same thing as *Syādvāda*. Then a distinction was made between the immediate knowledge of the whole truth which an omniscient person possesses and the various *Saptabhaṅgī* schemes through which this knowledge is given expression to. Using these *Saptabhaṅgī* schemes one after another and using the constituent propositions of one *Saptabhaṅgī* scheme one after another even an ordinary mortal can gain a knowledge of the whole of truth. Hence it was declared that an omniscient person knows the whole of truth immediately and simultaneously while an ordinary mortal knows it mediately and successively. Lastly, there seems to have developed a tradition of identifying *pramāṇa* whith the whole of truth and *naya* with a part of it. And the present part of

Āptamīmāṁsā somehow contributed towards an understanding of the import of this tradition. For *Syādvāda* as here described is virtually identical with *śrutajñāna* (=Jaina scripture) and at least from Umāsvāti onwards the five *jñānas* began to be called five *pramāṇas*. So appealing to the Āptamīmāṁsā passages under consideration (where the word *pramāṇa* too occurs incidentally) it could be argued that a *naya* is a part of the *pramāṇa* called *śruta*. However, the tradition of identifying *naya* with partial truth and *pramāṇa* with total truth seems to be older than Umāsvāti who was the first to call the five traditional *jñānas* by the name '*pramāṇa*'. But it is difficult to imagine how the tradition was originally understood.

3 THE SECOND STAGE

(A) HARIBHADRA

(i) Anekāntavāda

Haribhadra's Anekāntajayapatākā is one of the earlier works in which certain non-Jaina philosophical positions have been extensively evaluated from a typical Jaina standpoint. The authors like Siddhasena and Jinabhadra had not cared much to evaluate the non-Jaina philosophical positions, an author like Mallavādī had not cared much to evaluate them from a typical Jaina standpoint, while an author like Samantabhadra who had evaluated the non-Jaina philosophical positions from typical Jaina standpoint had done so on a rather elementary level. This is not to deny the respective historical roles of the great predecessors of Haribhadra but the points just made have to be noted if Haribhadra's own historical role is to be estimated correctly. In his Anekāntajayapatākā Haribhadra is chiefly interested in vindicating the validity of Anekāntavāda and his strategy is worth examination, for that might also provide a clue to the general working of the Jaina mind of his times. In the first four chapters of his text Haribhadra chooses four topics in connection with which it is possible to adopt two one-sided views, and after a preliminary criticism of these views he develops the Jaina view on the question in such a manner that it proves to be a synthesis of those earlier criticised one-sided views. Essentially the same thing had been done by Samantabhadra in his Āptamīmāṁsā but Anekāntajayapatākā repeats the performance on a much more advanced level. The four topics considered by Haribhadra are as follows :

(i) Existence–Nonexistence
(ii) Permanence–Transience
(iii) General–Particular
(iv) Describable–Indescribable

The first two of these topics had been dealt with by Samantabhadra under the same title, the third under a different one (viz. Oneness-

Separateness), while the fourth was bound to crop up in the course of his discussion inasmuch as the general framework for it was provided by the *Saptabhaṅgī* doctrine. But Haribhadra's treatment of the topics in question had its own unique features. For one thing, Haribhadra so developed his argument that he had a lot to say about the Buddhist positions as formulated in the camp of Dharmakīrti. As a matter of fact, Dharmakīrtians are almost the only recognisable rivals of note whom Haribhadra seeks to criticise. Thus in the third discussion — which is most extensive — Haribhadra throughout criticises Dharmakīrti and in the end positively defends the concerned Jaina view; (in this connection he just incidentally and most briefly– p. 274 — dissociates himself from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view on the question). Similarly, Dharmakīrtians are the advocates of transience in the second discussion and those of indescribability in the fourth; (in the fourth discussion the advocates of describability are the Śabadādvaitavādins). [In the first discussion there is a single non-Jaina rival who seeks to demonstrate the incompatibility of existence and non-existence but he is not recognisable; similarly, in the second discussion the advocate of permanence is not recognisable]. Even in the last two chapters of Anekāntajayapatākā which do not proceed with the framework of Anekāntavāda the non-Jaina rivals of Haribhadra are Dharmakīrtians, for here the fifth chapter is exclusively devoted to a refutation of *Vijñānavāda*, the sixth almost exclusively to a refutation of *Kṣaṇikavāda*. It looks as if the Jainas of the period were competing with the Brahmins in their anti-Buddhist crusade. Thus one chief endeavour of the contemporary Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and Mīmāṁsakas was to cross swords with Dharmakīrtians and the Jainas followed their practice. On one important question the Jainas were absolutely one with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and Mīmāṁsakas, for all the three were uncompromising critics of *Vijñānavāda* (=idealism) and defenders of *Bāhyārthavāda* (=realism). So on this question they could legitimately and freely borrow from each other's arsenal of arguments. But on the next most important question, viz, the question of criticising *Kṣaṇikavāda* (momentarism) the position was not so simple. For *Kṣaṇikavāda* was the Buddhist theory of reality in general and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṁsaka were deadly opposed to it, but they have no alternative theory of reality in general. The Jainas, on the other hand, had come to develop their own theory of reality in general. Now this Jaina theory of reality in general conceded the element of truth in *Kṣaṇikavāda* inasmuch as the former maintained that the properties of a substance change every moment even if this substance itself lasts for a longer or shorter period (in one sense it lasts for ever). Thus if the Jainas were opposed to *Kṣaṇikavāda* of the Buddhists they were also opposed to the other extreme position which could be called *Kūṭasthanityatvavāda*. But in those times there was no philosophical school worth the name which could be called an advocate of *Kūṭasthanityatvavāda* and so the Jainas could not much concentrate their

attack on it; as a result, it tended to appear as if they were less vehement in their criticism of *Kūṭasthanityatvavāda* than in that of *Kṣaṇikavāda*. A real balance could be maintained only after Advaitavedānta with its advocacy of *Kūṭasthanityatvavāda* — appeared on the scene in full force — but in Haribhadra's time that day was somewhat far off. That is why in Anekāntajayapatāka we have just a passing criticism of *Kūṭasthanityatvavāda* (in chapter II) and repeated criticism of *Kṣaṇikavāda* (in chapters II and VI). Another historical circumstance also deserves consideration in this connection. Dharmakīrtians would conduct a good part of their ontological discussion with the framework of epistemological problems. For instance, they would argue that a particular is real and a universal false inasmuch as perception reveals the former and not the latter. And since Haribhadra takes into consideration this total argument of the Buddhists his third chapter which is devoted to the problem of the general vs. the particular is most often dealing with epistemological matters; (and in spite of its vast bulk the chapter is unbalanced inasmuch as it contains no more than an incidental reference to the view that represents the other extreme, viz. the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view). [In the fourth chapter which is devoted to the problem of describability vs. indescribability the Buddhist case deals with purely epistemological matters the Śabdādvaitavādin's case with epistemological-cum-ontological one].

Keeping this historical background in mind it will be found that the first chapter of Anekāntajayapatākā, even not much big, is of a most fundamental importance. For here Haribhadra first enumerates all the objections in answer to which the six chapters of his text are written and then answers the first objection. This objection relates to the problem of existence vs. non-existence and consists in urging that existence and non-existence cannot characterise a thing at one and the same time. To be sure, this is the most fundamental objection against the doctrine of *Anekāntavāda* and has been treated as such by Haribhadra. Haribhadra's simple answer to it is that a thing exists as a particular substance, as occupying a particular position in space, as lasting for a particular period of time, as possessing a particular set of properties while it does not exist as any other substance, as occupying any other position in space, as lasting for any other period of time, as possessing any other set of properties — which, in turn, means that it is characterised by existence in its former capacity and by non-existence in the latter. Now this sort of formulation the Jaina theoreticians had been making ever since the days of Bhagavatī which had declared that a thing is a 'self' from the standpoint of its own properties and 'not-self' from that of the alien ones and on the face of it it seems to be a trivial formulation. But the new thing about it is that in the age of Logic it led the Jaina theoreticians to propound the general doctrine of what

might be called 'the co-presence of the opposites'. For example, it led them to examine how a thing is both permanent and transient, how it is both general and particular, how it is both describable and indescribable — the three enquiries which Haribhadra respectively undertakes in the second, third and fourth chapters of Anekāntajayapatākā. And these are just three instances for the different authors sought to apply the doctrine in question in different fields and thus enriched it to the extent of their capacity. Not everything that was said in this connection was a profound truth but there is little doubt about the basic soundness of the general approach adopted by the Jainas. For certainly, the idea of the co-presence of the opposites is a highly productive idea in the field of all theoretical research.

(ii) A General Evaluation of the Non-Jaina Philosophical views

In view of what has already been said the fifth chapter of Anekānta jayapatākā alone deserves to be examined under the present head. For the sixth chapter mostly undertakes a refutation of *kṣaṇikavāda* and so can be treated as a continuation of the refutation of the same undertaken in the second chapter. The subject-matter of the fifth chapter is a refutation of *Vijñānavāda*. Here Haribhadra first meets the objection raised by the rival against the existence of atoms and the composite bodies made up of them. In this connection we are enabled to see how the Jaina notions of an atom and a composite body differ from the corresponding Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika notions. Having finished this enquiry Haribhadra undertakes an elaborate refutation of the Vijñānavādins' own world-outlook, that is, idealism.

(B) AKALAṄKA

(i) Defence of the Traditional Jaina philosophical views :

Akalaṅka occupies a very important place among the authors belonging to the age of Logic. As a matter of fact, in a way it was he who was really responsible for the full-fledged advent of this age in the history of Jaina philosophical speculation. For he was the first to have a clear awareness of the rather exacting requirements presented by it. In this age a Jaina author was expected to be well conversant with the contemporary system of Indian philosophy and be in a position to evaluate them, particularly from the standpoint of *Anekāntavāda*. To a greater or lesser extent this was the case with Akalaṅka's predecessors belonging to this age and Haribhadra had come very near accomplishing what Akalaṅka in fact did. For Haribhadra did evaluate, particularly from the standpoint of *Anekāntavāda*, the contemporary non Jaina systems, particularly the Buddhist. But Haribhadra did not realize the significance of the Jainas having their own doctrine of *pramāṇas* that might rival those of Buddhism, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṁsakas, etc. And for an author living in the age Haribhadra did this meant a less

than adequate assessment of the needs of the times. From the fact that Akalanka was followed by a series of brilliant scholars who continued his work whereas Haribhadra was somewhat unfortunate in this respect it can be surmised that the conditions responsible for the unfoldment of the specific tendencies of the age of Logic were riper in the Digambara camp than in the Śvetāmbara. Be that as it may, Akalanka came out not only with an evaluation of the contemporary philosophical systems but also with a doctrine of *pramāṇas* typical of Jainas. He did all this in his commentary called Aṣṭaśatī on Samantabhadra's Āptamīmāṁsā and in his four independent writings, viz. Laghīyastraya (composed of Pramāṇa-nayapraveśa and Pravacanapraveśa), Nyāyaviniścaya, Pramāṇasaṅgraha and Siddhiviniścaya. In these works Akalanka undertook a defence of *Anekāntavāda*, a development of the doctrine of *pramāṇas* and an evaluation of the non-Jaina philosophical views. It will be instructive to learn the details of his performance. But before we do that let us take note of the fact that Akalanka also wrote a commentary called Tattvārtharājavārtika on Umāsvāti's Tattvārthasūtra. Essentially speaking this work belongs to the class of such ones as continued Āgamic activity in the age of Logic. For in spite of its occasional noticing of the non-Jaina philosophical views and its conspicuous tendency to appeal — in season and out of it — to the doctrine of *Anekāntavāda* it is in no way a text representative of the age of Logic. We therefore need not proceed with it any further and it will be enough to record that of Akalanka's writings this alone deserves to be considered under the head 'Defence of the traditional Jaina philosophical views.' In the case of his remaining writings it is not possible to bring any one of them under one of our general heads. Thus Aṣṭaśatī undertakes a defence of *Anekāntavāda* within the framework provided by Samantabhadra in Āptamīmāṁsā while Laghīyastraya, Nyāyaviniścaya and Pramāṇasaṅgraha are devoted to the problems of *pramāṇa*, *naya* and *nikṣepa* — which in essence means the problems of *pramāṇa* as well as *Anekāntavāda*; on the other hand, Siddhiviniścaya undertakes an independent treatment of twelve miscellaneous topics — some ontological, the rest pertaining to *pramāṇa*, *naya*, *nikṣepa*. And in all these writings maximum attempt is made to incidentally evaluate the non-Jaina philosophical views. Yet it should be possible to study the cantent of these writings under our selected heads, viz.

(i) *Anekāntavāda*

(ii) *Pramāṇa*

(iii) On evaluation of the non-Jaina philosophical views

This we propose to do next.

(i) Anekāntavāda

As is to be expected Akalanka's most clear-cut and concentrated enunciation and defence of *Anekāntavāda* occurs in his Aṣṭaśatī. For here he

has been able to express himself in one stretch on some of the most fundamental philosophical views centring around the admission or otherwise of two contradictory features, e. g. existence-and-non-existence, oneness-and-separateness, permanence-and-transience, 'identity between cause and effect, substance and properties, parts and whole' and 'difference between cause and effect, substance and properties, parts and whole'. But even in his other writings he loses no opportunity to criticise various one-sided ontological positions and defend the corresponding Jaina positions. Taken together these discussions of Akalaṅka constitute the first most comprehensive and mature vindication of *Anekāntavāda*; for in them he has taken into consideration the rival positions as actually maintained in the contemporary writings of various non-Jaina schools, particularly Buddhist. And by his time these schools — particularly the Buddhist — had reached almost the acme of perfection. Akalaṅka was particularly bitter against the Buddhist doctrine of *Kṣaṇikavāda* because in his eyes it was a monumental case of one-sided emphasis on transience at the cost of permanence. Similarly, he was critical of the Buddhist contention that no two reals share any feature in common. Then there were certain minor points of dispute — e. g. the Buddhist instance that a substance is nothing apart from its properties, a whole nothing apart from its parts.[22] Of course, on the question of the universal and particulars, the substance and properties, the whole and parts Akalaṅka had to argue not only against the Buddhist one-sidedness but also against its Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas opposite — for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas would submit that a universal is an entity absolutely independent of the particular falling under it, a substance an entity absolutely independent of the properties characterising it, a whole an entity absolutely independent of the parts constituting it.[23] As for Sāṅkhya Akalaṅka felt that it suffered from both one-sided emphasis on permanence and one-sided emphasis on transience inasmuch it on the one hand maintained that the transformations of *Prakṛti* are transitory and on the other that an effect is always present there (that is, it is present there even before and after it appears to be present there)[24]. On the other hand, the doctrine of *Brahma* which, logically speaking, is the polar opposite of the Buddhist doctrine of *Kṣaṇikavāda* does not much engage Akalaṅka's attention even if he at times refers to it in the passing[25], a circumstance that suggests that the doctrine of *Brahma* was not yet the mighty force it later on became. As for Akalaṅka's mode of demonstrating his *anekāntavādī* theses he would usually argue either that perception reveals a thing to be a 'unity of opposites' or that inference does so;[26] (hence the usual occurrence of such a demonstration either in connection with the treatment of perception or in connection with the treatment of inference). Thus in hundred and one ways does Akalaṅka say that what we see all around us is neither change-without-permanence nor permanence-without-change[27]

but change-in-permanence, an essentially sound utterance. Similarly, in hundred and one ways does he argue that causal efficiency is possible neither in a thing that changes without remaining permanent nor in a thing that remains permanent without changing but in a thing that remains permanent while changing,[28] an essentially sound argument.

Then a point of historical interest in connection with Akalaṅka's vindication of *Anekāntavāda*. Akalaṅka has thought fit to devote considerable attention to an elaboration of the traditional doctrines of *naya* and *nikṣepa*. Particularly noteworthy is his treatment of *nayas* in Pravacanapraveśa, Pramāṇanayapraveśa and Siddhiviniścaya, his treatment of *nikṣepas* in Pravacanapraveśa and Siddhiviniścaya[29]. Of course, these treatments are nothing as compared to Akalaṅka's extensively elaborate treatment of *pramāṇas*, but even then they are of utmost value as indicative of the author's link with the past. On the questions of *naya* Akalaṅka says so many important things that are comparable to the corresponding utterances of Siddhasena and Jinabhadra — though on certain minor points he differs from the latter (as the latter differ among themselves). Thus Akalaṅka's usual account of *vyavahāranaya* is different from that of Jinabhadra and his usual account of *naigamanaya* is broader than that of the latter. Moreover, Akalaṅka is more serious than both Siddhasena and Jinabhadra about attributing the different *nayas* — rather different *nayābhāsas* (pseudo-nayas) — to the different non-Jaina philosophical schools. For example, when he puts Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Sāṅkhya schools under *naigamābhāsa*, Brahmavāda under *saṅgrahābhāsa*, Vijñānavāda and Śūnyavāda under *vyavahārābhāsa*, Kṣaṇikavāda under *ṛjusūtrābhāsa* he throws interesting side-lights on his understanding of the *nayas* in question as well as the philosophical schools in question.

(iii) Pramāṇa

On the question of *pramāṇas* Akalaṅka's greatest contribution was his coming out with the idea that following are the six *pramāṇas* according to Jainas : *pratyakṣa, smṛti, pratyabhijñā, tarka, anumāna, āgama*. Of these six *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *āgama* were alreay admitted to be independent *pramāṇas* by so many of the non-Jaina schools but Akalaṅka was the first to accord the status of an independent *pramāṇa* to *smṛti, pratyabhijñā* and *tarka*. The Buddhists had held that neither *smṛti* nor *pratyabhijñā* is a *pramāṇa* while the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and Mīmāṁsakas had retorted that *smṛti* is certainly no *pramāṇa* but *pratyabhijñā* is a case of perception. As for *tarka* the very idea of it was almost unknown to others and the later Jainas stressed the point while finding fault with the rival doctrines of *pramāṇas*. According to Akalaṅka *tarka* is the specific instrument of arriving at *vyāpti* (i. e. the relation of invariable concomitance) and his followers taunted

their rivals that they had no right to speak of inference when they had not developed anything like the Jaina notion of *tarka*. Be that as it may, by his way of putting forth a definite list of *pramāṇas* Akalaṅka gave birth to what might rightly be called the Jaina school of Logic. For this list Akalaṅka was apparently indebted to Umāsvāti who had declared that *mati*, *smṛti*, *sañjñā*, *cintā*, *abhinibodha* are *anarthāntara*. Following the tradition, Umāsvāti had also spoken of *avadhi*, *manaḥparyāya* and *kevala* as three types of extra-sensory perception and he had spoken of *śruta* as scriptural knowledge. Akalaṅka pondered over all this and finally maintained that *mati* stands for sensory (also mental) perception, *avadhi*, *manaḥparyāya* and *kevala* for extra-sensory perception — so that the four together consitute the *pramāṇa* called *pratyakṣa*; again, he retained Umāsvāti's *smṛti*, identified his *sañjñā* with *pratyabhijñā*, his *cintā* with *tarka*, his *abhinibodha* with *anumāna*, his *śruta* with *āgama* and thus arrived at his own above list of six *pramāṇas*. But in the course of his quest Akalaṅka vacillated not a little on certain secondary questions. Thus in Pravacana-praveśa he identified *mati* with *indriya-pratyakṣa*, *avadhi*, *manaḥparyāya* and *kevala* with *atīndriya-pratyakṣa* while *smṛti*, *pratyabhijñā*, *tarka* and *anumāna* with *anindriya-pratyakṣa*; thus *śruta* or *āgama* being the only type of *parokṣajñāna*.[30] This most faulty classification seems to have been the earliest. In Pramāṇanayapraveśa on the other hand Akalanka identified *mati* with *indriya-pratyakṣa* and *anindriya-pratyakṣa*, *avadhi*, *manaḥparyāya* and *kevala* with *atīndriyapratyakṣa*, at the same time maintaining that *smṛti*, *pratyabhijñā*, *tarka* and *anumāna* are *mati* before the employment of words and *śruta* after it;[31] (on *śruta* or *āgama* he here retained his old understanding). This was the better classification than the earlier one. Lastly in Nyāyaviniścaya and Pramāṇasangraha Akalaṅka retained the latter understanding of *indriya-pratyakṣa*, *anindriyapratyakṣa*, *atīndriyapratyakṣa* (and the old understanding of *śruta* or *āgama*) but in the first text he went on to add that *smṛti*, *pratyabhijñāna*, *tarka* and *anumāna* are types of *śrutajñāna*[32], in the second that they are types of *parokṣajñāna*[33] (without further elaborating the point). These two classifications were an improvement on the second — the latter being better. All this was indicative of Akalaṅka's endeavour to equate his six *pramāṇas* with *mati*, *śruta*, *avadhi*, *manaḥparyāya*, *kevala* on the one hand, with *pratyakṣajñāna* and *parokṣajñāna* on the other. The later authors gave up the former part of endeavour and simply maintained that sensory (also mental) perception and the three types of extra-sensory perception are *pratyakṣajñāna* while *smṛti*, *pratyabhijñā*, *tarka*, *anumāna* and *āgama* are *parokṣajñāna*. However, Akalaṅka's treatment of *pramāṇas* as such contains little that is of ontological signification and so it is time we take leave of it.

(iv) A General Evaluation of the non-Jaina Philosophical Views

We have already noted how Akalaṅka while vindicating *Anekāntavāda* took into consideration the rival philosophical views. But even otherwise he

has frequently found occasion to undertake examination of such views. Thus time and again does Akalaṅka criticise Vijñānavāda and Śūnyavāda (usually in the course of his treatment of perception).[34] Similarly, in Siddhiviniścaya in the course of his treatment of *śabda* he twice criticises Sphoṭavāda[35] while here as well as elsewhere he several times criticises Bhūtacaitanyavāda[36]; in Siddhiviniścaya Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrines of God and soul and the Sāṅkhya doctrines of soul and *Prakṛti*[37] are also subjected to an independent criticism. Lastly, Akalaṅka frequently takes exception to the Mīmāṁsaka's defence of *Vedāpauruṣeyatvavāda*[38] and his criticism of *Sarvajñatāvāda*;[39] on his part Akalaṅka seeks to demonstrate that Vedas with no author to compose them are an impossibility while omniscience on the part of a Jaina *tīrthaṅkara* (really, on the part of anyone standing on the eve of *mokṣa*) is a plain possibility.

This summary review of the various facets of Akalaṅka's intellectual performance should enable us to form an idea of his great role in the history of Jaina philosophical speculation. Of course, in so many things that he did he was a pioneer and faced the problems that confront a pioneer. Most noteworthy in this connection was his attempt at creating a Jaina doctrine of *pramāṇas* and certainly he spent the best part of his labour working around this problem. Always keeping Dharmakīrti before his eyes — not only as a rival but also as a model — Akalaṅka succeeded in formulating a body of tenets that well deserve the title 'Jaina Logic'. In all this his predecessors had provided Akalaṅka with no ready-made material to fall back upon; nay, certain positions traditionally maintained on the question created more or less serious difficulties for him, difficulties which he sought to obviate as best he could. Akalaṅka came after Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti and in essence he alone did for the Jainas what they together had done for the Buddhists. But this late arrival on the scene of the father of Jaina Logic was bound to affect the fate of the Jaina camp. Akalaṅka's writings fail not only to be as systematic as is desirable but also to be as comprehensive in scope as is desirable. To be sure, Akalaṅka took note of almost all the serious rivals whom the Jainas of the period faced and he was also correct in choosing the direction from which to attack them, but the resulting engagements were of the nature of skirmishes rather than hard-fought battles. This deficiency of Akalaṅka was made good in an adequate measure by his worthy successor Vidyānanda whom we consider next.

(C) VIDYĀNANDA

(i) A Defence of the Traditional Jaina philosophical views

Vidyānanda is the last of the great Digambara philosophical triad of the age of Logic, his predecessors being Samantabhadra and Akalaṅka.

Samantabhadra had clinched the most crucial point that the Jainas of this age had to elaborate, viz. the all-out importance of *Anekāntavāda* as the central criterion for evaluating the contemporary non-Jaina philosophical systems. He had also offered valuable hints as to the lines on which the systems like Buddhist, Sāṅkhya, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika had to be assailed. But he heardly went beyond offering mere hints. Akalaṅka continued what Samantabhadra had begun and so he was in a position to enter into a larger number of details than was the case with the latter. But even Akalaṅka had his limitations. Moreover, he devoted a good part of his energy to formulating the Jaina doctrine of *pramāṇas*, a doctrine that was to fill up a glaring lacuna vitiating the Jaina thought-world. The result was that even Akalaṅka's was not an all-round battle against possible rivals. The credit for waging such a battle goes to Vidyānanda who had thoroughly mastered both the contemporary systems of philosophy and the legacy left by Akalaṅka. Certainly, in some sense Vidyānanda's Tattvārthaślokavārtika and Aṣṭasahasrī represent the biggest achievement of the Jaina camp in the field of philosophical speculation. But the precise meaning of this statement has to be grasped.

Since long were the Jaina theoreticians comparing and contrasting their own ideological convictions with those of their rivals, but in the beginning the task must have proved pretty uphill. For the entire body of Jaina tenets was couched in a technical terminology that was almost untranslatable into one that would be comprehensive to others. It was in Umāsvātī's Tattvārthasūtra that the problems were for the first time so posed that a comparison of the Jaina solution of them with its non-Jaina counterparts became somewhat easy. But even Umāsvāti can be said to have taken only first steps in this connection. For neither Tattvārthasūtra nor even Umāsvāti's Bhāṣya on it ever enters into a comparison of the Jaina and non-Jaina views. Of course, there seems to have been another tradition which was more thoroughgoing in this matter and which stood culminated in Mallavādī's Nayacakra, but for some reason or other Mallavādī's example could not be followed by his successors and his performance remained something of the nature of an isolated adventure. But it was not entirely so. For the Jainas of the period somehow grew convinced that *Anekāntavāda* was to be their central philosophical tenet and this conviction came out in bolder relief in Mallavādī than in Umāsvāti. Samantabhadra was the real spiritual heir of Mallavādī even if he worked on a much less ambitious scale than the latter. For Samantabhadra busied himself with a basic evaluation of the most important of the contemporary philosophical systems and this was something essentially in the fashion of Mallavādī. But Samantabhadra was much more thorough-going than Mallavādī so far as viewing things from an *anekātanvādī* standpoint was concerned. These two facts taken

together go to prove that Samantabhadra was ready with a better answer than Mallavādī to the theoretical queries of the Jainas of the time. Of course, socio-historical circumstances too must have been playing their role, for otherwise Mallavādī supplemented by Haribhadra, if not the former alone, could have proved to be a good match for Samantabhadra and as a result the brilliant achievements of Akalaṅka and Vidyānanda could have had a Śvetāmbara counterpart. But that was not to be and the real progress in the field of philosophical speculation was now made in the Digambara camp and not in the Śvetāmbara.

Akalaṅka wrote a commentary not only on Āptamīmāṁsā but also on Tattvārthasūtra and that is symptomatic. For this way Akalaṅka sought to meet his rivals not only on the specific ground provided by *Anekāntavāda* but also on a more general one. But Akalaṅka's encounter with the non-Jaina systems in the course of his commentary on Tattvārthasūtra was of a very superficial nature. It was rather in his independent writings mostly devoted to the epistemological problems that Akalaṅka seriously challenged his rivals But even here the ensuing engagement lacked the sweep of a Mallavādī. To be sure, a new Mallavādī appeared not in the form of Akalaṅka but in that of Vidyānanda who wrote a commentary called Tattvārthaślokavārtika on Tattvārthasūtra and a sub-commentary called Aṣṭasahasrī on Akalaṅka's commentary on Āptamīmāmsā. In Aṣṭasahasrī Vidyānanda remained confined to the framework devised by Samantabhadra and scrupulously followed by Akalaṅka, but even here his examination of the rival philosophical views, as also his presentation of the corresponding Jaina views, was extremely thorough. It was, however, in Tattvārthaśloka-vārtika that Vidyānanda so developed his argument that he could do full justice to the multifarious sides of the Jaina vs. non-Jaina duel on philosophical questions. Thus in this text he logically argued — and at length – in support of the traditional Jaina philosophical views, in support of the doctrine of *Anekāntavāda*, in support of the doctrine of *pramāṇas* worked out by Akalaṅka, in each case incidentally coming out with an evaluation of various non-Jaina philosophical views. Of course, there are cases when Vidyānada's incidental reference to a non-Jaina view seems to be farfetched but even here his examination of the view referred to is as searching as elsewhere. But such cases are not very many and on the whole his references to non-Jaina views are strikingly illuminating. For instance, Vidyānanda's commentary on the first aphorism of Umāsvāti is preceded by a long introductory discussion in the course of which the Buddhist, Sāṅkhya and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika views on the question of the supreme religious preaching are examined in details. This part of the discussion throws interesting side-light on the historical circumstance under which the Jaina doctrine of *mokṣamārga* was first formulated. We know that the old Āgamic texts did

not raise the problem of *mokṣamārga* in the manner of Umāsvāti and we know that near about this time of Umāsvāti the Buddhist, Sāṅkhya and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools were disputing among themselves as to the nature of *mokṣamārga*. In this disputation the questions boiled down to determining as to how many and which are the constituents of *mokṣamārga*, a procedure essentially similar to that adopted by Umāsvāti in this connection. Now Umāsvāti himself does not refer to the Buddhist, Sāṅkhya, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika etc. in the course of his discussion on *mokṣamārga* but his commentators like Pūjyapāda and Akalaṅka began to do so. It was however left for Vidyānanda to bring the process to a culminating point by undertaking consideration of the whole question; (to be precise, the present part of Vidyānanda's discussion manages to take into consideration only the Sāṅkhya and Buddhist views on *mokṣamārga* — a rather different aspect of the matter being touched upon in the case of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika[40]). Similarly, in the course of his explanation of the seven *tattvas* Vidyānanda emphasizes that five of them, viz. *bandha, āsrava, saṁvara, nirjarā,* and *mokṣa* are supposed to stand for *bandha* and *bandhakāraṇa, mokṣa* and *mokṣakāraṇa,*[41] an emphasis which again is illuminating. For the tradition of putting together these five elements and them alone is not very old and Vidyānanda's mode of arguing clearly suggests that it was supposed to counterblast to the Buddhist talk of *duḥkha* and *duḥkhahetu, duḥkhanirodha* and *duḥkhanirodhahetu*. Lastly Vidyānanda argues that the Jaina list of seven *tattvas,* viz. the five just mentioned plus *jīva* and *ajīva* represents an all-comprehensive enumeration of the reals which is not the case, say, with the Nyāya list of sixteen *padārthas* or the Vaiśeṣika list of six *padārthas*[42]. This shows that some need formulating a list of a definite number of *tattvas* was felt by way of competing against systems like Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika etc., a circumstance that partly explains why a list like this does not appear in the old Āgamic texts. But let us be clear about one point. Vidyānanda himself would not believe that the doctrines in question originated in the circumstances surmised by us, for he must have been of the view that they are eternal. Again, being a Digambara he would not care to see where the available Āgamic texts stood vis-a-vis these doctrines. But all this does not affect our point; nay, it rather confirms it. For it shows the direction in which a logician of Vidyānanda's calibre would move when looking for the non-Jaina views comparable to the Jaina doctrines in questions. And on the basis of an independent study it can be shown that these views came into existence at a particular period in the history of Indian philosophy; then the absence of the Jaina doctrines in question in the old Āgamic texts would prove that these texts were composed at a period when these non-Jaina views had not yet come iuto existence—at least, at a period when they had not yet attracted the attention of the Jaina theoreticians. Be that as it may, Vidyānanda's Tattvārthaślokavārtika is the maturest and

most comprehensive text useful for undertaking a comparative study of the Jaina and non-Jaina views on the most burning philosophical questions. We know that in its chapters II, V and VIII Tattvārthasūtra mostly presents a defence of the traditional Jaina views and the corresponding parts of Tattvārthaślokavārtika too are on the whole free from controversies against rivals. This is so because such controversies have already been entered into in the course of commenting on the chapter I, for otherwise one can easily imagine how Vidyānanda would have argued against this or that rival in this or that part of these later chapters. But even as they stand these chapters of Tattvārthaślokavārtika deserve serious study. For they are written in a language that a logician of the period — and so also a modern student who specialises in that period — would find most easy to follow; (the process of so putting things had already started in Akalaṅka — to some extent in Pūjyapāda even — but it found its consummation in Vidyānanda). However, Vidyānanda's real services were in the field of *Anekāntavāda*, the doctrine of *pramāṇas* and an evaluation of the non-Jaina philosophical views; and these we take up next.

(ii) Anekāntavāda

Naturally, Vidyānanda's most outstanding treatment of *Anekāntavāda* came in Aṣṭasahasrī. For in this work he undertook a detailed examination of certain one-sided views on certain most burning philosophical questions. And here these views are clearly identifiable as those upheld by certain well-known schools of Indian philosophy. A note-worthy new addition in this connection was the doctrine of *Brahmavāda* which had already been taken note of by Akalaṅka but was subjected to an elaborate criticism for the first time by Vidyānanda. Till the time of Akalaṅka Buddhists were treated as the main rivals by the Jaina scholars and in a way Vidyānanda too continued the tradition. For Buddhism remains the largest single target of his criticism. But Vidyānanda also took into serious consideration his various non-Buddhist rivals. Thus he frequently criticised *Brahmavāda* on the basis of an independent study made of it by himself and almost as frequently pointed out to the Vijñānavādī and Śunyavādī Buddhists that so far as their repudiation of the reality of the empirical world was concerned they were being one with the Brahmavādī Vedāndist.[18] Similarly, his criticism of Sāṅkhya, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṁsā, Śabdādvaitavāda, Tattvopaplavavāda, Bhūtacaitanyavāda was based on a study that was thoroughest possible. All this makes Vidyānanda's studies in *Anekāntavāda* — for the most part preserved in Aṣṭasahasrī — a most solid Jaina contribution to the treasure-house of philosophy. *Anekāntavāda* is a much misunderstood doctrine and its defence at the hands of incompetent persons only makes matters worse. But Vidyānanda's competence was of the higher order and

so his elaboration of the essentials of *Anekāntavāda* deserves serious study by those who harbour genuine misgivings against this typical Jaina philosophical doctrine. Certainly, the doctrine took its rise in the atmosphere surcharged by the Buddist vs. Brahmin controversies as to the nature of change and the ontological status of universals. For these provided two of the most conspicuous fields for the application of Anekāntavāda, fields of which there was little inkling in the old Āgamic texts. Thus it was no regular theme of Āgamic discussions as to what it means when we say that a thing undergoes change or when we say that two things share a feature in common. But in course of time the Buddhists tended to argue that a thing becomes altogether different every next moment and they were criticised by the Brahmanical philosophers like Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and Mīmāṁsakas; similarly these Brahmanical philosophers tended to argue that an universal is an independent entity standing over and above the particulars subsumed under it and they were criticised by the Buddhists. This precisely was the period when the Jainas began to talk of *dravyārthikanaya* and *paryāyārthikanaya* — the former diametrically opposed to Buddhist momentarism, the latter identical with it; similarly this was the period when the doctrine of seven *nayas* was so explained that the first three *nayas* came to mean an advocacy of the mechanical juxtaposition of universals and particulars, an advocacy of the reality of universals at the cost of particulars, an advocacy of the reality of particulars at the cost of universals. Soon afterwards the Buddhist and the various Brahmanical schools were made an independent subject of study and it was shown how this or that from among them represented the standpoint of this or that *naya*. In the begining the result of the endeavour was rather crude but with the passage of time much refinement was introduced therein. And the process of refinement reaches its pinnacle in Vidyānanda who has given us not only a critique of the one-sided views pertaining to the problems like that of change and permanence, that of universals and particulars but also an exposition of the traditional doctrines of *naya* and *nikṣepa*, doctrines which played a significant role in the evolution of *Anekāntavāda*. Vidyānanda's account of *nayas* and *nikṣepas* occurs in his commentary on the relevant aphorisms of Umāsvāti but his critique of the one-sided views in question occurs in both Aṣṭasahasrī and Tattvārthaślokavārtika, for in the latter text too Vidyānanda has so argued his case that occasions for such a critique are created rather frequently. For instance while dealing with the item *sthiti* in the course of his commentary on the aphorism related to the *Anuyogadvāras, nirdeśa, svāmitva* etc. Vidyānanda undertakes a criticism of *Kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda*,[44] in the course of his commentary on the aphorism related to *nikṣepas* he repudiates the Buddhist thesis on universals,[45] while in the course of his commentary on the aphorism related to *pramāṇa* and *naya* he takes exception to Buddhist contention that a composite is nothing over

and above its component parts[40]. And these instances are not isolated, for the whole of Tattvārthaślokavārtika is strewn with criticisms directed against rival philosophical views and good many of them pursue the theme of *Anekāntavāda*.

(iii) Pramāṇa

Umāsvāti's text devotes a good part of its first chapter to the problem of *pramāṇas* and so the corresponding part of Tattvārthaślokavārtika had naturally a lot to say on the question. But the way the discussion is conducted by Vidyānanda is masterly. As a matter of fact, it is this part of Tattvārthaślokavārtika that really enables us to form an idea of the full extent of Akalaṅka's achievements in the field of epistemology. For in this field Akalaṅka himself was ever making experiments, so to say; moreover, he had to use his independent writings on epistemology also for the purpose of undertaking ontological discussion of all sorts . All this resulted in many crucial concepts having remained neglected or but poorly developed in Akalaṅka. But Vidyānanda was in a more favourable position inasmuch as he had Akalaṅka's net findings for his starting point. Thus he ably developed the logic of these findings and gave us a reliable picture of what was soon going to become the doctrine of *pramāṇas* acceptable to whole Jaina camp. Here again he took detailed notice of rival positions related to the questions under consideration. Thus on the question as to what constitutes *pramāṇa* Vidyānanda examined the Buddhist and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika positions, on the question as to how cognition itself is cognised he examined the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṁsā positions; similarly, on the questions of defining *pramāṇa* he examined the Buddhist and Mīmāṁsā positions while on the question of classifying *pramāṇas* he examined the Buddhist, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṁsā positions. Again, he undertook a positive defence of Akalaṅka's list of *pramāṇas* and sought to demonstrate that it alone was free from both omissions and superfluities; similarly, he evaluated the content of each and every *pramāṇas* posited by Akalanka. Certainly, many — if not most — of these questions had been touched upon by Akalaṅka himself but Vidyānanda's treatment of them was extremely elaborate. Of course, Akalaṅka's epistemological texts were commented upon by others before as well as after Vidyānanda; (e. g. Anantavīrya who commented on Siddhiviniścaya came before Vidyānanda, while Prabhācandra who commented on Laghīyastraya and Vādirāja who commented on Nyāya-viniścaya came after him). And yet it is Vidyānanda who deserves to be called *the* commentator of Akalaṅka's epistemological texts even if he formally commented on none of them. For it is his treatment of the problem that deserves to be considered a creative continuation of Akalaṅka's findings. However, since it on the whole falls outside the purview of ontological discussions we proceed with it no further.

(iv) A General Evaluation of the non-Jaina philosophical views

We have already noted that Vidyānanda was a thorough student of the contemporary systems of Indian philosophy. As a matter of fact, what is most conspicuous about his treatment of problems is to a great extent the result of his acquaintance with these systems; (the other factors responsible for it are Vidyānanda's mastery over the traditional Jaina views and his remarkably keen insight). But we have already referred to Vidyānanda's encounter with the rival philosophical views that took place in connection with the elaboration of *Anekāntavāda* and the doctrine of *pramāṇas*. What remains to be spoken of is his miscellaneous evaluation of the rival views. The remarkable thing is that the cases of such miscellaneous evaluation are abundant, not a surprising fact when we keep in mind Vidyānanda's versatility. As has already been hinted, so far as repudiating the reality of the empirical world is concerned Vidyānanda found essential kinship between the Vijñānavādī and Śūnyavādī Buddhists and the Brahmavādī Vedāntists. On numerous occasions he has separately criticised the three views in question and that proves his acquaintance with the niceties exhibited by each. And yet he bracketed them togather for a good reason. Thus while criticising *Vijñānavāda* Vidyānanda argues that a tenet like this, that is, a tenet repudiating the reality of the physical world can be defended only at the expense of all logic and that this makes it a bedfellow of *Śūnyavāda* (and *Tattvopaplavavāda*) with its open aversion for all logic; the argument can easily be extended to cover a system like *Brahmavāda*. Again, Vidyānanda undertakes an elaborate criticism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of God[47] and the Mīmāṃsā doctrine of *Vedāpauruṣeyatvavāda*,[48] two doctrines that were respectively characteristic of the systems in question. At the same time, Vidyānanda undertakes an elaborate defence of the Jaina thesis on the possibility of omniscience,[49] a defence intended to repel the Mīmāṃsaka's criticism on this count. Lastly, Vidyānanda criticises at length the materialist doctrine of *Bhūtacaitanyavāda*[50] which too was a fit target of all these philosophers who believed in the reality of soul, *mokṣa*, etc. As a matter of fact, there is hardly a contemporary philosophical school whose most characteristic philosophical views Vidyānanda does not criticise — and at length — in some part or other of his Tattvārthaślokavārtika; and here lies the lasting value of this text.

With Vidyānanda comes to an end the second stage of Logic and the fact needs being estimated soberly. For Vidyānanda was not only the last representative of the stage in question he was also its most learned representative. Certainly, it is in his writings that this memorable period in the history of Indian philosophy stands reflected in an adequate manner. Those who came before him made way for him and in this sense they did what nobody else did, but it was he who really proved equal to the task of the

hour. However, Vidyānanda was not followed — at least not in immediate future — by authors who surpassed him in sweep or depth of insight. In the Digambara camp there now came Prabhācandra who was a diligent student of Akalaṅka and Vidyānanda and wrote useful commentaries, one on Akalaṅka another on another author. In the Śvetāmbara camp there came Abhayadeva who, making ample use of the material provided by his Digambara predecessors, wrote a commentary on Sanmati; he was followed by Vādideva who, leaning heavily on Prabhācandra and through him on Akalaṅka and Vidyānanda, wrote Syādvādaratnākara. All these authors we will meet in the third stage of the age of Logic and all of them are more or less significant. But none was a genius of the type of Vidyānanda. But even this third stage was to produce a great author who did in his times what Vidyānanda did in his. It was the Śvetāmbara Yaśovijaya, the last name in the age of Logic. The individual achievements of these four authors of the third stage of the age of Logic we propose to study next.

4. THE THIRD STAGE

(A) PRABHĀCANDRA

The post-Vidyānanda phase in the history of Jaina philosophical speculation bears certain specific marks of its own. The Digambaras were now no more in ascendency while the Śvetāmbaras were now once more in ascendency. On the other hand, for Indian philosophy as a whole the era of new creative advance was now almost at an end. The reasons responsible for this complex situation remain to be investigated into, but a few things can be said even now. The gradual collapse of Hindu rule all over the country by Muslim rule was one reason why Indian philosophy as a whole entered the period of relative decline. Another reason for the same must have been the gradual disappearance from the scene of the Buddhists whose ever bolder speculations had since long been providing the Brahmin scholars of all hue with food for thought. Then the specific stimulation that now emerged within the Jaina camp has to be accounted for. Thus in this period the Digambaras who were chiefly concentrated in the southern part of the country gradually grew weaker in face of the opposition, violent and otherwise, they had to encounter from the side of their Hindu rivals. Contrariwise, the Svetāmbaras who were chiefly concentrated in the western part of the country somehow found the current atmosphere more congenial for advance and made significant advance. This explains why the last titan among Digambara philosophers was Vidyānanda but a fairly long stretch of time divides him from Yaśovijaya, the last titan among Śvetāmbara philosophers. Again, this explains why the Digambara Prabhācandra who followed Vidyānada was a lesser author than the latter, also why Abhayadeva who was the first great Śvetāmbara philosopher of the period was followed by Vādideva who was a

greater author than he while Vādideva was followed by Yaśovijaya who was a greater author than both Abhayadeva and Vādideva. Be that as it may, what we call the third stage of the age of Logic in the history of Jaina philosophical speculation produced Prabhācandra among the Digambaras, Abhayadeva, Vādideva and Yaśovijaya among the Śvetāmbaras. We take up these authors one by one.

Prabhācandra is the author of two fairly long commentaries on two fairly important texts. One of these texts is Akalaṅka's Laghīyastraya, the other Māṇikyanandin's Parīkṣāmukha. Now Laghīyastraya, inspite of its title, is a collection of two works which are the earliest among Akalaṅka's independent writings. And as we know Akalaṅka only gradually reached clarity on the questions of epistemology which is the central subject-matter of his independent writings. This means that in the form of Laghīyastraya Prabhācandra had before him a rather raw work on epistemology, even if a work coming from the pen of Akalaṅka. In this respect Parīkṣāmukha was just the opposite of Laghīyastraya, for the former lucidly and systematically summarises Akalaṅka's final epistemological findings as perfected by his followers like Anantavīrya and Vidyānanda. However, the programme of Prabhācandra being what it was this difference in character between two works he chose to comment on was rather immaterial. For he had made it a point to introduce in his commentaries an exhaustive and systematic discussion of the major philosophical issues of his times. And an occasion for such a discussion was not difficult to find out — not only in the Parīkṣāmukha but also in the rather unsystematic Laghīyastraya. The result is that barring exceptions the same questions are discussed in Nyāyakumudacandra, the commentary on Laghīyastraya, and Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa, the commentary on Parīkṣāmukha. Two things are noteworthy in this connection : first, that most of these questions had been discussed also by Vidyānanda; secondly, that Prabhācandra's level of discussion is decidedly less advanced than that of Vidyānanda. Of course, two questions are somewhat new in Prabhācandra. Thus in Nyāyakumudacandra there occurs a detailed refutation of the six Vaiśeṣika *padārthas* and the sixteen Nyāya *padārthas*, the former which is more important being repeated in Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa; (in Vidyānanda such a refutation was just hinted at). Similarly, in both Nyāyakumudacandra and Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa there occurs a detailed treatment of the theories of error maintained by diverse philosophical schools; (Vidyānanda is unfamiliar with this problem). For the rest what Prabhācandra says in connection with his treatment of this or that problem had already been said by Vidyānanda most tersely and precisely and as a matter of fact Prabhācandra's writings should serve as a good introduction to those of Vidyānanda; (Prabhācandra's writings have the advantage that they contain one discussion at one place).

In the body of Prabhācandra's writings the above discussions are loosely joined to what is directly said by way of commenting on the text concerned. This is particularly true of Nyāyakumudacandra which was supposed to throw light on Akalaṅka's difficult (often obscure) utterances but which did not do much of the sort. A glaring example is Prabhācandra's commentary on Akalaṅka's famous verse *'jñānam ādyaṁ matiḥ saṅjñā cintā cābhinibodhikam* etc'. Here *'matiḥ'* was a wrong reading for *'smṛti'*. (Vidyānanda has the correct reading) and yet Prabhācandra had no difficulty in commenting on it and in the course of it in attributing an arbitrary meaning to the phrase *'jñānam ādyam'*.[61] As a matter of fact, the part of Nyāyakumudacandra directly explaining the meaning of Laghīyastraya is a very small part of the whole. Of course, to some extent the same sort of high-handedness was exhibited by Vidyānanda while commenting on Tattvārthasūtra, but then Tattvārthasūtra was after all an old work and on the whole Vidyānanda's comments were true to the spirit of the original text. In any case, Nyāyakumudacandra is to be studied not so much for the sake of light it throws on Akalaṅka's words as for that of the independent philosophical discussions it incorporates. As a matter of fact, this feature distinguishes Nyāyakumudacandra from the commentaries on other works of Akalaṅka composed by other authors. These latter too contain a lot of incidental discussion but it is less systematic; similarly, their authors evince great keenness to get at the meaning of Akalaṅka's words — one reason for it being that the works they commented on were definitely more difficult than Laghīyastraya. As for Parīkṣāmukha its wording was crystal-clear in its import, though in the course of commenting on even it Prabhācandra had to employ some ingenuity while introducing this or that piece of independent philosophical discussions. But that again is not an important point. For Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa is virtually a collection of certain independent philosophical discussions Prabhācandra has chosen to undertake and from that point of view it matters little as to which of them occupies which part of the text.

(B) ABHAYADEVA

Abhayadeva was the first Śvetāmbara author who seriously realised the need for doing something that might stand comparison to the performance of his great Digambara predecessors. The striking point is that the realisation did not occur to an earlier Śvetāmbara author but let us not pursue it further. Abhayadeva in essence did to Siddhasena's Sanmati what Prabhācandra did to Akalaṅka's Laghīyastraya, viz. to use the original text as a pretext for undertaking certain independent philosophical discussions. That is why Abhayadeva, like Prabhācandra, has not much to say by way of explaining the words of the original text. But a difference that obtains between the two cases is worth noting. Akalaṅka was recent author who

had himself done much to mould the thinking of the contemporary Jaina authors interested in philosophical problems. Thus most of the questions that Prabhācandra takes up for discussion had come to the notice of Akalaṅka in practically the same form in which they did to the notice of Prabhācandra. But Siddhasena was a pretty old author to whom philosophical questions did not occur in the same form in which they did to Abhayadeva. As a matter of fact, Abhayadeva broadly shared with Prabhācandra the general framework in which to arrange his philosophical cogitations and yet he chose to express himself by way of commenting on Sanmati. The result is that the distance separating the atmosphere of Sanmatiṭīkā from that of Sanmati is greater than that separating the atmosphere of Nyāyakumudacandra from that of Laghīyastraya. For the rest most of the discussions that occur in Sanmatiṭīkā also do in Nyāyakumudacandra (and Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa) and what remains to be done is to see what new points Abhayadeva raises in connection with them. One thing, however, is noteworthy and that about Abhayadeva's epistemological discussions. At one place Abhayadeva creates an occasion for an elaborate treatment of epistemological problems but here he makes almost no use of Akalaṅka's specific innovations, e. g. his classification of *pramāṇas*. This naturally is a conspicuous difference between Abhayadeva and Prabhācandra, for the latter is a more enthusiastic exponent of Akalaṅka's new contributions in the field of epistemology. Of course, in his criticism of the Buuddist, Nyāya-vaiśesika, Mīmāṁsā and Sāṅkhya positions as also in his defencc of a traditional position such as that the visual sense-organ cognises its object without coming in contact with it Abhayadeva has much in common with Prabhācandra. Abhayadeva concludes his discussion by referring to Gandhahasti (i. e. Siddhasena) whose commentary on the relevant aphorisms of Umāsvāti is supposed to convey all necessary basic information on the subject — thus suggesting that Siddhasena is for him what Akalaṅka is for Prabhācandra[52]. In any case Abhayadeva's Sanmatiṭīkā is the first Śvetāmbara text in which the post-Dharmakīrti philosophical scene of the country is subjected to an extensive survey and criticism from the Jaina standpoint. And that is symptomatic, for it signifies that the Śvetāmbaras were now eager to outcome the lag that separated them from the Digabambaras whose ideas on the subject were most upto date. But even Abhayadeva can be said to have taken only the first step in this direction, even if this step was considerably big. For the author who so argued his case that almost nothing remained to distinguish him from his Digambara camp-followers was Vādideva whom we consider next.

(C) VĀDIDEVA

Vādideva wrote his Syādvādaratnākara consciously and closely imitating Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa of Prabhācandra. As we have noted Prameyakam-

alamārtaṇḍa was a commentary on Parīkṣāmukha which in its turn was a systematic summary in an aphoristic form of the whole of Akalaṅka's teaching on the questions of epistemology. Vādideva himself wrote the corresponding aphorisms, calling them Pramāṇanayatattvāloka, and of course the commentary thereon, calling it Syādvādaratnākara. This stylistic similarity between Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa and Syādvādaratnākara is as significant as was between Nyāyakumudacandra and Sanmatiṭīkā. For it indicates that the Śvetāmbaras were now not content with a piecemeal borrowing of the contemporary Digambara achievements in the field of philosophy. And that is of immense value. For as a result of a performance like that of Vādideva the whole of the Jaina camp could now speak an essentially identical language on the questions of philosophy. Of course Vādideva had studied not only Prabhācandra but also Vidyānanda as is evident from his borrowing of certain discussions directly from Vidyānanda. Moreover, he had made an independent study of important non-Jaina philosophies as is evident from his frequent quoting from them directly. As a result of a close study of Syādvādaratnākara it should be possible to determine as to how far the unique features of this text owe their origin to a reading of Prabhācandra, how far to that of Vidyānanda and how far to that of non-Jaina philosophers. But that will be a secondary piece of research work. For the most striking thing in this connection is the essential identity of the general framework used by Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa and Syādvādaratnākara for arranging their respective materials. And not only that, even the materials in question are essentially identical. The result was that from now onwards there was going to be no discrepancy between a Śvetāmbara author and his Digambara counter-part so far as their consideration of the contemporary philosophical problems was concerned. As has already been hinted now was the period when the Digambaras were a comparatively declining sub-sect of the Jainas while the Śvetāmbaras a comparatively rising sub-sect. Hence Vādideva's wholesale borrowing of the Digambara philosophical achievements opened the possibility of their enrichment in an atmosphere that was congenial for such an enrichment. This was more or less evident in the case of all Śvetāmbara authors coming after Vādideva but it was most evident in that of Yaśovijaya, the last of them. For through a mere study of Syādvādaratnākara Yaśovijaya was in a position to get at whatever there was of value in the Digambara masterpieces of the preceding centuries. Of course Yaśovijaya was not content with just what Syādvādaratnākara provided him. For he also made an independent and thorough study of the pre-Vādideva Śvetāmbara authors, the series going as far back as the author of Anuyogadvārasūtra. This enabled him to incorporate in his writings a discussion of even such questions as were important and were discussed in early texts but were absent in Syādvādaratnākara simply because the Digambaras had no tradition of taking them up. But all this is a different matter. For what

is to be noted is the great role of Syādvādaratnākara as the first Śvetāmbara masterpiece to assimilate all that was of value in the philosophical discussions of the Digambaras of the preceding few centuries.

(D) YAŚOVIJAYA

Yaśovijaya is the last great author of the third stage of the age of Logic and with him ends the history of Jaina philosophical speculation. For he belonged to the 17th-18th Centuries and he was followed by no great author till our times when modern Jaina scholars with a new situation to face appeared on the scene. Now circumstances so developed that Yaśovijaya was in a position to do full justice to the theoretical problems faced by the Jainas in his times. For one thing he was born among the Śvetāmbaras who were a sub-sect of the Jainas that was then on comparative ascendancy. As a result Yaśovijaya felt enthused enough to master in their entirety the philosophical problems of his age. A most conspicuous new phenomena of this age was Navya-Nyāya and Yaśovijaya thoroughly acquainted himself with it. Another new phenomenon was the marked success of the Śaṅkarite school of *Brahmavāda* and Yaśovijaya thought worth while to grasp the logic of its positions as well. The Buddhists were now physically absent from the scene but the Jainas had a rich tradition of arguing against them; this tradition which stood finally expressed in Syādvādaratnākara was available to Yaśovijaya and he made a diligent study of it. As for Sāṅkhya it was a spent force since long but Yaśovijaya was in intelligent possession of whatever Jaina tradition there was of criticising the tenets upheld by this very old Brahmanical school of philosophy. Finally, the Mīmāṁsakas were there in the field with their dogmatic and philosophical positions which they had been defending since pretty long time; Yaśovijaya was adequately conversant with these as well. Of course, it goes without saying that Yaśovijaya had studied all the great Śvetāmbara authors from the oldest down to the latest, also the most important from among the great Digambara authors. Yaśovijaya's writings, huge in number and most diverse in content, are a standing testimony to this multi-faced character of his intellectual equipment. Added to it be the fact that he himself possessed an extremely sharp mind which could easily pick out essentials from among a mass of sundry details. All this makes his argument in support of the Jaina case an immensely profound and highly illuminating performance. We have already decided to concentrate our attention on three of his writings devoted to the problems of *Anekāntavāda*, viz. Nayarahasya, Anekāntavyavasthā and Nayopadeśa and two of them devoted to the epistemological problems, Tarkabhāṣā and Jñānabindu. For students of Jaina ontology the former set of texts is much more useful than the latter and we take that first.

In the course of his defence of *Anekāntavāda* Yaśovijaya heavily depends on the old texts like Anuyogadvāra, Āvaśyakaniryukti, Tattvārthasūtra (sabhāṣya,) Sanmati and Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya, to a considerable extent also on Sanmatiṭīkā and Syādvādaratnākara. As a matter of fact, his one endeavour is to offer such an account of *naya*, *nikṣepa* and *saptabhaṅgī* as should be consistent not only with itself but also with the texts in question taken together. The project was certainly ambitious inasmuch as these texts were composed by authors equipped with different intellectual capacities and living under different conditions. Naturally, therefore, Yaśovijaya had his moments of doubt and vacillation but on the whole he managed to fulfil his ambition to a much greater extent than a lesser author could have done. For instance, Anuyogadvāra gave him an account of *nayas* in which a succeeding *naya* was conceived as somehow more refined than the preceding one but this account was not formulated in terms of the doctrine of universals and particulars; on the other hand, Sanmati and Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya (particularly the latter) would categorise *nayas* on the basis of their stand on the question of universals and particulars. Yaśovijaya did his best to combine into one the essentials of these two rather mutually divergent accounts Thus according to an example cited in Anuyogadvāra the *naigamanaya* gives the name '*prasthaka*' to a *prasthaka* as it stands while the *saṅgrahanaya* gives this name to it only when it is actually undertaking measurement-of-grain (this being the specific function of a *prasthaka*); on the other hand, Viśesāvaśyakabhāsya argues that the *naigamanaya* posits the reality of both universals and particulars while the *saṅgrahanaya* posits the reality of universals at the cost of particulars. Keeping all this in mind Yaśovijaya suggests that the essence of *saṅgraha* lies in the renunciation of particulars or in the renunciation of 'lack of refinement',[53] the former alternative doing justice to the Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya account, the latter to the Anuyogadvāra account Again, the doctrine of *Saptabhaṅgī* was available to Yaśovijaya in two versions — in the version of Sanmati directly and in that of Āptamīmāṁsā through Syādvādaratnākara. In his treatment of the question, therefore, he usually follows the first version while frequent enough also lending support to the second.[54] As a matter of fact, through Syādvādaratnākara Yaśovijaya came in contact with many notions which were current only among the Digambaras, but by treating this text as basically authoritative Yaśovijaya gave these notions a due place in his repository of ideas that was otherwise for the most part drawn from the Śvetāmbara sources. For instance, the Syādvādaratnākara account of *naigamanaya* is based on Vidyānanda's account of it given in Tattvārthaślokavārtika but no earlier Śvetāmbara text is familiar with the same; Yaśovijaya was in a good position to make use of this account along with the corresponding account available to him from old Śvetāmbara texts.[55] As for the Digambara notions

not come down to him through Syādvādaratnākara Yaśovijaya was often critical of them. For instance, he frequently criticises Kundakunda's distinction between *vyavahāranaya* and *niścayanaya* as applied to the account of soul.[56] Thus Kundakunda argues that from the standpoint of *niścayanaya* only that soul is to be called *jīva* which possesses just the most essential property of soul, viz. congnitive capacity; this means that according to him only a released soul is to be called *jīva* from the standpoint of *niścayanaya*. On the other hand Yaśovijaya argues that from the standpoint of *niścayanaya* only that soul is to be called *jīva* which is leading an embodied life; this means that according to him only an embodied soul is to be called *jīva* from the standpoint of *niścayanaya*. Both positions have logic in their support but the noteworthy thing is that Yaśovijaya criticises Kundakunda because the latter was supported by no Śvetāmbara author. Be that as it may, Yaśovijaya's treatment of *naya*, *nikṣepa* and *saptabhaṅgī* is a most welcome aid to the study of the old Śvetāmbara authors' treatment of the same. However, Yaśovijaya was not only a faithful reporter of the past, he was also a creative interpreter of this past in the light of the current situation. And the current situation being powerfully moulded by the thought-currents emanating from the Navya-Nyāya and Advaita Vedānta circles. This means that among the Jainas only an author as well equipped as Yaśovijaya was in a position to cope with the tasks of the hour. Yaśovijaya could at once see where the Jaina notions coincided — rather tended to do so — with certain Navya-Nyāya and Advaita Vedānta notions and he would never be slow to point it out in a language that was always pointed and precise. For example, it was an old Jaina position that a thing exists from the standpoint of its own properties while it does not exist from the standpoint of the alien properties. This was an odd sounding position but it constituted the heart of the *Anekāntavāda* doctrine and so the generations of Jaina scholars defended it as best they could. But in Navya-Nyāya circles a position similar to the present one began to be maintained. Thus they would speak of 'a thing's absence "limited" by a property not belonging to it,' e.g. 'a jar's absence "limited" by cloth-ness (*paṭatvāvadhikaghaṭābhāva*)'; and it was given out that such an absence of a thing exists even at a place where the thing itself exists. Yaśovijaya aptly pointed out that this amounted to endorsing the Jaina position that a thing as viewed from the standpoint of the alien properties does not exist (i. e. is absent) even at a place where it is seen to exist, it being the case that at this place it exists only as viewed from the standpoint of its own properties.[57] And there were other such cases, though not of such basic importance. For instance the Navyanaiyāyikas would argue that variegated colour is a type *sui generis* and not just a mechanical juxtaposition of the constituent colours; Yaśovijaya pointed out that in a similar fashion the unity of opposites spoken of by the Jaina is a type *sui generis* and not just a mechanical

juxtaposition of the opposites concerned.[58] As a matter of fact, a close observer could not fail to see that there was some sort of basic similarity between the Jaina's traditional preoccupation with the problem of 'standpoint' and the Navyanaiyāyika's current preoccupation with the problem of '*avacchedakatā*'; both were meant to ensure that no ambiguities remain attached to what one says. Of course, in both cases one might feel that the thinkers concerned are being rather unduly cautious but that they are evincing an identical attitude is unmistakable. In any case, Yaśovijaya was as thorough a student of Navya-nyāya as that of the traditional Jaina positions and this one fact is sufficient to make his treatment of *Anekāntavāda* unique performance. Moreover, this treatment based as it is on texts as old as Anuyogadvāra is important also from the standpoint of historical evolution. Nor that there are no cases when one feels that even Yaśovijaya has failed to get at the meaning of an old text-passage; but such cases are not very many and even here it is almost always difficult to suggest a more plausible alternative to what Yaśovijaya says[59]. Again, it is not the case that Yaśovijaya himself sees things in a correct historical perspective but that is a different question. Take for example, his treatment of that intriguing Āvaśyakaniryukti statement according to which the doctrine of *nayas* was well applicable in olden days when scriptural texts were not classified subjectwise but it is not so applicable now (at the most the first three *nayas* are applicable now) after Āryarakṣita has executed such a classification. Yaśovijaya dilates upon this point in the course of emphasising the subtlety of the *naya* doctrine and his thesis is that in olden days the students of scriptural texts were intelligent enough to follow the standpoint of all the seven *nayas* but that they are now too dull to do that (at the most they can now follow the standpoint of the first three *nayas* which are not as subtle as the remaining four).[60] To historically minded student of Jaina philosophy Yaśovijaya's thesis will make just no sense. But then it will perhaps be too much to expect in an old Indian author — even in an author as recent as Yaśovijaya — a due sense of historical perspective. Nevertheless, Yaśovijaya will be our best guide in grasping the logic of a Jaina philosophical position. However, here again there is a snag. For Yaśovijaya's discussions are most often replete with the technical terminology of Navya-nyāya, a terminology not easy to master. But fortunately, Nayarahasya, Anekāntavyavasthā (minus the portion dealing with Vaiśeṣika), Nayopadeśa (plus some part of its auto-commentary called Nayāmṛtataraṅgiṇī) are all relatively free from Navyanyāya terminology; (it is the Anekāntavyavasthā part dealing with Vaiśeṣika and a large part of Nayāmṛtataraṅgiṇī which are incomprehensible without an adequate grounding in Navyanyāya terminology). Anekāntavyavasthā contains not only a discussion of *naya*, *nikṣepa* and *saptabhaṅgī* but also a connected critique of the Vaiśeṣika, Advaita-vedānta, Sāṅkhya and Buddhist standpoints respectively exemplify

the *naigama, saṅgraha, vyavahāra* and *ṛjusūtra nayas*. In Nayāmṛtataraṅgiṇī we get a connected critique of Advaita-vedānta alone[61] but on a number of questions — more or less fundamental — the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika positions have been here examined in details; (even momentarism, the basic Buddhist doctrine, here comes in for criticism at due place).[62] It is these incidental — but in their own way important and in any case most elaborate — discussions that constitute the most difficult part of Nayāmṛtataraṅgiṇī and this means that even this text in the parts directly explanatory of the original is comparatively easy of comprehension A thorough perusal of these texts should go a long way towards dispelling much misconception that prevails regarding Jaina philosophy in general and the doctrine of *Anekāntavāda* in particular.

As has alreday been hinted, Tarkabhāṣā and Jñānabindu, Yaśovijaya's writings on epistemology, do not contain much that has a decisive bearing on ontological questions. For these texts are devoted to a specific discussion of the problems of epistemology and logic. Only we have to note that in Tarkabhāṣā Yaśovijaya so develops his argument that he has been able to incorporate in it not only what Akalaṅka has said in this connection but also what Jinabhadra has said. Moreover, along with *pramāṇa* this text also deals with *naya* and *nikṣepa*, and these latter two topics are definitely a part of the discussion on *Anekāntavāda*. In Jñānabindu, on the other hand, the epistemological problems have been dealt with exclusively on the model of Jinabhadra. But even here we get a brief incidental discussion of *prāmāṇasvatastvaparatastva*[63] and a detailed incidental critique of certain positions maintained by Advaitavedānta[64], a performance that is independently Yaśovijaya's own. Finally, in this text Yaśovijaya discusses a problem on which Jinabhadra and Siddhasena take two diametrically opposite positions, viz. the problem whether *kevalajñāna* and *kevaladarśana* proceed simultaneously or alternately. The noteworthy point is that Yaśovijaya here undertakes a detailed defence of Siddhasena's side of the case, without at all considering Jinabhadra's point of view[65].

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APPENDIX I

A NOTE ON STHĀNĀṄGA AND SAMAVĀYĀṄGA SŪTRA

Sthānāṅga and Samavāyāṅga are respectively counted as the third and fourth Aṅga-texts and hence are two of the most authoritative texts laying down the fundamentals of Jaina doctrine. However, barring negligible exception these texts discuss no problems but simply narrate as to what things are one in number, what things are two in number and so on and so forth, Sthānāṅga taking within its purview the numbers one to ten and Samavāyāṅga the numbers one to one *koṭikoṭisāgaropama* (hence a slight repetition of the former's subject-matter in the latter). Now as things stood it was always possible and most easy to insert new material in the body of these texts and so the fact that a doctrine has found mention here is no proof that it is as old as some other standing nearby. (As for the concluding portion of Samavāyāṅga coming after the number one *koṭikoṭisāgaropama* has been dealt with it does not even fit within the general framework of the text and is thoroughly miscellaneous)

What seems to have happened is that the tradition of grouping things according to their number began early enough, so early as to justify the inclusion of two texts devoted to the problem among the eleven (or twelve) treated as most authoritative. And certainly texts like these were meant for an advanced student's use who would test with their help whether and how far he had been able to master the problems of doctrine. Veiwed in this capacity our texts must have been of no mean value. But they are important even otherwise. For the very fact that these texts have been able to carry out their specific task rather well speaks enough for the systematic character of the doctrines they were out to summarise. Thus they tell us most vital things about the Jaina view on the problems of the philosophy, ethics and mythology, (by the way, on those of astronomy, physiology, medicine and general culture). Indeed by the time these texts were finally compiled the Jainas had come to espouse certain very definite notions as to the problems in question and here we have these notions in a nut-shell. However, all this notwithstanding it will be pointless to base on these texts a study of how these notions evolved in the course of time.

What has to be done is to make an independent study of how the Jaina doctrinal views evolved historically and then see if Sthānāṅga and Samavāyāṅga throw some side-light on the same. Thus if certain views are proved to be a later growth and find mention here it will be possible to locate on the time-scale the relevant text-portions; similarly, if such views find no mention here the fact will again be of value though from a different angle.

Take for example, the case of fourteen *jīvasthānas*, fourteen *guṇasthānas*, fourteen (or twenty) *mārgaṇāsthānas*. In Samavāyāṅga fourteen *jīvasthānas* are mentioned under the title *bhūtagrāma*, fourteen *guṇasthānas* under an obscure longish title while fourteen or (twenty) *mārgaṇāsthānas* are not mentioned at all. Again, the seven alternatives of the *Saptabhaṅgī* doctrine are mentioned neither in Sthānāṅga nor in Samavāyāṅga; similarly, while seven *nayas* are mentioned in Sthānāṅga, four *nikṣepas* are mentioned neither in Sthānāṅga nor in Samavāyāṅg. Lastly in the case of comparatively large numbers Samavāyāṅga often refers to the *karmas* whose *bandha* takes place in this or that *guṇasthāna* and this pre-supposes the application of the doctrine of *karma-bandha* not only to the basic karma-types but also to their sub-types. These and such facts have to be studied carefully and legitimate conclusions drawn therefrom.

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APPENDIX II

A NOTE ON THE ĀGAMIC ACTIVITY CARRIED ON IN THE AGE OF LOGIC

As we shall see, the main tendency of the age of Logic was considerably different from that of the age of Āgamas but some sort of Āgamic activity was carried on even in the age of Logic. For one thing, a series of authors beginning from Haribhadra and coming upto Abhayadeva, Malayagiri, Maladhāri Hemacandra wrote Sanskrit commentaries on the Āgamic texts. These authors invariably and admittedly fell back upon the old Prakrit commentaries available to them, from which they often qoute more or less lengthy passages. Thus they sought to remain loyal not only to the original words of the old Āgamic texts but also to the words of the old Prakrit commentaries. But these Āgamic texts and these Prakrit commentaries belonged to two different stages of doctrinal evolution while the Sanskrit commentators themselves belonged to a third such stage. This fact has to be clearly kept in mind by a modern student if he is not to lose sight of historical perspectives. And to make his task easy, some important Prakrit commentaries on the Āgamic texts are available in full. We have already taken note of Āvaśyakaniryukti and Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya; but there are other Niryuktis and there are other Cūrṇis from which those related to the philosophically important Āgamic texts have to be selected and made use of. The Digambaras naturally had no Āgmic text to comment on but they did justice to Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama and Kaṣāyaprābhṛta by writing on them those three commentaries mentioned earlier (one on the former two on the latter); Yativṛṣabha's commentary is in pure Prakrit but Vīrasena and Jinasen while mainly employing Prakrit occasionally resort to Sanskrit. This was the chief Āgamic activity carried on in the age of Logic. But to the same category belongs the tendency to compose Karma-texts. Within the Śvetāmbara camp the karma doctrine was fully developed and systematised in Śivaśarmasūri's Śataka and Karmaprakṛti and some anonymous author's Saptatikā but the high water-mark of the endeavour came in Candrarṣi's Pañcasaṅgraha whose study renders superfluous a study of its three predecessors. And the character of Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama and Kaṣāyaprābhṛta being what it is the Digambara counterpart of Pañcasaṅgraha are those three commentaries on these very texts. What was written after Pañcasaṅgraha in the Śvetāmbara camp and after the commentaries in question in the Digambara is of the natuare of school-boy's text-books. With Śvetāmbaras they are what they call four old Karmagranthas (by four different authors) and what they call five new Karmagranths (by Devendrasūri); with the Digambaras they are Nemicandra's Gommaṭasāra, Amitagati's Sanskrit Pañcasaṅgraha. This whole Karma literature too has to be consulted and made use of.

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APPENDIX III

THE LOGIC OF ANEKĀNTAVĀDA, ITS APPLICATION AND A PARALLEL WITH HEGEL

The most specific and important philosophical contribution of the Jaina authors belonging to the age of Logic is their doctrine of *Anekāntavāda*. It will therefore be useful if we have at our disposal a clear idea of the logic lying at the basis of this doctrine. To put it in a nutshell *Anekāntavāda* consists in maintaining that everything is characterised by mutually contradictory properties But this thesis unless amplified is bound to give rise to misgivings. So let us attempt an amplification.

When we say that a thing S is characterised by property P what we really mean is that this thing is characterised by this property under certain specific conditions; now this logically entails the corollary that the thing in question is *not* characterised by the property in question when placed outside the conditions in question. This gives us the quintessence of the logic of *Anekāntavāda*. Here all that we need to be convinced of is that a thing is characterised by a property only under certain specific conditions. The conviction is easier for certain persons than for others but it should be impossible for none. Really, to say that a thing is characterised by a property P is to say that it behaves in a particular fashion when placed under certain specific conditions. And to say that a thing behaves in a particular fashion when placed under certain specific conditions is *equivalent* to saying that it does not behave in this fashion when placed outside these conditions; but the two statements are not *identical*. The statements are *equivalent* because whenever the first is true the second also is true, but they are not *identical* because they describe different aspects of the situation.

To conclude, there is a perfect sense in which the statements 'S is P' and 'S is not-P' are both true, moreover, the information conveyed by one of these statements is different from that conveyed by the other. That is to say, what *Anekāntavāda* upholds is neither something self-contradictory nor something self-repetetive.

This basic logic of *Anekāntavāda* was applied by the Jaina authors to the most burning philosophical questions of the age and the result was certain important corollaries that constitute the major and most important part of literature devoted to *Anekāntavāda*. These questions related to the following five problems.

(i) that of change and permanence
(ii) that of similarity and dissimilarty

(iii) that of identity and difference between a substance and its properties

(v) that of identity and difference between a cause and its effect

In relation to each of these problems two mutually opposed extreme positions were actually maintained by certain historically evolved schools of Indian philosophy. But the Jaina authors were not so much bound to consider the historicity of a position like that. For convinced of the validity af the basic logic of *Anekāntavāda* they could at once proceed to examine the specific conditions under which this position was tenable. For instance, on the question of change and permanence one extreme position was maintained by the Buddhists and it was done early enough; on the other hand, the other extreme position was maintained by the Advaita Vedāntist and it was done late enough. Yet since very beginning the Jaina authors were placing forward cansiderations that would define the conditions under which these two extreme positions would have been one like that maintained by the Buddhists and the other like that maintained by the Advita Vedāntists. Yet historically speaking the parties in dispute here were the Buddhists on the one hand and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas (and Mīmāṁsakas) on the other. Hence so far as the question of recognising the reality of similarity was concerned the Jainas sided with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas (and Mīmāṁsakas) as against the Buddhists but they criticised the former themselves for maintaining that the factor reponsible for similarity is something over and above the things similar. Thus this controversy got related to that which was being waged around the question of identity and difference between a substance and its properties. For the Jainas argued that the factor resposible for similarity is but a property of the things similar and therefore identical with as well as different from these things, just as each and every property of these things is identical with as wells as different from these things. On the broader question of properties in general the two extreme positions were again those of the Buddhist and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, for the former maintained that the properties of a substance are nothing over and above this substance and the latter that they are something over and above it. Here the Jainas actually developed their position in the light of these historically developed positions. The same was the case with the controversy waged around the question of identity and difference between a whole and its part — for here again the Buddhists maintained that a whole is nothing over and above its parts and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas that it is something over and above them. The question of cause and effect could be viewed in two ways. In one case the parts could be treated as the cause of the whole they go to constitute, and in this case the question of cause and effect would reduce itself to the earlier question of whole and parts. In the other case an effect could be treated as something immediately following its cause and

the Buddhist would maintain that an effect thus understood is absolutely different from its cause. The position opposed to it will be that an effect thus understood is absolutely identical with its cause but such a position will be logically committed to repudiate the reality of temporal succession itself. Now Advaita Vedānta will answer this description all right and so the controversy in question viewed in this light will reduce itself to that waged around the question of change and permanence. Be that as it may, the Jaina discussion on these so many questions has to be studied on the one hand in the light of logical possibilities open in each case and on the other hand in the light of the historical realities evolved in each case.

The situation which thus prevailed in the Jaina camp in the age of Logic bears, in certain important respects, a striking resemblance to the Hegelian phenomenon of European philosophy. Hegel made familiar the idea that in ways numerous things of the world harbour within their bosom elements that are mutually contradictory This is the root thesis of the celebrated Hegelian dialectics. In his Logic Hegel sought to demonstrate how all the basic categories of human thought involve a synthesis of mutually contradictory aspects. In this connection his procedure was to "deduce" a higher category from the lower ones and thus to show that the former united within its content mutually contradictory aspects derived from the latter. The validity of the details of Hegel's performance is open to grave doubt but in any case he has been able to say a good number of illuminating things about some of the most important categories of human thought. The student of Jainism should find particularly interesting Hegel's treatment of the following categories .

1 Being (which comprises 'being', 'not-bing' and 'becoming)
2 Determinate Being
3 Being-for-self
4 Identity and Difference (which includes 'likeness and unlikeness')
5 Existence
6 Thing (which includes 'the thing and its properties')
7 Relation (which includes 'the whole and the parts')
8 Substance and Accidents
9 Cause and Effect
10 Reciprocity

Here the categories 1-3 belong to the sub-section 'Quality' of the section 'Being'; similarly the categories 4-6 belong to the sub-section 'Essence as the Ground of Existence', 7 to the sub-section 'Appearance' and 8-10 to the sub-section 'Actuality' of the section 'Essence'. Also interesting is Hegel's

attempt to interpret the historically evolved systems of European philosophy in terms of the categories formulated by him in his Logic. Here again his procedure was somewhat akin to that of the Jainas, for he considered himself to stand in relation to the systems in question almost exactly as the Jainas considered themselves to stand in relation to the historically evolved systems of Indian philosophy. In both cases it often happened that history did not produce — or did not produce in time what logic needed. For instance, in Hegel's eyes 'becoming' was a more complete category than 'being' and yet Hereclitus, the representative of the former category, came earlier than Parmenides, the representative of the latter; (it was something like Advaitavedānta not appearing on the scene simultaneously with Sautrāntika Buddhism).

* * *

ANNOTATIONS

[Numbers given in brackets refer to pages]

(Chapter I & II)

1 (8) As will be evident soon, the evaluation of the contents of Tattvārthasūtra here sketched is crucial for the views propounded in the present essay. As such, elements of it will appear now and then throughout the enquiry and the reader is advised to take special note of them. Almost all the question here raised (minus the one on *anuyogadvāra*) are once more discussed on pp. 21-30, the question of *anuyogadvāra* having already been disposed of on pp. 14-17.

2 (14) Really speaking, these three lists are well known only to those students of Jainism who have taken special interest in what is called the Jaina Karma literature. For it is here that a basic use has been made of these lists. The present essay itself evinces only general interst in Karma literature but the lists in question are here mentioned because they represent the most outstanding case of formulating such standardised lists. Even then the reader will get some additional information about *mārgaṇāsthānas* on pp. 51-52, about *jīvasthānas* on pp. 50-51, about *guṇasthānas* on p. 30,

3 (14) 257 b

4 (15) The reference is here to the list used by Vīrasena in the post-script to his commentary on Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama-Jīvakhaṇḍa-Satpada (II volume of the printed text in sixteen volumes) — also by Nemicandra in his Gommaṭasāra-Jīvakāṇḍa,

5 (15) 328 b

6 (15) 852 b

7 (15) 1599 a

8 (15) 291 a; also elsewhere.

9 (16) 383 b

10 (16) Really speaking, an account of *kāyasthiti* implies an account of *antara* only in those cases where the thing described is divided into just two classes, for then *kāyasthiti* of one is *antara* of the other. Hence it is that an explicit recognition of the problem of *antara* and its application to the cases of things with more than two classes is a more advanced stage of speculation — to be met with in Jīvājīvābhigama rather than Prajñāpanā.

11 (18) 80 b, 95 b

12 (19) 571 a

13 (20) 723 b, 777 a

14 (21) 66 a

15 (21) In this connection the Bhagavatī passage occurring on pp. 418b-419a is also worth noting. For here the question is raised about the eligibility to attain *mokṣa* in the case of persons who exercise superior, medium or inferior *jñāna*, *darśana* or *cāritra*. But the interesting point is that for each the range of possibilities here extends from so many heavenly (or human) births upto the attainment of *mokṣa*. The passage must have been composed at a time when the doctrine of triple *mokṣamārga* was already formulated but it was not sharply demarketed from the doctrines of heavenly births etc.

16 (21) 54 b

17 (21) Thus Sūtrakṛtāṅga 2·5 and Aupapātikasūtra 34 enumerate entities whose existence is to be believed in and both catalogues contain all the items enumerated in the list of nine *tattvas*. Similarly, Sūtrakṛtāṅga 2.2 and Bhagavatī 134b enumerate entities whose existence a community of the faithful believed in and both catalogues again contain all the items enumerated in the list of nine *tattvas*. The fact that all these catalogues contain all the items enumerated in the list of nine *tattvas* and yet add certain more to them proves that the list in question had not yet assumed a special status.

18 (22) 221 b

19 (22) 179 a

20 (22) Sūtras 1 and 144

21 (22) Sūtras 2-5 and 24

22 (22) 216 a, 223 b

23 (22) 342 a

24 (23) 191a, 433 a, 517 a, 552 a

25 (23) 657 a, 754 b

26 (25) Even saying that the properties of a substance must be transitory — not momentary — would not obviate the difficulty, for then one might well ask as to why it should be so. And in any case, there remains the question as to what is meant by the statement that everything is eternal from the standpoint of substance. Not that even this puzzling question cannot be answered. But the fact that this and the allied questions are not discussed in any old Āgamic text suggests that they came to the forefront rather late. Be that as it may, the doctrine of seven *nayas* is conspicuous by its absence in the old Āgamic texts.

27 (26) 592 b

28 (26) Sūtras 76 and 92

29 (27) 324 a
30 (27) 750 b
31 (28) 717 b
32 (30) 430 a–437a
33 (33) 248 a
34 (33) 78 b
35 (33) 80 b
36 (33) 81 a
37 (33) 81 b
38 (34) *"eyaṁsi.........cakkiyā kei āsaittae vā ciṭṭhittae vā nisiittie vā tuiṭṭittie vā"* — 615 b
39 (34) 608 a
40 (34) 608 a
41 (35) Really, these are two consecutive passages (609 a, 613 a) — each containing an assertion of the type in question.
42 (35) 232 b
43 (35) 754 b
44 (35) 748 b
45 (35) Ibid
46 (35) *"je davvao sapadese se khettao siya sapadese siya apadese"* — 240 b.
47 (36) E. g. 233 a, 233 b, 420 b
48 (36) 561 a
49 (36) 778 a
50 (36) Numerous Bhagavatī passages refer - in passing or in details — to the phenomena of nourishment and breathing. E. g. 19 a, 23 a, 24 b, 26 a, 39 a, 84 b, 109 a, 109 b, 252 b, 299 b, 491 b, 604 b, 616 b, 719 b, 743 b.
51 (36) 621 a, 622 b
52 (36) For most comprehensive list of physical (= bodily) functions see 608 b, 856 a.
53 (37) 109 a, 762 b, 59 b
54 (37) E. g *uvaogalakkhaṇe ṇaṁ jīve* — i.e. cognition is the essential characteristic of a soul — 149 a.
55 (38) Eor both *'vaireṇa spṛṣṭaḥ'* and *'kriyayā spṛṣṭaḥ'*.
56 (38) E. g 13 a, 16 b, 24 b, 25 b, 26 a, 34 a, 52 a, 53 a, 57 b, 79 b, 82 b, 101 b, 250 a, 253 a, 556 a, 655 a, 701 b, 704 b, 767 b.
57 (38) Really, the passage in question offers the strongest support to the supposition that the details of the Karma doctrine as worked out in the later Karma-texts took some time to get finalised. But to enter into a discussion of these details lies outside the purview of the present essay,

58 (39) For the essentials of the doctrine of *dravya-, kṣetra-, kāla-, bhāva-pradeśa* see 240 a. Additional clarification on certain points can be had from 609 a and 613 b (already referred to in connection with the treatment of time). But the doctrine is pre-supposed in a good number of other passages as well.

59 (41) 928 b

60 (42) 708 b

61 (42) The Jaina theoreticians have devised a special system of enumeration. Its basic units are *saṁkhyāta, asaṁkhyāta* and *ananta*. *Saṁkhyāta* covers the lowest quantities but even *asaṁkhyāta* begins at a high enough stage; *ananta* begins at a stage higher still but even the region of *ananta* has an end. This much information should suffice for our present purpose.

62 (42) 18 b, 581 a (both for *ajīva*)

63 (42) 414 b

64 (43) 422 b

65 (43) 23 a

66 (43) 876 b

67 (45) 583 a

68 (45) 457 a

69 (45) 461 a

70 (46) 712 b

71 (52) 356 b

72 (52) 865 a

73 (53) 528 b

74 (60) 642 b

75 (60) 89 a

76 (61) *Samudghāta* is conceived as a process in which a large quantity of Karmic physical particles are expelled at one go. As here enumerated, the first type of *samudghāta* involves the expulsion of *vedanīya-karma*, the second that of *kaṣāya-karma*, the third that of *āyuṣ-karma*, the fourth that of *vaikriyaśarīra-nāmakarma*, the fifth that of *taijasaśarīra-nāmakarma*, the sixth that of *āhāraka-śarīra-nāmakarma*. The seventh type is a special operation which a person undertakes when he is on the eve of attaining *mokṣa* but his *vedanīya-, nāma-*, and *gotra-karmas* happen to be of greater duration than his *āyuṣ-karma*. The operation results in the equating of the duration of the former three types of karma to that of *āyuṣ-karma*. This much information should suffice for our present purpose

77 (67) Sūtra 1-59

78 (68) Sūtra 8-27

79 (68) Sutra 122
80 (68) Sutra 142
81 (68) Sutra 133
82 (68) Sutra 139
83 (68) Sutra 144
84 (68) Sutra 72–114
85 (69) Sutra 14
86 (69) Sutra 146
87 (69) Sutra 147
88 (69) Sutra 145
89 (70) Ibid
90 (70) Ibid
91 (70) Sutra 152
92 (71) Sutra 144
93 (71) Sutra 126
94 (72) Sutra 123
95 (73) Sutra 4
96 (74) Sutra 35
97 (74) Ibid
98 (74) Sutra 26
99 (74) Sutra 38–39
100 (74) *Savvajīvānampi yi naṁ akkharassa aṇaṁtabhāgo niccugghāḍio ciṭṭhai / jai puṇa so'vi āvarijjā teṇa jīvo ajīvattaṁ pāvijjā* / Sutra 42
101 (78) vv. 227–34
102 (83) One more Digambara text needs mention in this connection. It is Mūlācāra attributed to one Vaṭṭakera. It is a miscellaneous collection of twelve discussions conducted at a rather elementary level and mostly devoted to ethical matters but at two places it undertakes an elaborate exposition of philosophical views. [In this respect the text reminds one of the very old Sūtrakṛtāṅga and not the so old Uttarādhyayana]. Thus its fifth chapter, viz Pañcācārādhikāra has a section, viz, Darśanācāra in the course of which there has been given a fairly lengthy description of nine *tattvas*. Again its twelfth chapter, viz. Paryāptyadhikāra is wholly devoted to a philosophical discussion. It proceeds somewhat like Prajñāpanā inasmuch as it takes up for treatment some seventeen topics rather at random but it is definitely a late literary piece because it evinces full acquaintance with 14 *guṇasthānas*, 14 *jīvasthānas*, 14 *mārgaṇāsthānas* — the topic *sthāna* in fact being an exposition of these very three subjects. Nevertheless, Mūlācāra deserves to be studied in the company of Prajñāpanā,

Jīvājīvābhigama and Uttarādhyayana and then it will be easy to see how both the Śvetāmbara and Digambara were in actual possession of the same Āgamic heritage. [It is not unlikely that like Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama Mūlācāra too is not a composition of one author but a collection of texts written by different authors at different periods. But that will only go to enhance the value of its content which mostly seem to be old enough].

103 (86) Bhagavatī 755 b
Prajñāpanā 1558 b
Tattvārtha I, p. 110

104 (86) Tattvārtha I, p. 429 (the corresponding Bhagavatī and Prajñāpanā position being too obvious to need reference).

105 (86) II, p. 161

106 (87) Bhagavatī 159 a
Prajñāpanā 1533 a

107 (87) Bhagavatī 287 a
Prajñāpanā 1175 a
Tattvārtha I, p. 187

108 (87) II, p. 176

109 (87) II, p. 176

110 (87) 286 a

(**Chapter III**)

1 (101) I, 146–210

2 (101) I, 212–368

3 (102) I, 516–583

4 (103) 1.5

5 (104) 2.1

6 (104) 3.49

7 (104) p. 553

8 (118) This chapter deserves study specially because it almost throughout argues from the Jaina standpoint. It is only towards its end that the speaker adopts a tone more appropriate to a Sautrāntika Bhuddhist — perhaps thus preparing the way for the chapter being declared to be a vindication of *ṛjusūtranaya*. Another speciality of the chapter is that it develops certain Vaiśeṣika positions which are unknown to the later texts. For instance, the Vaiśeṣika here argues that an effect exists in its cause even prior to its production but that it is then called absent there because it has not yet been associated with *sattā* — an example of things which exist without being associated with *sattā* being *sāmānya*, *viśeṣa*, *samavāya*. (p. 624, 625).

9 (121) Other such cases occur on pp. 598, 786, 1046, 1057, 1114

10 (128) 1175–1346
11 (128) 3030–3188
12 (128) 3089–3135
13 (129) 2027–26, 2032–33
14 (128) 2021–62
15 (128) 2097–2118
16 (128) 2153–2154
17 (129) 2164–2171
18 (129) 3300–3437
19 (129) 1549–2024
20 (129) 2300–2609
21 (131) 2275–2297
22 (144) E. g. Siddhiviniścaya 1.9
23 (144) A clearest exposition of this view is to be found in Akalaṅka's account of *naigamābhāsa* and *ṛjusūtrābhāsa* — the former criticising the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the latter the Buddhist. The account (to which reference will be made later on) occurs in Pravacanapraveśa, Pramāṇanayapraveśa as well as Siddhiviniścaya.
24 (145) Aṣṭaśatī on Āptamīmāṁsā verse 13.
25 (144) Akalaṅka's most typical references to Brahmavāda occur in his account of *saṅgrahanayābhāsa*. Besides, a passage like Nyāyaviniścaya verse 76 refers to it.
26 (144) *adhyakṣaliṅgataḥ siddham anekātmakam astu sat* /
—Nyāyaviniścaya v. 150
27 (144) E. g. Nyāyaviniścaya v. 117
28 (145) E. g. Nyāyaviniścaya vv. 344 etc.
Pramāṇasaṅgraha vv. 40 etc.
Siddhiviniścaya 6. 22
29 (145) For the Pravacanapraveśa account of *naya*
Laghīyastraya vv. 62–72,
For its account of *nikṣepa*
ibid vv. 73–75.
For the Pramāṇanayapraveśa account of *naya*
Laghīyastraya vv. 30–50
For the Siddhiviniścaya account of *naya*
chapter X and XI,
For its account of *nikṣepa*
chapter XII
30 (146) Laghīyastraya v. 61
31 (146) Ibid v. 10
32 (146) Nyāyaviniścaya v. 469
33 (146) Pramāṇasaṅgraha v. 2

34 (147) E. g. Nyāyaviniścaya v v. 50–100

35 (147) 9. 38–43;
11. 4–5

36 (147) Siddhiviniścaya 4. 13–14
Nyāyaviniścaya vv. 225–229

37 (147) Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika God in Siddhiviniścaya 7. 12
Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Soul in Siddhiviniścaya 4. 15
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38 (147) Siddhiviniścaya 7. 28–29
Nyāyaviniścaya vv. 416–21

39 (147) Siddhiviniścaya Chapter VIII;
Nyāyaviniścaya vv. 406–15

40 (150) For Sāṅkhya I, 150–59;
For Buddhism I, 178–210.

41 (150) II, 117; II, 120–21

42 (150) For Nyāya II, 159–61
For Vaiśeṣika II, 161–62

43 (151) A close study of the following Tattvārthaślokavārtika passages will be instructive:
I, 206–10; 271–86, 600–30;
II, 125–43.
The relevant Aṣṭasahasrı passages — not only on this subject but on most others as well — can be detected without much difficulty.

44 (152) II, 573–81

45 (152) II, 175–93

46 (153) II, 324–60

47 (154) V, 400–88

48 (154) III, 609–32

49 (154) IV, 73–93

50 (154) I, 212–60

51 (157) Nyāyakumudacandra, p. 403. For Vidyānanda's reading Tattvārthaślokavārtika III, 634

52 (158) Of course, Abhayadeva here speaks of Siddhasena etc. but that does not materially alter the point; (Gandhahasti was a name under which Siddhasena was often referred to by later authors).

53 (161) *saṅgrahaś ca viśeṣavinirmoko'śuddhaviṣayavinirmokaś ca ityādir yathāsaṁbhavam upādeyaḥ* / Nayarahasya p. 89

54 (161) For the Sanmati version Nayarahasya p. 117; for the Āptamīmāṁsā version Nayāmṛtataraṅgiṇī on v. 6 (where Syādvādaratnākara is actually quoted).
Anekāntavyavasthā II, 243 makes use of both versions.

55 (161) Thus Anekāntavayavasthā I, p. 59 says about *naigama* : *trividho hy ayam ākarādāv udāhriyate* etc.; (*ākara* = Syādvādaratnākara).

56 (162) Nayarahasya p. 134
Nayopadeśa vv. 48-52, v. 80
Anekāntavyavasthā II, 191

57 (162) *paṭādigatais tvaktrāṇādibhiḥ paraparyāyair asadbhāvenārpito'kumbho bhaṇyate, kumbhe kumbhatvānavacchedakadharmāvacchinnākumbhatva-sattvāt* / Nayarahasya p. 118

The implicit reference to the Navya-Nyāya position in question is here all too obvious.

58 (163) *yathā naiyāyikair iṣṭā citre'nekaikarūpadhīḥ /*
naya-pramāṇabhedena sarvatraiva tathā'rhataḥ // Nayopadeśa v. 7

59 (163) A good example of Yaśovijaya's vacillation in his attempt to get at the meaning of that obscure Sanmati verse '*evaṁ sattaviyappo vayaṇapaho*' etc. He undertakes it twice — once in Anekāntavyavasthā II, 246 and then in Nayāmṛtataraṁgiṇī on v. 6—but the difficulty concerned remains essentially unresolved.

60 (163) Nayopadeśa v. 79; Anekāntavyavasthā II, 195.

61 (164) Nayāmṛtataraṅgiṇī on v. 110

62 (164) Nayāmṛtataraṅgiṇī on v. 16

63 (164) pp. 11 etc.

64 (164) pp. 23 etc.

65 (164) pp. 33 etc.

* * *

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बिक्री के नियम

(१ अप्रैल १९७१ से)

१. पुस्तक-बिक्रेताओं को ला. द. ग्रन्थमाला (L. D. Series) के प्रकाशनों पर साधारणतः २५ प्रतिशत कमीशन दिया जायगा ।

२. १,००० रु० या इससे अधिक के एककालिक आर्डर पर रेलभाड़ा तथा पैकिंग नहीं लिया जायगा ।

३. वर्ष भर (१ अप्रैल से ३१ मार्च) में ५,००० रु० या इससे अधिक की पुस्तकें खरीदने पर नियम १ में उल्लिखित कमीशन के अतिरिक्त ५ प्रतिशत अधिक और १०,००० रु० या इससे अधिक की पुस्तकें खरीदने पर १० प्रतिशत अधिक कमीशन वर्ष के अन्त में दिया जायगा। इस कमीशन की रकम नगद नहीं दी जायगी किन्तु आगामी वर्ष के बिल या बिलों में से काट दी जायगी ।

४. बिल भेजने के बाद एक मास की अवधि में पेमेन्ट हो जाना चाहिए ।